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The photo on the front page was taken late autumn 
1993 in the basement on Goncharnaia street 8 in 
St.Petersburg. It was the night patrol of the German 
organisation “Psalm – 23” who established contact 
with Sergei Shelaiev (12 years) and Sergei Voronin 
(16 years). The younger Sergei, who had an alcoholic 
mother and no father, died only 4 months later after a 
fall from the 7th floor in a building (near Vitebskii 
railroad station) where he used to stay overnight in the 
attic. The fate of the older Sergei was equally sad. 
Half a year later, when searching for a place to sleep 
in a cellar, he was shot with a gas pistol by junkies 
and lost 80 percent of his sight. In 1997 he was 
sentenced for robbery and sent to a colony (prison). 
There all traces of Sergei end.   
(Source: Dr Sereda’s personal archives) 





This thesis is born out of a desire to learn more about the causal circumstances associated 
with the deep and protracted humanitarian crisis that so detrimentally has affected the life of 
tens of millions of people in the post-Soviet countries.  
 
This thesis also represents a lifetime interest and engagement in Russian affairs starting with a 
youthful curiosity and determination to understand Russia on its own terms, so to speak. From 
this grew studies in History, Musicology and Russian, which, in turn, were rewarded with a 
scholarship to Brezhnev’s and Andropov’s Leningrad. A Cand. Phil. thesis in Russian music 
history was one tangible result of this stay. Later, the prospects of thriving contacts between 
the Soviet Union and the West inspired me to study business management. But instead of 
progress, the modernisation drive that Gorbachev had initiated soon ended in chaos and 
prolonged economic decline, turning Russia into a second-rate nation. Personally, I actually 
“earned my bread” from commercial work with Russians during this period and had a few 
rather interesting experiences. From the mid-nineties, however, humanitarian work has been 
my profession, and the post-Soviet countries my main area of responsibility. My current job 
has therefore provided abundant opportunities for “specialisation” in social and organisational 
effects of the collapse of the USSR. Included in this have been numerous visits to the many 
run-down apartments in Russia which typically are inhabited by alcoholics, as well as 
conversations with children who have experienced various degrees of suffering due to 
parental and societal neglect.  
 
If this thesis is to be dedicated to someone, it must be to those children who are at the end of 
the chain of destitution, those who have escaped intolerable conditions at home or in 
institutions only to end up on the street, in a living hell of intoxicants, alcohol, drugs, bitter 
cold and hunger, sickness, abuse, and crime. 
 
The above is an attempt to explain why I “had to” adopt such a broad approach to my Master 
thesis in History. The work has indeed been challenging and I am therefore obliged to those 
who have helped me. First of all I owe great thanks to Professor Vasilii M. Sereda for his 
advice and assistance. As an “outreach” paediatrician and organiser of various shelters for 
street children in St.Petersburg, Dr Sereda has, since the late 1980s, followed the plight of 
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Russian street children at closer range and with more competent and compassionate eyes than 
perhaps anyone else. Furthermore, I would like to thank my supervisor, Professor Åsmund 
Egge, who has been very useful as a discussion partner. Thanks also to the researchers 
Victoria Telina and Aileen Espíritu at the Barents Institute in Kirkenes for the assistance I 
have received. Furthermore, I am grateful to my employer for understanding and many 
colleagues for support. Finally, my wife should be thanked for indulgence.  
 
All primary sources and much of the literature in this study are in Russian. Original language 
fragments are only included in the text when necessary as a supplement to my translations of 
the original citations. Whereas Russian titles of the secondary sources are indicated in the 
footnotes, the normative documents referred to are translated into English. In the 
bibliography, however, all Russian titles are with English translations. I have used the British 
Standard System of transliteration from Russian, but kept the Latin letter “y” for the Cyrillic 
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The rationale and the research objectives of the thesis 
One of the less studied and acknowledged consequences of the disintegration of the USSR 
and the establishment of post-Soviet Russia is the emergence of the “third wave” of vagrant 
and homeless children in Russian history.1 Although the manifestation of large cohorts of 
street children must be one of the most alarming and noticeable symptoms of crisis in any 
modern society,2 the specific circumstances around the significant growth, presumably from 
around 1990, in the number of seriously neglected children in Russia seems to have attracted 
little if any historical research, both internationally and in Russia.3 
Thus, the overall research objective of the thesis is to analyse the causal relationship 
between, on the one hand, the late Soviet and early post-Soviet societal development, and, on 
the other, the evolving street-children problem. In terms of timeframe, the thesis mainly 
explores developments in Russia from 1985 (when Gorbachev came to power) until 1996 
(when the post-Soviet framework conditions for child neglect became virtually irreversible as 
a result of the presidential elections of that year). However, several of the examinations of 
concrete child-neglect determinants will narrow their perspective to include only the period 
from 1987 (when Gorbachev embarked on radical reforms) or occasionally from a later point 
of time (due to lack of available sources).  
In Russia, there seems to be a tendency to regard the emergence of mass child neglect 
during this period as a more or less inevitable result of a socio-economic crisis.4 Although 
                                               
1
 In Russian public debate it is common to talk about three different waves of mass child homelessness and 
vagrancy in the 20th century. This view has for example been articulated by the Russian Minister of Internal 
Affairs (MVD), Rashid Nurgaliev, speaking before the government in June 2005: “Presently, Russia experiences 
the third wave of homelessness among minors (tret’ia volna bezprizornosti) after the Civil War and the Great 
Fatherland War.” MVD Press Service, 01 June 2005. http://www.mvd.ru/about/press/3466/?print (24.10.2007) 
2
 “Street children” denote minors who find themselves in a process of physical and social displacement 
characterised by extreme parental and societal neglect, such as deprivations (e.g. lack of food and shelter, lack of 
heating and cloths, lack of healthcare, lack of education and vocational training; lack of standard socialisation; 
lack of elementary care and love); and exposure to hazards (e.g. diseases and infections; alcohol, inhalants and 
drugs abuse; others and own criminal acts etc.). While “neglected children”, along with “street children”, are 
frequently used in the thesis, also other English words may appear, like “at-risk children”, “homeless”, ”vagrant” 
“displaced”, “disadapted”, “unattended”, and “waifs”. In this way it is possible to reflect various stages of, and 
causalities leading to, the actual street children phenomenon, but also to enable a degree of linguistic variation. 
For the Russian words “besprizornik” and “beznadzornik”, see page 14.  
3
 Typically, in its review of child homelessness in Russian history, the publication, Sirotstvo i Besprizornost’ v 
Rossii. Istoria i Sovremennost’ (ed. L.P. Bogdanov, St Petersburg, 2008), contains no actual analysis of the 
causalities of the last street-children wave in Russia. Yet its photo documentation speaks where words are silent. 
4
 S.N.Smorgunova, Preduprezhdenie bezprizornosti sredi detei i podrostkov v Rossii (20-90-e gg XX v), 
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moving beyond such a “mechanical” interpretation, I will carefully analyse economic and 
social factors, when reviewing determinants of the evolving street children problem. 
However, viewing political and organisational aspects of the system shift as the ultimate 
determinants of the child welfare crisis that occurred in Russia, I will pay considerable 
attention to processes and dilemmas at the top political levels of both the late Soviet Union 
and the first post-Soviet years.  
According to Soviet and post-1991 Russian legislation alike, the pivotal role in child-
protection work in Russia was assigned to the Commissions for the Affairs of Minors 
(Komissii po Delam Nesovershennoletnikh, KDN). This child protection institute thus acquires 
double actuality for the thesis. First, in its capacity as coordinating organ for all other 
agencies involved in prevention of child neglect, as well as in its capacity as agency assessing 
individual child-neglect cases, the KDN institute is definitely within the scope of the thesis. 
Second, as a societal institute spanning the Soviet and post-Soviet periods in Russia, the 
Commissions for the Affairs of Minors conveniently provides a topic for evaluating the effect 
of the politico-organisational (i.e. systemic) changes on the country’s child protection system.  
Therefore, while the scope and magnitude of the evolving street children phenomenon (i.e. 
child-neglect scale) represents one research topic, the changing effectiveness of KDN (i.e. 
KDN capacity) constitutes a second research topic.5  
As far as the issue of continuity or rupture from Soviet to post-Soviet reality is 
concerned, the role of the Communist Party (in the thesis referred to as CPSU or Party) is 
undoubtedly of crucial importance. The Party was ultimately and solely responsible for the 
organisation of all aspects of Soviet society, child-protection work and KDN included. If the 
chaos and anarchy that increasingly characterised the late Soviet era, and in particular post-
Soviet Russia, is largely associated with the organisational vacuum that arose from the rapid 
and unredressed disappearance of the Party from the historical scene, a logical consequence of 
the collapse of the USSR should also be an enfeebled KDN. Focusing on the politico-
organisational aspects of the break-up of the Soviet Union, the specific research objective of 
the thesis will therefore be to assess the assumption that the weakening and eventual 
dissolution of the CPSU contributed to an accelerating disorganisation of KDN, thereby 
sharpening the effects of the socio-economic downturn on Russian child protection. 
                                                                                                                                                   
Candidate thesis in Pedagogic, (Vladimir: 1977), 1: “The direct dependence between socio-economic indicators 
and the scale of the street children phenomenon is sufficiently evidently and patently manifested in the 
respective historical time spans of any country”.  
5
 By “research topic” is understood a focus area that will be maintained throughout the analyses of the thesis. 
Undoubtedly interesting also in the overall perspective of the thesis, the research topics serves as a longitudinal 
source of information when addressing the overall and specific research objectives of the thesis.  
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The conceptual framework and the methodology of the thesis 
With regard to child vagrancy and homelessness, 20th century Russian history can provide 
examples of a range of various causalities. Different crisis situations, such as revolution, war, 
natural disasters, state violence, and, finally, the abrupt system change, have evidently 
occasioned mass child displacement as one of several tragic consequences. The complexity of 
these phenomena, along with the relatively low research interest in child issues, might 
perhaps explain why no generalised hypothesis has been deduced in terms of causality of 
mass child displacement. However, for any historic research, a consistent terminology and a 
theoretical reference framework are required. I therefore suggest the Child-Neglect Flow 
Chart,6 supported by the Child-Neglect Indicator Table,7 as the conceptual framework for the 
thesis. 
The methodology reflected in this conceptual framework is developed on the basis of 
elements from public-health sociology in combination with knowledge of mass child neglect 
in Russian history. 8  As it appears from Annex 1, child-neglect environment constitutes the 
societal context within manifested child-neglect phenomena are generated. The term child-
neglect environment includes principally therefore those conceivable determinants, which, 
within a given historical context, possess the capacity of influencing formation and 
modification of the manifested child-neglect phenomena. Determinants can be expressed in a 
number of specific, measurable and/or describable indicators, (possibly grouped in 
dimensions and categories – as the examples of indicators suggested in Annex 2). While 
determinants are factors of a causal level, the manifested child-neglect phenomena belongs to 
the resultative level, constituting the actual incidence, in a specific historical context, of 
neglected children, including these children’s social, medical, psychological criminological 
and anthropological etc. characteristics.  
Finally, feedback is provided from the manifested child-neglect phenomena to the 
society at large (i.e. the child-neglect environment). This feedback has the potential of 
influencing public and politicians, thus prompting preventive child-neglect measures.9 In the 
                                               
6
 Annex 1, page 121. 
7
 Annex 2, page 122.  
8
 There is an established social research tradition building on “social determinant”, see for example Michael 
Marmot and, Richard Wilkinson, Social Determinants of health, (Oxford: University Press 2006), and Dominic 
Richardson, Petra Hoelscher and Jonathan Bradshaw, “Child Well-Being in Central and Eastern European 
Countries (CEE) and the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS),” in Child Indicators Research, 1, 2 (2008) 
211-250.  Expanding on this research, I have introduced terms like “overall child determinants,” (i.e. overall 
societal factors impacting the child-neglect environment), along with the terms “macro and micro determinants 
of child neglect”, (i.e. measurable determinants of macro-social and family level character). 
9
 By “preventive measures” are understood any initiative or programme, organised by the state, by non-
governmental organisations or individuals, aimed at protecting and supporting neglected children.  
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thesis, preventive measures are largely represented by the Commissions for the Affairs of 
Minors, KDN. The dimension “preventive measures” have, however, a dual function. On the 
one hand, the KDN child-protection institute evidently evolved under strong impact of the 
general societal development, and therefore belongs to the resultative level. On the other 
hand, within the Child-Neglect Flow Chart, KDN functions causally along with the specific 
child-neglect determinants within the street children environment (since KDN at a given point 
of time impacts the manifested child-neglect phenomena by modifying the child-neglect 
environment).10 Depending on the context, KDN will therefore be considered in both of these 
perspectives.  
Ideally, the application of this methodological model on a historical study should 
entail a year-by-year survey of all conceivable indicators that are relevant from the 
perspective of the methodology of the child-neglect Flow Chart.11 While attempting to focus 
on particularly potent and characteristic indicators, the theses has limited itself according to 
its scope and availability of the sources.  
 
The structure of the thesis 
In the 1990s, street children became a permanent and acknowledged part of the life in several 
Russian cities.12  However, as will be discussed further below, details concerning causalities 
as well as scale and trends of the street-children problem remain largely unknown. Also the 
KDN institute and how it was affected by transition crisis has practically speaking escaped 
any research interest. Consequently, there is only very limited research devoted to the topics 
of the thesis, and there are few statistics, which can be of help.13 What is beyond any doubt, 
however, is the fact that a new significant street-children problem emerged from around 1990.  
                                                                                                                                                   
 
10
 The study of KDN, within the conceptual framework of the Child-Neglect Flow Chart, illustrates the notion 
necessary and sufficient causality. The matter of the logic is that changes in the street children environment do 
represent merely a necessary, but not sufficient, causality relative to manifestable changes at the level of the 
street children phenomena. In principle, necessary causal factors can be checked and balanced by preventive 
measures. Critical for the emergence of a child neglect crisis is therefore to what extent the measures carried out 
tackle the consequences of a deteriorating street-children environment. Hence, the absence of adequate 
preventive measures constitutes a sufficient causality for generating increased child-neglect in society.  
11
 In Annex II, a range of imaginable indicators of child neglect determinant as well as other indicators of the 
research model are suggested. Needless to say, the thesis does not intend to explore but a few of these indicators. 
12
 IN 2003, the Historian and deputy director of the Centre of Sociological Studies at the Russian Ministry of 
Education, A.L. Arefiev, wrote that street children have become “an integral part of the common life and a 
characteristic symbol of post-Soviet Russia.” Arefiev shares with his readers that the estimates (as per 1.1. 2002) 
of the street-children scale (i.e. the magnitude of the problem) in Russia vary from 1.1-1.13 Mill (“according to 
data from the Government”) via 2-2.5 mill (“according to MVD and the General Procuracy”) to 3-4 Mill 
(“according to The Soviet Federatsii and independent experts”). A.L Arefiev. “Besprizornye Deti Rossii,” 
Sociologicheskie Issledovania 9 (2002), 61. 
13
 As a curiosity can be mentioned that, of a total of 21 presentations at a “scientific-practical” conference in 
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In order to tackle this information drought, the thesis applies a two-pronged approach; 
one represented by the causal level, the other by the manifested or resultative level of the 
research model. Hence, in order to chart causes as well as manifestations of child neglect to 
the extent possible, both levels are subject to extensive analysis by the thesis. Structurally, the 
two levels are linked together by two pairs of working hypotheses.  
In more detail, the thesis is structured as follows: Chapter 2 outlines mass child-
neglect experiences from earlier periods of Soviet history. The focus is on causalities as well 
as on the way in which authorities and society responded to the problem. This chapter forms a 
historical, organisational and cultural backdrop against which the recent wave of child neglect 
can be understood. Chapter 3 presents overall political and organisational determinants of 
child neglect, associated with the political history of the years 1985 to 1996. The basic 
assumption of the chapter is that both Gorbachev and Yeltsin were facing real alternatives 
when they decided on their strategies and policies. The decisions they finally made were 
therefore to provide the framework for the child-neglect environment of the period.  Chapter 4 
presents a detailed account of economic and social determinants at macro and family level for 
the evolving child neglect problem. At the end of the chapter, four working hypotheses are 
framed, encapsulating causalities established by the thesis, and, on the basis of these 
causalities, inferring developments at the resultative level of the research model:  
Hypotheses concerning: Subperiod  1 Subperiod  2 
Child Neglect Scale 1987- August 1991 (i.e. “1991”) Post-August  1991 (i.e. “1992”) -1996 
KDN Capacity 1987- August 1991 (i.e. “1991”) Post-August  1991 (i.e. “1992”) -1996 
 
Whereas Chapter 5 assesses the hypotheses with the help of normative documents (legislative 
sources) and secondary sources, Chapter 6 assesses the hypotheses by scrutinising primary 
sources linked to the work of KDN. Finally, Chapter 7 consolidates the key findings of the 
thesis and updates the hypotheses. The chapter also indicates outstanding research issues and 
comments on the degree to which the research objectives of the thesis have been reached.  
 
Bibliography  
The review of the literature and discussion of sources for the thesis following below is 
organised in accordance with the structural elements and chapters of the thesis.  
                                                                                                                                                   
St.Petersburg in October 2008, the author of this thesis, who was alone as foreigner at the conference, was the 
only one giving a paper on the recent Russian street children wave from a causal perspective, including the role 
of KDN. Karsten Solheim, “Raspad SSSR. Novaia Volna Besprizornosti. Metodologicheskie podkhody k 
izucheniiu dannoi problemy,” in Besprizornost’ i beznadzornost’ v Rossii: istoria i sovremennost’. Materialy 
nauchno-prakticheskoi konferentsii, ed. Mishenkova, (St. Petersburg. Liki Rosii 2009) 83-93. 
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The methodology of the thesis (Chapter 1):  
For this thesis, I could not identify any established methodology for the study of the causal 
chain from top political decisions, via economic and social repercussions, and down to the 
conditions for at-risk children.14 The methodology suggested is therefore a result of years of 
pondering on how to approach the modern street children phenomenon in Russia from a 
historical angle. What I have arrived at is an attempt to secure a holistic approach to historical 
change, combining politics, economics and sociology, on the one hand; and research 
traditions focusing on the living conditions for people at the bottom of the social hierarchy, on 
the other. In general, both schools are broadly represented in the historiography of the past 
several decades. But as indicated, a study of the recent wave of Russian street children from 
this perspective has probably not yet been undertaken. 
The survey of child-neglect issues in Soviet history (Chapter 2):  
Depending on political conjunctures and causalities, mass child neglect and displacement in 
Soviet-Russian history has been treated very differently in the literature. The first period after 
the Russian revolution, that is, until Stalin’s social upheavals around 1930, has been studied 
relatively thoroughly in this regard. This relates both to Russian and Western scholar 
publications. With the onset of Stalinism, access to sources and unbiased information 
pertaining to controversial issues was virtually blocked until the end of the Soviet era. One 
may assume that the lack of willingness to let child-protection issues of the 1930s be 
subjected to impartial research was associated with the fact that these problems, contrary to 
what had been the case during the preceding decade, were mainly caused by political actions 
by the Soviet leadership itself. Interestingly enough, in spite of the radically improved 
accessibility of sources after 1990, also post-Soviet researchers seem to have been somehow 
reluctant to explore child displacement topics of the pre-War years.   
                                               
14
 The third wave of street children in Russia emerged in a unique historical context. An industrialised society, in 
a matter of short time, collapsed in peacetime, causing massive social dislocation. Although literature on street 
children and child neglect worldwide could not be exhaustively reviewed for this study, it seems that research on 
causalities of street children outside the context of the Soviet collapse can have only limited relevance for the 
methodological approach I have chosen. Rosaria Franco, Social Order and Social policies towards Displaced 
Children: The Soviet Case (1917-1953), PhD Thesis in History (Manchester, University, 2006), 12-13, provides 
arguably indirect support for this view. On the one hand, Franco regards street children as “homeless children, 
typically for societies going though a process of modernisation.” (This builds, as also Franco underlines, on 
definitions used by UNICEF since the UN Year of the Child in 1979.) On the other hand, Franco perceives child 
homelessness in developed societies both in association with a “difficult personality” (“delinquency, alcoholism, 
drug abuse and prostitution”) and with the “injustice” (…) “underlying the existing social order.” In other words, 
in spite of certain communalities of a general nature between the Soviet and non-Soviet context, the causal 
circumstances of extreme child neglect in Franco’s abovementioned examples appear, to the author of this thesis, 
to lie far beyond the situation associated with the abrupt collapse of the extremely centralised and indeed very 
specific Soviet state.  
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A completely different attitude to child displacement as a public topic and an area of 
research, especially on part of the Soviet establishment, has been seen regarding the Second 
World War. The social problems caused by this cataclysm were evidently beyond Soviet 
responsibility. Thus, the fate of children who were displaced following war and occupation, as 
well as of minors who continued a vagrant life during the first post-war years, has been 
studied reasonably well. Western research in this field, on the contrary, seems to be limited.15 
When moving to the post-Stalin and Brezhnev years, it appears as if little proper 
historical research has been conducted. Certainly, there exist psychological and socio-medical 
studies examining the life of “disadapted children.”16 But there seems to be no research work 
exploring the dynamics of child neglect in light of economic and social processes from the 
mid-1950s to the mid 1980s, such as the continued forced industrialisation which, inter alia,  
entailed extensive migration, but presumably also increased alcohol consumption.17 Soviet-
Russian literature covering this period seems first of all to be of normative or of campaigning 
character.18 As far as Western research is concerned, the only scholar that has demonstrated 
interest in this period, albeit primarily as a background for a more deep-ploughing scrutiny of 
child-welfare issues during and after Perestroika, is the English professor Judith Harding.19 
 
 
                                               
15
 Franco, Social Order and Social policies towards Displaced Children, is the latest and most comprehensive 
study of Russian mass child neglect of the period 1917-1953. The work itself, and in particular its extensive 
literature list, reflects, however, the uneven amount of research and attention devoted to child-neglect issues of 
the various periods of Soviet history: There seems to be an emphasis, both in the text volume and in particular on 
the number of references cited, on the 1920s, and less coverage of the 1930s and the 1940s. Also other works 
referred to in my historical review of Soviet child-neglect issues reflects this fact: e.g. Margaret Stolee, 
“Homeless Children in the USSR, 1917-1957”, Soviet Studies 40, 1 (1988): 64-83; Laurie Bernstein, “Fostering 
the next generation of socialists: Partonirovanie in the Fledgling Soviet State,” Journal of Family History 26, 
No1 (2001):66-89; and Alan Ball, “State Children: Soviet Russia’s Bezprizornye and the New Socialist 
Generation,” The Russian Review 52, April (1993): 228-247.   
16
 Vasilii M. Sereda, Zdorov’e desadaptirovannykh detei i puti sovershenstvovaniia mediko-social’noi pomoschi 
v sovremennykh usloviaiakh, Doctoral Dissertation in Social Medicine, (St Petersburg, The University of St 
Petersburg, 2005), 89-90, states that, in the 1940s and 50s, there were “extremely little research work” related to 
the subject of street children, while in the 1960s and 70s there was an “intensification in the research activities”. 
The focus of this research, however, was not on child neglect as such, but on “deviant behaviour of minors.” 
17
 In her historical study of the legal conditions for Russian children in the family and in society, the Leading 
specialist at the Russian academy of Science, A.M. Nechayeva, Rossiia i ieio deti, (Moscow, 2000), is indeed 
brief in her review of the period 1945 -1989. Only 12 of totally 240 pages are devoted to this these more than 
four decades and no reference to secondary literature is indicated.   
18
 See for example the rather optimistic description of social community workers efforts in Iu.N. Iemel’ianov, et 
al., Obshchestvennye vospitateli nesovershennoletnykh. (Moscow: Iuridicheskaia Literatura, 1974)  
19
 The Professor of social welfare studies at the University of Sussex, Judith Harwin, has written the apparently 
only major Western study that reviews vulnerable Russian children throughout the 20th century with a degree of 
holistic historical perspective. The work is the result of field studies in the late USSR and early post-Soviet 
Russia and contains valuable sources for my thesis. However, Harwin’s interest seems first of all to be 
concentrated on various forms of care arrangements and social service provision. Harwin, Children of the 
Russian State, (Aldershot: Avebury, 1995). 
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The overall determinants of child neglect (Chapter 3):  
There is no lack of publications devoted to the political development during Gorbachev and 
Yeltsyn. These works undertake frequent forays into economic and social issues in order to 
find support for their reasoning. In addition, there are numerous specialised studies 
concerning different aspects of the transition period such as economy, the crime, the role of 
the oligarchs etc. Some of the literature, both Russian and Western, tends to be somehow 
partisan, that is, in favour of one of or both of the main protagonists of the period. However, 
there are also authors who are strongly critical of either Gorbachev or Yeltsin, or both. 20 
The survey of macro and micro determinants of child neglect (Chapter 4):  
In its examination of economic and social determinants of child neglect, the thesis is 
particularly obliged to the UNICEF reporting on transitional Eastern Europe,21 but also to 
other research initiatives that larger institutions conducted.22 When it comes to particular 
aspects of the social consequences of the transition, in particular social-medical aspects, these 
appear to be well examined. Many of these issues, such as for example life expectancy, 
suicide rates, social diseases like tuberculosis and others, can not be considered as 
determinant of child neglect, but rather as concurrent phenomena. One aspect that has been 
subjected to considerable analyses, although consensus as to the actual per-capital 
consumption hardly has been reached, is the question of alcohol.23 Other significant 
determinants of child neglect, like child abuse and drug addition, on the contrary, seem to 
have been studied only to a limited degree.24  
                                               
20
 The internationally most active advocate of the Russian “Capitalist Revolution” seems to be the Swedish-
American researcher, Anders Åslund. See e.g. Åslund, Russia’s Capitalist Revolution, (Washington D.C.: 2007). 
Evidently, Åslund strongly celebrates the overall outcome of this Revolution (and might therefore be slightly 
indulgent in his evaluation of Yeltsin’s performance, with whom he had worked as an adviser in the early 
nineties). His works contain, however, invaluable sources of information. A Russian counterpart of Åslund in 
terms of a certain apologetic approach to Yeltsin’s rule is found in the works of the official guardian of the 
central Russian State Archives, Rudolf G. Rudolf. See Pikhoia, Moskva. Kreml’. Vlast’. Dve Istorii Odnoi 
Strany. Rossiia na izlome tyciacheletii. 1985-2005. (Moscow 2007). On the other extreme of the spectre we find 
authors like Peter Reddaway and Dmitrii Glinski, 2001, The Tragedy of Russia’s Reforms. Market Bolshevism 
against Democracy. Washington: 2001, who tend to be particularly critical of Yeltsin. Conversely, the Russian 
professor Igor Froianov, Pogruzhenie v bezdnu. (Rossiia na ishode XX veka), (St.Petersburg: 1999), clearly 
regards Gorbachev as the culprit and traitor of the Russian people. A perhaps more balanced position is taken by 
authors like Stephen Kotkin in: Armageddon Averted: The Soviet Collapse, 1970-2000   (Oxford: 2001). 
21
 UNICEF’s research on the transition societies, beginning from the early nineties, is considerable. The 
weakness of these reports is perhaps that they mostly seem to be based on official statistics (see note 201, p.52).  
As will be discussed in this thesis, official social and other statistics from this period can often be largely non-
exhaustive. For the complete UNICEF transition reports, see:  http://www.unicef-irc.org/databases/transmonee/  
22
 See e.g. Dabrowski, Marek and Razislawa, Gortat 2002, Political and Economic Institutions, Growth and 
Poverty – Experience of Transition Countries. UN Development Programme. Occasional Paper, Background for 
the UN Human Development Report 2002. Warsaw: Center for Social and Economic research, 2002. 
23
 E.g. A.V. Nemcov, ”Suicides and alcohol consumption in Russia, 1965-1999”. Drug and Alcohol 
Dependence, 71 (2): (2003) 161-168. 
24
 Russian studies like Galina Yegoshina, Sekusal’nye posjagatel’stva na maloletnykh i nesovershennoletnikh i 
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Normative sources and secondary research material (Chapter 5):  
It has not been possible to establish a complete list of all relevant laws, decrees and other 
normative documents adapted by central Soviet and Russian authorities over the period 1985-
1996. It would moreover go far beyond the scope of the thesis to give an exhaustive review of 
all of them.25 However, the normative documents discussed in Chapter 5 are selected on the 
basis of references in the literature, as well as of the availability of the sources on the Internet, 
and should therefore reflect the most relevant normative documents.  
Research conducted on manifestations of the child-neglect phenomenon seems to be 
limited. There are in particular only very few western publications touching upon legislative 
and political aspects of the child-protection issues of the 1980s and 90s.26 Some of the 
Russian academic publications with a certain historical approach are definitively of interest.27 
The same can be said also about other Russian publications and reports,28 and not least about 
the background/analytic parts of most normative documents analysed in this thesis.  
Primary sources linked to KDN (Chapter 6):  
An exhaustive study of the impact of the Soviet collapse on the Commissions for the Affairs 
of Minors, KDN, including an analysis of how KDN tackled the growing number of seriously 
neglected children, would ideally require a broad investigation into documentary sources 
associated with the work of this key child-protection institute in several regions across 
Russia.29 Obviously, this could not be done as part of this thesis.  
In fact, even to get access to primary sources related to the work of KDN in a small 
selection of administrative entities in Russia was a challenging task.30 As part of these efforts, 
I have made several inquires to persons who had published material that somehow was related 
                                                                                                                                                   
ikh preduprzhdenie. Candidate Dissertation in Law. (Joshkar-Ola: Marijskij State University 1999), seem to lack 
a systematic presentation of statistic as well as documented longitudinal trends.  
25
 At central Russian level, only from 1994 to 1995, four presidential decrees and thirty ministerial legislative 
orders were published on educational matters. Conf. The National Action Plan in the Interest of children 
approved through Presidential decree No 942 of 14.9.95. (More on this decree on page 85) 
26
 Harwin, Children of the Russian State, has already been mentioned as an important source for my thesis. 
Anthropological works like C. Fujimora, Russia's Abandoned Children: An Intimate Understanding, (London, 
Pager, 2005) have been consulted for the study, but did not appear to contain much specific information of 
relevance for my approach to the subject.  
27
 E.g. A.M. Nechayeva, Rossiia i ieio deti. (See footnote 17 above). 
28
 See e.g. A. Likhachev et. al (ed.) Polozhenie Detei v Rossii 1992 g (Social’nyi Portret), Moscow (1993), a 
report issued by the Russian Children’s Fond to monitor the commitments that Russia had made under the UN 
Convention on the Rights of the Child. 
29
 By “regions” are here understood “subjects” (including “oblast” – county) of the RSFSR or the Russian 
Federation”. The sub-entity of regions is “raion” (municipality), which exist both in districts and in big cities. In 
Arkhangelsk city, the city municipalities are called “okrugy” (plural of okrug).  
30
 Such difficulties may possibly have to do with the currently prevailing atmosphere in Russia: Not least 
amongst Russian officials there appears to exist a certain distrust towards foreigners and their motives. In the 
case of this study, such a scepticism may perhaps be nurtured by an intuitive understanding that a probe into the 
recent child-neglect problems of the country hardly can contribute to improving the image of Russia. 
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to the work of KDN.31 In the end, however, KDN-related sources could be accessed only in 
Leningrad/St Petersburg32 and in Arkhangelsk. The analyses of KDN’s work will therefore 
concentrate on these two regions.33 For unclear reasons, it was impossible to get access to 
unbroken, annual series of material related to the period under study. Neither were documents 
pertaining to certain of KDN’s statutory areas of responsibility found in the archive material 
(such as political initiatives aimed at improving the child welfare, or proceedings related to 
the coordination of agencies involved in child-protection work). Apart from a few archive 
files pertaining to KDNs handling of mostly disciplinary cases against children and their 
parents, the material accessed consists therefore of annual reports on KDN’s work in a 
number of raions within the two abovementioned Russian regions.34   
 
 
                                               
31
 I have corresponded with researchers in so different regions as Omsk oblast in Siberia, the republic Chuvashia 
on the river Volga in central Russia, the metropolis Leningrad/St Petersburg in the western part of the country, as 
well as Arkhangelsk oblast and city in north-west Russia. In addition, I have inquired through a professor of 
history in St Petersburg whether it was feasible to access MVD (militia) archives regarding vagrant minors 
detained in the Temporary Isolation Centres for Juvenile Delinquents (formerly Reception and Distribution 
Centres). Although this historian is well connected, the attempt was futile. 
32
 The city on the Neva has seen its name changed repeatedly. The last time was in June 1991, when a majority 
of voters chose to restore the name "Saint Petersburg."   
33
 For Leningrad/St.Petersburg the following material has been accessed: 1) Annual reports from the work of 
KDN in Kalininskii rayon (1990: 511,900 inhabitants; the population data are taken from: Sankt Petersburg: 
Federal’naia sluzhba gosudarsvennoi statistiki, 2006) for the years 1985-1991, as well as for 1996 to 2005. 2) 
Annual reports for the work of KDN in Leninskii rayon and Oktiabrskii raion (1991: 219,500) for the period 
including the years 1989-1993. 3) Archive material from the proceedings of Krasnogvardeiskii raion (1990: 
371,400) for the period 1989-1991 (this material includes only files from examination of individual child 
protection cases).  
For Arkhangelsk have been accessed: 1) Survey of annual aggregated data for KDN in Arkhangelsk oblast for 
1975 as well as for the years 1985-1988.  2) Annual reports and some additional material (mostly various 
comments and specifications to the annual reports), have been accessed for a number of okrugi of Arkhangelsk 
city as well for some raions of Arkhangelsk oblast. The okrugi Oktiabrskii (2002: 85,044 inhabitants) and 
Solombalskii (2002: 37,160) are represented with annual reports and some additional material for 1985-1988, 
including Varvarino-Faktoria (36,392) and Maimanskii (24,701). From Arkhangelsk oblast, the raions 
Belomorskii, Severodvinsk and Primorskii are represented for the period 1985-1988. The two okrugs 
Isakogorskii (26,533) and Lomonosovskii (72,869) are, however, represented from the period both prior to and 
after 1991, but not uninterruptedly: the years 1990-1991 are not included in the material.  
34
 In order to get a well-founded impression of the work of the Commissions for the Affairs of Minors, in these 
two regions also a few persons involved in the word of KDN of the actual period have been interviewed. 
However, whether or not it had to do with failing memory; insufficient intellectual capacity to analyse child 
neglect issues of the period; or a perception of the questionnaires of the interviews as a test of their personal 
work; the answers received were largely unusable due to the evidently massive errors and inconsistencies. These 
questionnaires – although the most qualitative of them provided information that largely is in line with the 
conclusions of the thesis - are therefore not taken into account in the thesis. 
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Chapter 2 
MASS CHILD NEGLECT IN SOVIET RUSSIAN HISTORY UNTIL 1985 
 
Introduction 
This chapter explores briefly the history of neglected and homeless children in Soviet 
Russia.35 The focus is on causalities for mass child neglect as well as on the response to it by 
Soviet authorities. The purpose is to identify reaction patterns and traditions that might 
contribute to explaining child-protection developments that followed after 1985. While the 
first section of the chapter covers the period from 1917 to the first years after 1945 (i.e. the 
first and the second waves of street children), the second section addresses the period of 
controlled child neglect, lasting from the mid-1950s to the first part of the Gorbachev era.36  
 
The First and the Second Waves of Child Homelessness (Street Children) 
When emerging from the turbulence of 1917 and its aftermath as the new rulers of Russia, the 
triumphant Bolsheviks inherited an army of homeless children. As a result of the death and 
destruction brought upon Russia by the First World War, there were already by 1917 more 
than two million homeless children in the country.37 Following the social displacement and 
huge losses of life caused by revolution, civil war, and epidemics and famines of 1920-22, 
this figure did definitely not decrease.  Thus, in 1923, N. Krupskaya, a leading educational 
politician and Lenin’s wife, estimated that the figure had risen to about seven million.38  
From 1917, several government offices were involved in the work aimed at bringing 
child homelessness under control. Until the 1930s, it was the People’s Commissariat for 
Culture and Education (Narkompros) that had the most prominent role in this regard.39 
Another central agency was the Commission for the Improvement of Children’s Life, 
(Detkommisiia), founded in 1921 by F.E. Dzerzhinsky - the head of the Secret Police, Cheka. 
                                               
35
 Strictly historically, “Russia” denotes the Russian Empire before 1917 or the Russian Federation after 1991. In 
the thesis, (“Soviet”) “Russia” may therefore occasionally be used beyond legal definitions. “Soviet Russia” or 
“RSFSR” (the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic) thus formally refers to the Soviet state from the 
Revolution until the formal creation of the Soviet Union (USSR) in December 1922. After 1922, “RSFSR” 
denotes the Russian Union Republic (in legal terms RSFSR was fully abolished only in December 1993 with the 
adoption of a new Russian Constitution). Besides, while the focus of this thesis is on the Russian part of the 
Soviet Union as well as on post-Soviet Russia, frequent references will are also made to the entire USSR.   
36
 The indeed conditional term “controlled child neglect” emphasises the relatively limited scale this problem 
had over most post-war years, that is, when compared to both the enormous child homelessness of the preceding 
decades as well as to the third street-children wave that emerged from the late 1980s. 
37
 See discussion on this in Stolee, “Homeless Children,” 65. 
38
 Stolee, “Homeless Children,” 69 
39
 A number of agencies operated children’s institutions, colonies and clinics, but Narkompros’s share of the 
total may have been as high as 90 percent. Alan Ball, “State Children,” 230, note 10. 
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Whereas Narkompros can be said to have embodied a “soft” approach reflecting the 
educational optimism that largely characterised the young Soviet state,40 Detkommisiia 
introduced also more authoritarian measures in the struggle to reduce child homelessness. 41  
The Bolsheviks soon nationalised all welfare provisions.42 Adding to this, the most 
radical currents of the young revolutionary state taught that the family as an institution was 
obsolete and unsuitable for the upbringing of children.43 Thus, it was the collective, and 
ultimately the state, that was the most qualified guardian, also for street children.44 However, 
the capacity of children’s institutions did not match the number of needy children: In 1919, 
125,000 children resided in various boarding homes; in 1921-22 this figure had risen to 
540,000;45 and in 1923 there was a total of 800,000.46 When compared to the 7 million 
vagrant children Krupskaya estimated in 1923, it was obvious that the state had to find other 
solutions if the children were not to be left on the street. In spite of ideological hesitations, 
fostering (patronirovanie) was therefore both accepted and promoted, in practice, as an 
alternative to institutionalisation. In a predominant agrarian society, this meant placement of 
homeless children in peasant homes.47    
While the reason for the original emergence of mass child homelessness had been 
major catastrophes inflicted on children and their families by identifiable “external” agents or 
events, such as war, intervention, civil war and starvation; the continued problem was 
prompted by social issues generated internally in Soviet Russia.48 Studies made by 
Narkompros indicated that the unremedied backwardness and economic problems of the 
                                               
40
 Ball writes that Narkompros in 1920 justified its claim on the running of institutions for destitute juveniles by 
its “preeminent expertise in educating and rehabilitating children”, that is, in contrast to agencies that merely fed 
the children. See Ball, “State Children,” 233.     
41
 Following the famines of the early twenties and the dramatic rise in the number of vagrant children, 
Detkommisija often resorted to police-like methods in collecting and detaining vagrant minors so as to prevent 
juvenile crime getting totally out of control.  See Stolee, “Homeless Children,” 68. 
42
 Rosaria Franco, Social Order and Social Policies towards Displaced Children, The Soviet Case (1917-1953), 
Ph.D. thesis in history (Manchester: University of Manchester, 2006), 67. 
43
 Becky L. Glass, Becky and Margaret K. Stolee, “Family Law in Soviet Russia, 1917-1945.”Journal of 
Marriage and the Family. 49, (November 1987):893. 
44
 This attitude was reflected in the Family Code of 1918 stating that adoption was outlawed and that all needy 
children were to be under the guardianship of the state. See: L. Bernstein. “Fostering the next generation of 
socialists: Partonirovanie in the Fledgling Soviet State.” Journal of Family History Vol. 26 No1 (2001): 66 
45
 Pedagogicheskaya encyclopedia, ed. Shapovalova Volume 1 (1964), 193. Quoted from the article “Detskaia 
Besprizornost” on the Russian Wikipedia Internet site. (Internet address not cited due to its extreme length) 
46
 Stolee, “Homeless Children,” 69. 
47
 This could not be an optimal solution for the leading Bolsheviks, who frowned upon parts of the peasant 
culture due to the latter’s ”primitiveness, prejudices and frequent cruelty towards children,” not to mention the 
growing rural anti-Bolshevik sentiment following the numerous crop requisitions imposed by the government Ie. 
Chervoneko. “Sistema zaschity detei i elementy patronirovaniia v Sovetskoi Rossii”, in Nuzda i Poriadok: 
Istoriia socialnoi raboty v Rossii, XX v. Ed.: PB Romanova, (Saratov: Nauchnaia Kniga, 2005) 342-345. 
48
 As late as in 1927, there might have been as many as seven million homeless children in the USSR, according 
to the Large Soviet Encyclopaedia. Quoted from Stolee, “Homeless Children,” 65. 
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country created internal causes for the persistent huge caseload of homeless and disadapted 
children. In particular poor school facilities, a weakened family institution and child 
exploitation prompted children to run away from insufferable conditions.49  
Towards the end of the 1920s, more initiatives were therefore taken to strengthen 
prevention of child neglect as well as rehabilitation of children who already had become used 
to an unsupervised life on the street. In June 1927, the Sovnarkom and VTsIK issued a 
detailed three-year plan aimed at minimizing the street-children problem until 1930.50 It might 
be that this plan contributed to reducing the number of homeless children, but soon the first 
wave of street children in post-revolutionary Russia was to regain strength. Prompted by the 
social upheavals of industrialisation and collectivisation, new hosts of fresh “recruits” joined 
the remaining cohorts of neglected and abandoned children. In the 1930s, children of 
"dekulakized" farmers and of sundry “unmasked class enemies” could thus end up as waifs.51 
But especially the famine in the grain producing regions of the USSR in 1932-34, which was 
exacerbated by the effects of the collectivisation, created large numbers of vagrant children.52 
The tendencies seen in the abovementioned plan of 1927 appeared more clearly in the 
Decree of May 1935 on Liquidation of Children’s Besprizornost’ and Beznadzornost, issued 
by the Soviet government and the Central Committee of the Party.53 Typically for Soviet 
campaigning under Stalin, historic goals were set that were supposed to be reached almost 
instantaneously. In the context of the current terror regime, this meant that a huge 
mobilisation could begin and that the most diverse methods were utilised. One of the methods 
was to put blame on all “practitioners” in the sector criticized. Thus, the Decree in particular 
scolded state agencies and public organisation involved in child protection work. Needless to 
say, the top Party leadership was not touched. In contrast, parents were sharply criticised for 
letting their children out of control. Also children themselves were supposed to bear greater 
“responsibility” for their own situation. The latter factor indeed provided justification for the 
ever tougher police methods used in the fight against juvenile vagrancy and delinquency.54 
Hereafter, the child-protectionist attitude of the first post-revolutionary years was definitely 
                                               
49
 See Stolee, “Homeless Children”, 70. 
50
 On the plan by the Government and All-Russian Executive Committee, see: Stolee, “Homeless Children”, 71. 
51
 Some of the 700 000 children of kulaks (the moderately affluent farmers who in 1930/31 lost their possessions 
and were deported) became for different reasons displaced from their families. Franco, Social Order,131-35. 
Children also became displaced following the mass arrests in connection with “counter-revolutionary crimes.” 
From 1930-1939, a total of 1.38 million persons were detained on such charges. Ibid., 137.  
52
 An unknown number of children became homeless when perhaps 5.7 million persons perished during the 
famine of 1932-33. Ibid., 135.   
53
 On the 1935 Decree, see for example Stole, Homeless Children, 74-75; and Franco, Social Order, 148-163. 
54
 On the role of the NKVD after the 1935 Decree in the Far East of the USSR, see A. Zharkova, Istoricheskii 
Opyt Bor’by s Besprizornost’iu Dal’nom Vostoke (20-e-30-e gg. XX Veka). Autoreferat, (Khabarovsk, 2006), 23. 
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abandoned.55 Delinquent minors tended therefore to be regarded more as criminals than as 
victims of circumstantial causes. E.g. criminal law was again applicable to 12 year-old 
children and all restrictions lifted in terms of punishment used in cases involving minors. 
Labour colonies for juveniles swelled and death penalty for children was reintroduced in 
serious criminal cases.56 There are even unconfirmed reports of premeditated shooting by the 
NKVD of waifs caught steeling or found infected with venereal diseases.57  
The changes in child protection policies of the 1930s were also reflected in the 
terminology. Besprizornost’ (child homelessness; besprizornik – a homeless child) and 
beznadzornost’ (neglected/unsupervised minors; beznadzornik – an unsupervised child) had 
hitherto largely been used indiscriminately. With the “victory” of Soviet socialism, the issue 
of whom to blame appeared to have become crucial. Obviously, the responsibility for 
unsupervised children “could not” be ascribed to the system as such, only to failing parental 
care. Hence, while beznadzornost’ (i.e. minor delinquency occurring due to parental 
negligence – not due to homelessness inflicted upon children) continued to exist as a result of 
individual human faults (and could thus at least theoretically be admitted),58 besprizornost’ 
was deemed intolerable in a socialist society and had to be “eradicated” immediately.59   
Towards the end of the 1930s, Stalin’s USSR had taken significant steps towards 
becoming an industrialised society. However, the economic transformation was achieved 
through unprecedented hardship and sacrifices. Under the lid of the terror-based autocracy, 
the socio-psychological tensions for Soviet people must have been extremely high. At family 
level, these circumstances, if combined with other risk factors, could undoubtedly create 
grounds for new cases of serious child neglect. Despite campaigns and coercive methods, the 
objective of the Decree of 1935 on “eliminating juvenile vagrancy” was therefore unrealistic. 
Hence, although there might have become fewer unsupervised or homeless children on streets 
                                               
55
 M. Goloviznina, “Politika social’nogo kontrolia prestupnosti nesovershennoletnikh v SSSR,” Zhurnal 
issledovanii social’noi politiki 3, No 2, (2005), 223, states that post-Revolutionary Russia had mainly seen 
children as “victims of adverse socio-economic conditions,” which strengthened an obvious “protectionist” 
attitude towards them on part of the society. However, with Stalin a “Period of Reaction” set in. Ibid. 229. 
56
 Franco, Social Control, 174 -198, gives an account of the expanding network of labour colonies for juveniles.   
57
 Ball, “State Children,” 246. 
58
 The ideologue and practitioner in the field of collectivist re-education of vagrant children, Anton Makarenko, 
provides an explanation to the increased parental role in causing child neglect: “Street Children of 1921-24 have 
long since disappeared. Our current street children are a product not of class collapse. Presently street children 
are children who have lost their family. There are numerous reasons for this. The family has a freer form; we 
cannot impose [marital] cohabitation; people’s life is more stressed; and both mothers and fathers are more 
heavily loaded by work tasks; the woman has departed from the constraint of family; and there are material and 
other contradictions. “Explanatory note to the project of organising children’s labour corpus (1934),”in  
A Makarenko, Collected works I, Quoted from M. Goloviznina,”Politika social’nogo kontrolia,” 229-230. 
59
 M.V. Goloviznina, in Social’nyi kontrol’ protivopravoi povedenie nesovershennoletnikh v penitentsiarnom 
uchrezhdenii. Candidate thesis in criminology. Saratov University, (2005), 56, states that after the 1935 Decree 
“besprizornost” disappeared from Soviet discourse to be used again only in cases pertaining to WWII.  
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and squares after 1935, there is no evidence to assert that the long-lasting, post-1917 first 
wave of child homelessness completely receded prior to the entry of the USSR into WWII.60  
At any rate, not before long, a second major wave of child homelessness was to sweep 
over the Soviet Union. The German attack on the country in June 1941 gave rise to new 
uncontrollable caseloads of orphaned, displaced and fleeing children. The first months of the 
War created a chaotic atmosphere for many children, and, following acts of war and 
unsuccessful attempts of evacuation, numerous minors did get lost. Since most state bodies 
dealing with these problems had been dismantled in the late 1930s in connection with the 
“liquidation” of besprizornost’,61 a new agency was established. In 1942, the Commission for 
the Arrangements for Children Left without Parents was set up to coordinate all activities 
aimed at gathering up stray children into receiving stations; register the children; possibly 
reunify them with their guardians; or place them in those institutions that were available.62  
In order to decrease the pressure on the collapsing network of children’s institutions, 
various forms of placement of children in private homes were encouraged, including 
adoption, which had been prohibited in 1918, but again made legal in 1928.63 Also other 
forms of placement of children in private families were advanced, such as guardianship 
(opeka) and foster care (patronirovanie or patronat).64  
When Soviet forces regained control over occupied territories, massive campaigns 
were unfolded in order to accommodate for the war orphans. It was considered a matter of 
honour for the state to provide shelter for the multi-thousand hosts of homeless children who 
had seen their life disrupted by the War. And it seemed that the efforts were successful: very 
soon, most of the wartime street children were evidently taken care of.65  
Interestingly enough, during and shortly after the Second World War, Soviet discourse 
again applied the term “besprizornost” to contemporary Soviet realities. In the case of the 
                                               
60
 By mainly analysing memoirs, Stole, Homeless Children, 76, concludes that “the government’s more stringent 
measures may have reduced the numbers of homeless children, but they did not eliminate them completely.” See 
also Zharkova, Istoricheskii Opyt, 24, who, referring to the very beginning of the forties, states: The task of 
liquidating bezprizornost’, set by the organs of state power, was not solved. 
61
 Zharkova, Istoricheskii Opyt, 23, refers to the Party’s objective of 1935 to ”liquidate besprizornost”, and notes 
that the direction of preventive activities pertinent to juvenile delinquency had changed “from assistance to 
correction.” In this connection a number of organisation and services ceased to exist, such as the “Commission 
for Minors’ Affairs” (i.e. a post-1917 forerunner for the 1961 Child Protection institute), “Social Inspections”, 
“Detkommisija,” and the “Far East Society for the Friends of Children.” Also the Red Cross suffered.  
62
 Stolee, “Homeless Children,” 77. 
63
 Iev. Chervoneko, Sistema zaschity detei i elementy patronirovaniiz. (Saratov, 2005), 348. 
64
 Foster care was the most common household placement of children since this only required that the minors in 
question should be wards of the state. The other referred arrangements of child placement in families demanded 
court rulings to decide the status of the child relative to its parents/guardians. In the circumstance of war this was 
often an insurmountable task. See Stolee, “Homeless Children,”  77. 
65
 See Stolee, “Homeless Children”, 78. In the USSR one could obviously admit that there still existed homeless 
children as late as in 1946. See the vagrant child Vania in Sholokhov’s “The Fate of a Man” (1956). 
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second street children wave there was hardly any doubt that child homelessness had been 
entirely caused by the German attack on the USSR. On the other hand, when the first post-
War years had passed, and child homelessness yet again became a phenomenon that officially 
had been “solved,” “besprizornost” again seemed to be banned from open publications.66  
 
The period of controlled child neglect  
After World War II, the Soviet Union eventually went into smother waters. The economy 
grew, and - at least beginning with the second half of the 50s - the country did not experience 
huge and uncontrolled disasters or major social disorder on its territory. However, problems 
associated with Russia’s pre-revolutionary legacy and the inherent economic disbalances of 
the Soviet system continued to impact the country’s overall child-neglect environment.  
The transformation from a country dominated by peasants to an industrialised society, 
which had started before the War with Stalin’s violent social revolutions from above; 
continued to place enormous burdens on the population. As millions of former peasants were 
turned into first-generation Soviet industrial workers, their new life in the small and crowded 
flats of the Soviet industrial cities must have sparked off significant adaptation problems. The 
industrialisation was accompanied by ubiquitous scarcity of food and periods of hunger; lack 
of practically any item of consumption; forced mass migration; arrests and deportation; 
extreme pressure of work; as well as deprivation of the right to any autonomous expression. 
Needless to say, the unprecedented destructions caused by the War only increased the 
pressure on the population, not least on women.67 Adding to this was the overriding Cold-War 
logic of prioritising resource allocation to the heavy industry.    
Several people may definitely have felt that the Soviet system relegated the fulfilment 
of their most pressing needs to a largely unspecified future. For sure, Khrushchev attempted 
to define the advent of the future society of abundance (i.e. “Communism”). Yet, by raising 
expectations without basis in reality, he probably gave birth to feelings of deception and 
hopelessness, not least amongst those at the lower steps of Soviet society. With economic 
growth eventually slowing down, Soviet authorities did not succeed in bridging the gap 
between the historically backward Russia and their Cold-War rivals in the advanced West.68  
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The issue of disadaptation to modern society must have been at work, which, in the 
specific Soviet case, had to do in particular with material and other ordeals people were 
subjected to. But disadaptation at family level in Russia can not be understood without taking 
into account the deeply-rooted drinking traditions of the country. Moreover, with the stress 
people experienced, the inclination towards binge drinking as a way of escaping the harshness 
of reality could only increase.69  
 A second factor that could predispose for inappropriate parental behaviour can also be 
suggested: The extremely authoritarian Party monopoly, which was established during Stalin 
and continued after his dead, albeit in a milder and more predictable form;70 brought 
traditional Russian state paternalism to an unparalleled “perfection.”71 Included in this was 
the widely internalised notion of the state as the ultimate provider of physical security, 
material wellbeing and ethics for all citizens. This circumstance, along with the high degree of 
ideological approval of institutionalising of neglected and needy children, could strengthen 
already existing tendencies of low parental responsibility towards their children.72  
In sum, these and other factors may explain why risk factors for child neglect 
remained considerable in Russian families over the post-war decades. However, to 
corroborate this assumption empirically is difficult: As mentioned in Chapter 1, child-
protection issues of the post-WWII period is largely ignored in Soviet publications and 
explored only to a very limited extent by the international academia.  
On the other hand, legislative activity does indicate that “problematic children” posed 
sufficient challenges so as to be taken seriously by the authorities. Particularly important in 
                                                                                                                                                   
GDP share relative to the one of the USA from 29.7 % in 1950 to 36.3% at its highest relative point in 1973. 
Then the relative share slowly decreased until it collapsed after 1981. 
69
 According to the sources used in Stephen White, Russia goes dry. Alcohol, state and society, (Cambridge: 
1996), 38, the consumption of alcohol increased nearly with 8 times from 1940 to 1984.  
For more on alcohol and Russians, see Chapter 4 of this theses, p. 59-63; and Annex III and IV, p. 125-129.  
70
 As to child protection, the criminologist M. Goloviznina views the post-Stalin period as an “orientation 
towards humanism”, Goloviznina, Social’nyi kontrol’ protivopravogo povedeniia, 61. In particular she mentions 
the de-criminalization of certain forms of juvenile delinquency and the increased use if to non-penal reactions 
and “societal influence” (Ibid, 64). In 1963 labour colonies for juvenile were transformed into closed, technical 
schools for juvenile delinquents. Also important, decisions on placement of adolescents in institutions were not 
taken by the courts, but by the Commissions for the Affairs of Minors, KDN (on KDN, see page 18-19 below).  
71
 For the analysis of paternalism, see e.g. G.G. Diligenskii, “Rossiiskie arkhitipy i sovremennost’,” in T.I. 
Zaslavskaja (ed.), Mezhdunarodnaia simpozium: Kuda idet Russia- Obshcshee i osobenoie v  
sovremennom razviti,”(Moscow: Moskovskaia vyshaia shkola sotsialnykh. i ekonom. nauk, 1997), 273-279. 
72
 Glass et al., “Family Law in Soviet Russia, 1917-1945,”, 898, points at the high divorce rates following the 
liberal divorce legislation of the post-revolutionary years. She adds that Stalin reinstated more traditional legal 
frames for the marriage and family institutions, probably as a means of tightening social control during the 
industrialisation and post-War reconstruction. According to B.Kerblay, Modern Soviet Society, (London: 1983), 
123, the divorce rate peaked in 1935, when 44 percent of all marriages were dissolved. With stricter legislation, 
the divorce rate fell to 16.7 percent in 1940 and 10.4 in 1960. Then the rate rose dramatically with 30.3 percent 
in 1967 and 34 in 1979. 
 
                                                             
 18 
this regard is the initiative that was taken with the adoption of Decree No 1099 in 1957. The 
Decree contains two normative documents: “On measures to improve work among children 
during after-school hours,” along with the “Statutes for the Commissions on arrangements for 
children and juveniles.”73 Either document brings evidence of governmental intention to 
strengthen preventive measures such as leisure activities and involvement of public actors (i.e. 
Soviet mass organisations including volunteers) to compensate for lacking parental attention. 
In 1961, the Commissions mentioned in the decree of 1957 were renamed into the 
“Commissions for the Affairs of Minors” (below referred to as KDN or Commissions).74 The 
Commissions had their legal base upgraded through a Decree of 1967: “Statues for the 
Commissions of the Affairs of Minors”.75 According to these statues, the KDN should:  
organise work aimed at preventing child neglect (beznadzornost’) and delinquency; arrange 
for children;76 coordinate the efforts of state organs and public organisations in connection 
with the mentioned issues; review cases of [individual] juvenile delinquency; as well as 
control the conditions and educational work conducted in institutions run by the MVD,77 and 
in other [correctional] institutions for minors.78  
 
Commissions were to be attached to the executive organs of the state power at all levels, 
starting with the RSFSR government down to executive branches of raion Soviets 
(municipalities), and were accountable before the respective Soviets of People’s Deputes and 
their executive committees.”79 The various KDNs were to be chaired by the deputy head of 
the respective executive organ and should comprise members from Soviets of deputies, 
Unions, Komsomol and “other public organisations,” work collectives, as well as 
representatives of education, health, and culture authorities, along with MVD (militia), 
“culture-enlightenment” and other institutions.80  In addition, the work of KDN should be 
conducted with “broad participation of the Soviet public,” including parental and school 
committees; guardianship committees of kindergartens, residential children’s institutions; 
voluntary people’s guards (narodnye druzhiny); street and housing committees, and others. 
From these aktivy (pools of active representatives/volunteers of various organisations) KDN 
should appoint public inspectors to work with vulnerable children and their families.81  
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Decisions taken by KDN were binding for all involved state organs, but also for pubic 
organisations and citizens.82 On issues of educational work, vocational education, 
employment and referral of minors to study places; KDN should present proposals to state 
and public institutions and enterprises.83 In agreement with school authorities, social services, 
the militia, and with broad participation of the public; KDN should detect and put on record 
minors left without parental care, as well as of minors who were grossly neglected by their 
parents. If necessary, KDN should in turn secure alternative placement of such children.84  
During its sessions, KDN should review cases involving “social dangerous behaviour” 
(done by minors below 14 or of minors between 14 and16 years) as well as unlawful or 
(certain) criminal acts (done by minors beyond 14 years).85  In serious cases, KDN could refer 
the youngsters to special correctional institutions.86 As for parents who “intentionally” had 
failed to fulfil obligations pertaining to the upbringing and education of their children, KDN 
had several means of impacting or sanctioning. These included “public censure,” fees, referral 
to the “comrades courts,” referral to the “commissions for struggle against drunkenness,” or, 
in cases of deprival of parental rights, referral to the regular (“people’s”) court.87  
     
Several contemporary Soviet articles indicate that concrete community initiatives, for 
example in Kursk, Voronesh and Vladimir of the first half of the 1960s,88 gave positive 
results in terms of involving community actors (examples are given of local housing and 
factory committees as well as of creative individuals) in practical prevention of juvenile 
delinquency and other forms of child neglect. However, the focus of the aforesaid articles is 
not on the role of KDN as such, but on the effectiveness of voluntary community work. It is 
interesting though to note that the articles reflect a utopian discourse that obviously still was 
incumbent at a point of time when the change from Khrushchev to Brezhnev under way: 
Already the titles of two of the abovementioned articles set a maximalist tone by indicating 
that child delinquency actually could be “eradicated” altogether.89  
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Perhaps in a vein more like campaigning or disseminating, Iu. Emelianov and K. 
Shchedrina demonstrate the ambitions of KDN in terms of involving public activists in 
concrete follow-up work of individual child-neglect cases.90  In their brochure, the authors 
refer to success stories where children were averted from further developing deviant 
behaviour thanks to the intervention of “public [obshchestvennye] educators.” Whether or not 
these examples are based on empirical facts is naturally difficult to assess. 
In her study on “Children of the Russian State,” the British researcher Judith Harwin 
comments on the specific Soviet set-up of “support and control of families with child care 
problems” by involving unpaid community workers. Harwin points at the crucial role of the 
Party, both in appointing responsible professionals and mobilising volunteers. Interestingly, 
the network of community workers may indeed have been huge, in the 1970s perhaps 
totalling up to nine million voluntary social workers within all eras of social work.91 
Typically for the limited research interest in Soviet social history of the pre-Gorbachev 
era, there does not seem to exist any study devoted to the issue of how the key institute of 
Soviet child protection, KDN, actually functioned, how it took care of its mandatory tasks, 
and how its work evolved over time. This refers both to the USSR at large and to its 
republics.92 The contemporary studies of the KDN in Soviet Estonia (of the period 1969-76) 
by the legal scholar Hillar Randalu suggests that Estonia was far ahead of other Soviet 
regions. Already in the early seventies, KDN in Estonia evidently recorded data on individual 
delinquency electronically.93  However sophisticated the categories of Randalu’s work may 
be, there are, however, no absolute figures (i.e. on the child-neglect scale) or indications of 
the longitudinal trends of KDN’s work. All data represent percentages of an unknown total.  
Sadovnikov’s article on the activities of KDN in Chuvashia around 1966-68 brings 
evidence that KDN was involved in many of its statutory areas of activity, and not only in the 
handling of individual delinquency cases.94  Although the study is written recently, it does not 
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seem to be particularly analytical. Again, there are no absolute figures and no indication of 
how KDN evolved from year to year, or from decade to decade. Moreover, the actual capacity 
of KDN, as compared to the real needs, is not assessed, neither is the impact of its work. 
 In Western research, KDN is largely ignored. Harwin, for example, only briefly 
comments that KDN was a “semi lay (Party) semi professional body.” With reference to 
KDN’s evidently intrusive attitude in family situations, where parents “were neglecting or 
failing to care properly for their children,” Harwin primarily views this child-prevention 
institute in the perspective of the “erosion of family privacy” in the Soviet Union.95 
   
Concluding comments  
After 1917 and until around 1950-55, mass child neglect in the Soviet Union was linked to 
titanic crises like war, revolution, civil war, mass starvation, collectivisation, industrialisation 
and mass terror, and, yet again, war in the shape of the apocalypse of the Great Fatherland 
War. In the post-War decades, preconditions for mass child neglect did definitely not 
disappear, but changed when compared to the dramatic upheavals of the preceding years. 
Henceforth, deviant child behaviour emanated from parental neglect and was largely 
associated with the fundamental socio-economic problems of Soviet society.  
At the discourse level, the goal of the Soviet authorities had been to minimise and 
ultimately eradicate juvenile delinquency altogether. This echoed the USSR’s utopian goal of 
actually building Communism. However, as the Party faced increasing economic challenges in 
the post-war years, the most elevated goals of the Soviet ideology had to be abandoned.96 In 
the area of child protection, a similar adjustment of the once “grand visions” must therefore 
have occurred. With persistent and huge material shortages in the Soviet society, and Soviet 
Russians increasingly resorting to alcohol as a means of relaxation or escapism, it became 
obvious that the optimistic goal of eliminating juvenile delinquency, along with other forms 
of unacceptable behaviour of minors, could not be reached.  
The acknowledgment of a significant child-protection problem must have been 
decisive when Soviet authorities, around 1960, embarked on more active policies in terms of 
preventing, detecting and alleviating child neglect. Through the Commissions for the Affairs 
of Minors (KDN), administrative resources of the Soviet centralised command system - i.e. 
both state organs and Party-led “voluntary” community actors - were mobilised to bring the 
problem of child neglect under control.  
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The official policy in regard to child neglect seemed largely to reflect the given causal 
nature of the problem. The existence of child homelessness (besprizornost’) appeared to be 
acknowledged as a fact, and made subject to massive mobilisation and relatively open 
discussion, only if the problem causally had to do with factors evidently beyond regime 
control. If caused by endogenous factors, however, besprizornost’ tended to be denied and 
dealt with in a non-transparent fashion.  
In periods when the USSR was not shaken by a major crisis, deviant child behaviour 
was primarily seen as a result of parental neglect (in the official discourse: beznadzornost’), 
not of systemic defects. Although considerable organisational attention was directed towards 
the prevention of beznadzornost’ (as shown by the establishment of KDN), the existence of 
beznadzornost’ under socialism was evidently causing embarrassment for Soviet authorities: 
For the most part, the handling of the problem avoided open campaigning and public debate.  
It might be that the regime attitude of half denial and half concealment towards child 
neglect also impacted the mindset of the broader public. In a context of extreme state 
paternalism and a widespread expectation that societal initiatives had to come from the top, 
the conceptual distinction between besprizornost’ and beznadzornost’ had perhaps wider 
ramifications. In might be that the differentiated way in which Soviet society responded to 
concrete child-neglect phenomena (i.e. depending on whether the problem was caused by 
internal or external factors) led to patterns of perception and behaviour, both on the part of 
new generations of Russian leaders and the public at large, that ultimately could impede a 
broad mobilisation in case a major endogenous child-neglect crisis was to emerge.  
It is widely considered that the stability under Brezhnev was founded on a “Social 
Contract,” according to which Soviet authorities should guarantee economic progress and 
provisions of social welfare, including child welfare, in return for people’s “buy in” to the 
Soviet system. As discussed in Chapter 3, the Contract remained in place more or less until 
Gorbachev embarked on his radical reforms, that is, until around 1987.    
Expanding on the Social Contract, and in the absence of empirical evidence to the 
contrary, the thesis takes as one of its starting assumptions the following: The central Soviet 
child protection institute, the Commissions on the Affairs of Minors, by means of Party-
imposed discipline and Party-mobilised public organisations and grass-root volunteers, coped 
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Chapter 3 
THE OVERALL CHILD NEGLECT ENVIRONMENT 
 
Introduction  
In the Soviet Union, developments within the politico-ideological sphere have often assumed 
primacy over other societal processes. To a lesser extent, this has also been the case in the still 
authoritarian and only semi-democratic post-Soviet Russia. Due to the tradition of autocratic 
governance in Russia, along with a suppressed or only embryonic civil society, the power in 
the hands of the central rulers of the country has in practice been without substantial checks 
and balances. In Imperial Russia, in the USSR, as well as in post-Soviet Russia, the strategic 
choices made by Tsars, General Secretaries and Presidents have therefore entailed enormous 
consequences for the country and its population.97 
In light of this, one basic assumption of the thesis is that both Gorbachev and Yeltsin 
were facing real alternatives. Hence, the situation in Russia (including the overall child-
neglect environment), as it was formed in the period 1985-1996, could have become different 
if these politicians had acted differently than they did. This chapter therefore sets out to 
examine in some detail a few of the complex processes that prompted the growing socio-
economic crisis of the period.  
The first section of the chapter (covering 1985 - 1991) starts with a review of some of 
the main political processes, dilemmas and controversies that Gorbachev had to tackle as the 
top Soviet leader. The political narrative is, however, organically intertwined with the 
economic and social topics that characterised the period and gave dynamics to the historical 
development.  The remaining part of the section elaborates on economic and organisational 
consequences of the reforms. The second section of the chapter (1992-1996) is organised 
similarly to the first one, but with additional comments on economic issues.  
 
Sub-period 1: 1987 – 1991 
The post-Stalin Soviet model, consolidated during the Brezhnev era (1964-82), remained 
relatively stable until around 1987.  The initiatives aimed at promoting technological 
innovation, strengthening discipline in the society and fighting corruption, which were 
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undertaken by Andropov (1982-83) as well as by Gorbachev during his first two years in 
office (1985-87), are therefore regarded as attempts to increase the functionality of the 
existing Soviet model.98 The main purpose of these reforms was undoubtedly to reinvigorate 
an economy that had been seeing falling growth rates and stagnating technological 
developments from the 1970s onwards. This fact became all the more alarming for the Soviet 
leadership in a context of intensified Cold War rivalry between the USSR and its superiorly 
developed Western adversaries. Adding to Kremlin’s challenges was the outburst of serious 
movements of workers’ unrest in Poland, reminding it not only about the vulnerability of 
Soviet Union’s East European alliance system,99 but also of the Soviet Social Contract.100  
The initial post-1985 reform impulse that soon was to precipitate the terminal crisis of 
the Soviet model thus ironically emanated from a resolve by the top Communist hierarchy to 
strengthen the functionality of the Soviet Union. However, by 1987 it had become evident 
that the initial system-immanent medicine prescribed by Gorbachev, i.e. stronger discipline, 
anti-alcohol campaign and orientation towards the “pure” pre-Stalinist, Soviet socialist ideals, 
did not provide any healing as far as sustained economic growth was concerned. The very 
limited GDP growth that the USSR saw from 1985 to 1987 (conf. Chapter 4, p. 44) coincided 
with a dramatic fall in the oil prices.101 The failing revenues from oil sale were devastating for 
Soviet hard-currency earnings and seriously limited the latitude of the USSR policies, both 
internally and externally. In sum, the first two years of Gorbachev’s reforms neither brought 
about economic development nor reinvigoration of Soviet socialism.  
However, Gorbachev was determined to explore even more radical measures in his 
quest to bring about economic progress and renewal of the Soviet society.102 In the course of 
1987 all three main components of Gorbachev’s reform policies were clearly pronounced and 
set afloat: Perestroika introduced cautious, but in the Soviet context radical market reforms. 
Certain market mechanisms were allowed in the relationship between state enterprises, and 
green light was given for limited private business opportunities, including cooperatives. 
Democratizatsiia entailed pluralism, which first was conceived as a measure to revitalise the 
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Party, but soon spilled over to other spheres of the society. And finally, Glasnost made it 
possible eventually to discuss any historical or contemporary political, social and ideological 
issue; also such topics that the Party leadership had refused to acknowledge the existence of 
due to their perceived potential for undermining the legitimacy, stability and coherence of the 
Soviet society.  
For Gorbachev, the policy of allowing pluralism in the Soviet bodies and criticism of 
Communist Party malpractices was perhaps first of all a means of countering and discrediting 
conservative opposition against his reform policies within the CPSU itself. With his extensive 
experience from Komsomol and Party work, the new General Secretary must have been well 
aware of the innate conservatism within the Party apparatus.103 However, it is often believed 
that Gorbachev, while focusing on the opposition “from his owns,” did not foresee the strong 
centrifugal tendencies that his policies engendered in the republics.104 He thus might have 
underestimated the anti-system tendencies that increasingly characterised the political 
activism brought to life by his reforms.105 Ever more political groupings mushroomed, often 
under nationalist banners. Most activists focused on negative track records of the Party, 
which, on its part, unexpectedly and quickly retreated from its former ideological monopoly.  
In this situation the Soviet Party leader increasingly experienced that he was losing the 
political initiative. One sign of this was the fate of the anti-alcohol campaign which was 
closely associated with Gorbachev. While the collapsing anti-alcohol campaign symbolised 
Gorbachev’s failure to renew the Soviet society morally, his futile efforts to achieve economic 
restructuring convincingly demonstrated his inability to deliver on his overall reform project.  
None of Gorbachev’s economic reforms that gained momentum in 1987 and 1988 
provided any sustained improvement to the country’s industry and agriculture; neither did 
they result in well-stocked Soviet shops. As will be demonstrated in Chapter 4, the growth 
was limited and in 1989 the zero-growth line was crossed. From then on the GDP took a 
negative turn, increasingly so after mid-1990. Against a backdrop of growing economic 
problems, traditional Soviet shortages of consumer goods touched new levels. Amidst 
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shocking Glasnost revelations of Party misuse and mismanagement, the remaining confidence 
was undermined in Soviet socialism, and not least, in Gorbachev as a politician.106  
In 1989 the former allied states and trade partners in East Europe abandoned their 
former Soviet allegiance unopposed, and the Supreme Soviets of several Union republics in 
1990 became dominated by secessionist nationalism. With this, Gorbachev’s Soviet Union 
was dealt new blows, hastening the country’s political disintegration and economic downturn.   
The conditions were thus made ripe for the political comeback of Boris Yeltsin, 
Gorbachev's erstwhile reformist protégée and before that apparatchik colleague at top 
regional level. Demoted and humiliated in 1987 by Gorbachev for his populist radicalism in 
the Politburo, Yeltsin could now take “revenge.” He utilised the Glasnost atmosphere and 
general turbulence prevalent in the society to make his ascent as a “fearless” spokesman of the 
Russian people against Party privileges and mismanagement.  
The two protagonists fought on various political issues. One was on the question of 
economic reforms, especially from 1989, as systemic problems grew and outputs of the 
command economy plunged. The political agenda quickly became radicalised and it appeared 
as though the idea of a planned economy had exhausted its potential. Party traditionalists were 
clearly on the defensive. The political sentiments of Russia were furthermore influenced by 
the rightward tilt in international politics of the 1980s, the Chinese reforms from 1979, as well 
as the market revolutions of Eastern Europe in 1989.  
There seemed to be a shared opinion at the time that comprehensive economic reforms 
were required to give a boost to the faltering Soviet economy. However, Gorbachev’s already 
extremely low ratings in 1989-1990 must have made it impossible for him to take 
responsibility for a market liberalisation that would be socially very costly, thereby also 
confirming the continued actuality of Brezhnev’s “Social Contract.”107 Yeltsin was not bound 
by such considerations. Moreover, riding on a wave of populist approval, the main Russian 
opposition figure was only “delighted to use economic reform as yet another weapon in his 
power struggle with the Soviet president.”108   
Yeltsin also played off the nationalist card. He effectively rendered support to 
secessionist sentiments in the republics, among other things, by demanding sovereignty for 
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the RSFSR vis-à-vis the Union. This might have been one of several factors that fuelled the 
exploding separatism that the USSR witnessed from 1989. Accusations and recriminations 
were hurled between the numerous Soviet nationalities, and conflicts popped up at different 
hot spots in the enormous country.  
Gorbachev incessantly tried to balance the various factions within the Party and the 
country, however remaining faithful to socialist rhetoric and the principle of a unified Soviet 
state. Yeltsin, in contrast, demonstrated a widening split in the weakened Party by publicly 
giving up his Party card in July 1990. He quickly threw out previous ideological credo, freely 
manoeuvring amongst the rapidly changing political constellations of the crisis-ridden Soviet 
Union.109  
As the number of crises grew, it was nevertheless the national conflicts that were to 
pose the most immediate threats to the idea of a controlled restructuring of the Soviet Union. 
Could therefore the central power, which in the course of Soviet history had been especially 
“vigilant” in any controversy linked to utterances of nationalism, remain passive as open 
secessionist agendas dominated more and more in the republics! 
Certainly, from 1989 onwards there were indications that Moscow intended to crush 
the militant nationalist opposition in some of the republics. But the actions turned out to be 
half-hearted. Gorbachev washed his hands of these incidents; obviously he did not want to go 
down in history as a Machiavellian power politician under the guise of a “Peace Prince.”110 
It was indeed the opposition from numerous republics against a renewed and 
federalised Union treaty that provoked the final drama of the Union. Facing the imminent 
reality of a new, emasculated Union of only a little more than half of the original 15 republics, 
a group of top officials directly under, and appointed by Gorbachev undertook an ill-
conceived and hand-trembling attempt to rescue the Union.111  
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The failure of the “August Coup” heralded an immediate, de facto system change. The 
Union was in reality doomed. The ruling elites of the republics, to various degrees supported 
by popular mobilisation, soon proclaimed sovereignty. Declaring a nominal independence, 
most of the remaining republics, however, did not demonstrate any resolve to really leave the 
Union.112 Nevertheless, Yeltsin, who now dominated the Centre, did not attempt to save the 
rest of the USSR. Following some vodka-ridden proceedings at a state dacha in Belaveskaya 
Pushcha in Belarus, the bosses of Russia, Ukraine and Belarus signed a treaty that led to the 
formal and complete dissolution of the Soviet Union by 31 December 1991. 
 
Additional comments to Organisational and Economic Aspects of Gorbachev’s Reforms 
What seems to have been most decisive for the rapid demise of the post-August Soviet Union, 
as well as for the direction that post-Russia followed (along with the other republics), was the 
fact that the Soviet Communist Party was “relegated to the Rubbish Heap of History”. Prior to 
June 1990, the Party had been constitutionally guaranteed a “leading role”, and it had until 
recently dominated all spheres of Soviet society. In reality, the CPSU had kept the fate of the 
Soviet state in its hands until August 1991. It was ideologically committed to the idea of the 
Soviet state, and a continued existence of the USSR could hardly be imagined without a 
dominating Communist Party. The bureaucracy was still in a “wait-and-see” mode, and the 
Party had considerable leverages through its control over the army, militia and the KGB.  
However, when Yeltsin in late August suspended the activity of the CPSU on the 
territory of the Russian republic for its claimed participation in the coup, the once almighty 
Party and its followers in Russia met their fate without any resistance. The text of the formal 
dissolution of the CPSU in November 1991 tells much about the actual changes that took 
place with the Party descending from the historical scene: “The CPSU had never been a party. 
It had been a particular mechanism for forming and utilising the political power by help of its 
[own] coalescing with the state structures, or by subordinating the state to the CPSU”.113   
The impact that the prohibition of the CPSU had on numerous societal processes in the 
immediate post-Soviet Russia does not seem to have been broadly studied. A central 
assumption of this thesis is that the liquidation of the Party was fundamental for the direction 
that the post-Soviet Russian society took, also within the sphere of child protection.  
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First, the Party based its ultimate legitimacy on the notion that it was a provider of 
economic development and social equality. Ultimately, it had to deliver against these goals. 
(Gorbachev failed to deliver, and lost all popular support.) Second, the Party had throughout 
the Soviet period been solely and indisputably responsible for all aspects of societal life. All 
goals and objectives for the development of the Soviet society had been set by the Party, and 
the various implementing state bureaucracies and agencies were assigned, instructed, 
monitored, and, if deemed necessary, reprimanded by the Party. Organs and agencies dealing 
with child welfare and protection were integrated in this Party-led setup.  
The assumption of an extraordinary organisational role of the Party – a role that 
evidently was not, and probably could not, immediately be taken over by any other actor or 
group of actors when the CPSU was banned in post-August 1991 – can be seen to be closely 
related to the fourth of the “main interrelated factors” (i.e. in addition to “inherited problems”, 
“exogenous problems” and “policy design problems”) that the UNICEF research on the 
transition countries has identified as explanations for the “the largely unexpected deterioration 
in human welfare” that emerged in the wake of the collapse of East European/Soviet 
socialism. This fourth factor is determined as institutional vacuum and administrative 
weakness and is described in the following way: “Dismantling institutions and social norms of 
the socialist regime has not been accompanied by an equally rapid and extensive development 
of adequate substitutes, thus causing social costs beyond those due to economic factors”. 114  
The methods used by the Party to manage and secure discipline in the bureaucracy (in 
the wider sense of the word including nomenklatura personnel in social service and public 
organisations) were numerous: recruiting compatible subordinates and making defiance of 
authoritative decisions exceedingly costly; securing ideological coherence through intensive 
screening and indoctrination of all cadres; utilising public organisations, e.g. the Trade Union 
and the Komsomol in order to monitor the implementation of political initiatives stemming 
from the Centre; and, if necessary as a complementary mechanism for ensuring leadership 
power, resorting to purging bureaucrats who lacked bonds of loyalty to the leadership.115 
This system seemed to function so long as those at lower levels of the hierarchies 
acknowledged the authority of those at higher levels of the power structures. Since there was 
no third-party adjudicator of jurisdictional conflicts in the Soviet Union and all formal and 
real power belonged to Party officials and organs, the ultimate perpetuation of the links of 
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authority within the society therefore depended upon the continued existence of a Party that 
exercised leadership and was obeyed by the subordinates in the system.  
 Solnick’s analysis focuses on the behaviour of actors of Soviet organisations (in this 
regard signifying any entity of the state apparatus, including enterprises) who used the fading 
Party authority opportunistically in order to gain material advantage. The power vacuum that 
emerged when hierarchical control slackened enabled bureaucrats to start a fierce 
“privatising” of state assets which hitherto they had only administered on behalf of the Party.  
This model for understanding how nomenklaturchiks in enterprises took advantage of 
the eroding Party authority may be extrapolated to the level of Party-assigned staff in 
organisations that did not possess mentionable material assets. For this thesis, one central 
assumption is thus that as the old regime faltered, any obligations once imposed upon Soviet 
officials through the disciplining omnipresence of the Party were progressively abandoned.  
In other words, the declining and eventually abolished Party control offered an opportunity to 
both managers and employees in state agencies and organisations, which were without any 
marketable commodities or assets, to withdraw from challenging and stressful obligations. 
Hence, also these groups of professionals could “benefit” from the new power vacuum. 
     ***** 
At the time Gorbachev ascended to power, it was evident that many aspects of the existing 
Soviet economy, its technology and level of productivity, were unfit for market exposure and 
liberalised international trade.116 A possible adaptation to market conditions would therefore 
ideally have required large investments, training programmes, as well as transitional 
arrangements that could secure highest possible social security. And, it goes without saying: 
such a smooth transition would require a great degree of stability.  
But Gorbachev’s economic reforms, launched as the deficits and disfunctionalities in 
the Soviet planned economy became embarrassing, occurred at the time of demoralising 
Glasnost revelations. These developments were hardly envisaged. In any event, the result was 
destabilisation of the entire Soviet society and a government that lost its ability to set the 
agenda for the country. Part of this change process was the fact that the servility and fear that 
had characterised the behaviour of the bureaucracy and the whole Soviet society suddenly 
evaporated, unleashing waves of non-conformist economic behaviour. Included in this was:  
The thirst for primitive accumulation among the “emancipating” nomenclature and the 
emerging new Russian business class was undoubtedly a driving force for the development of 
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Gorbachev’s late Soviet society: As soon as the first economic liberalisation started, a chase 
for easy gains created new imbalances in Soviet economy. For example, cooperatives, 
distorting the intentions of the legislation, could now deliberately withhold parts of the 
production from circulation for speculative purposes. Further, joint ventures could divert 
commodities abroad for covert currency revenues instead of feeding the internal market.117  
But there were also other forms of non-conformist economic behaviour that followed 
in the wake of the Gorbachev reforms. One of these was increasing working-class demands 
and strikes for increased pays. Before the end of the 1980s, strikes had virtually been a non-
phenomenon in the USSR. When people’s standard of living fell dramatically, the workers 
flew into a rage.118 But the problem was that wage rises did not see a corresponding increase 
in supplies: Social benefits and wages had started to show a steep increase as of 1989, 
precisely as the country’s GDP went into a period of serious contraction.119  
Adding to the growing economic chaos was the increasing use of protectionism in 
both Soviet republics and regions. To strengthen the local supply level, republican and local 
actors started to withhold from circulation commodities of vital importance for the Soviet 
economy.120  For the population, the indeed tangible result of these non-conform 
developments were chronic shortages,121 increasing inflation, and unemployment.  
Finally, the policy of the authorities of allowing a drastically widening budgetary 
imbalance was also “non-conformist”. The rising deficit in the country’s international trade 
balance and the growing dependence on international credits created a situation where the 
Soviet Union after 1989 in reality approached the stage of bankruptcy.122  
The above discussion of the relationship between Gorbachev’s economic reforms and 
their unintended consequences makes it possible to conclude that the dismantling of central 
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planning under Gorbachev was not replaced by any other system of organising the economy. 
On the contrary, instead of improving people’s lives, which was the main focus of 
Gorbachev’s rather “tedious” rhetoric tirades,123 the Perestroika experiment came to mean a 
“precipitous decline in the standard of living.”124 
 
Sub-period 2: 1992 – 1996 
When the yet formally Soviet republic, RSFSR, in the aftermath of August 1991 emerged as a 
de facto sovereign Russian state, there were no strong political parties or mass civil-society 
organisations that could exert significant influence on the political processes.125 With the 
disappearance of the CPSU from the historical scene, the leading role in the new Russian 
society was therefore assumed by the new, emerging Russian elite, practically unopposed. 
The post-Soviet ruling elite consisted of a rather diverse mix of recently converted democrats 
and market proponents arising from former Soviet intellectuals and politicians; red 
directors126 and sundry representatives of the former top nomenklatura who had been fully 
released of previous Party constraints;127 along with young biznesmen of the Gorbachev era.  
On the other hand, most of the 57 percent of the Russian electorate that had given 
Yeltsin their vote in the direct presidential elections of 1991 were ordinary citizens who had 
borne the social brunt of Gorbachev’s reforms. Naturally, with their favourite politician 
assuming power in Russia, they now expected tangible improvements.  
Hence, there was no stable constituency for Yeltsin when he inherited the crisis-ridden 
and historically dwarfed Russian state. One of the major dilemmas he immediately faced was 
whether to work with the Russian parliament, elected in 1989 according to the RSFSR 
Constitution, or to call swift elections for a new Constitution and a new Legislature. Yeltsin 
would perhaps have preferred neither, but rather continued in the spirit of a revolutionary and 
unifying leader who had saved the nation from “doomsday” in August 1991.128 However, 
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with both the Gorbachev regime and Communist “hard-liners” ejected from real political life 
in post-August Russia, and the USSR nothing but an empty shell, agendas and allegiances of 
the pro-Yeltsin, Democratic Russia movement rapidly changed.129  
Throughout 1991, Yeltsin seemed to enjoy strong popular endorsement. Nevertheless, 
according to the Russian researcher, Tatiana Koval, in 1991-1992 “only a small fraction – 
between 10 and 15 percent by most estimates – approved of the specific steps to reform the 
country’s economy.”130 Besides, it is uncertain whether majority Russians eventually were 
supportive of many of Yeltsin's other policies, such as dissolving the USSR,131 and the 
tendency of disavowing Soviet achievements and credentials.132   
Yeltsin's perception of his actual and future support might therefore have dissuaded 
him from putting efforts into the potentially risky project of winning a majority in a new 
constitutional legislature. In the event of elections Yeltsin would have had to put forward not 
only his vision for the new Russian statehood, but also specify his reform program. Until 
August 1991, Yeltsin had spoken mostly in general terms of his goals, concentrating on 
generalities such as democracy, market economy, a law-governed state, human rights, cultural 
freedom and a normal life.133   
Elections or not, it was clear that Yeltsin’s priority as of now was to initiate far-
reaching economic changes. Clearly, Russia was a country in free fall economically. There 
was hardly anyone in the Post-Soviet political establishment who questioned the need for 
substantial market reforms. Still, there was no roadmap as to exactly how Yeltsin, a former 
top Party bureaucrat with no outstanding intellectual credentials, in any event in the field of 
economics, would proceed in practical terms with the reforms. Yeltsin was therefore 
susceptible to influences from various quarters such as numerous Soviet politicians, opinion 
makers, as well as entrepreneurial Komsomol leaders who had dramatically changed their 
views under influence of Glasnost, Soviet disintegration and Western contacts. With the 
collapse of the Soviet Union they appeared as militant converts of economic liberalism. Yet 
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the rapid conversion hardly meant that they had changed their basic value system. If earlier 
they had defended economic determinism and looked upon average people’s needs with a 
degree of condescension, the refashioned zealots incorporated their former attributes into the 
new laissez-faire ideological edifice.134  
Moreover, the end-of-the-system ideological transmutation was undoubtedly 
stimulated by the Soviet elite’s craving for money, luxury and material prestige, which under 
Soviet rule officially had been considered ideologically impure. Accumulated through years 
of ubiquitous lack of quality consumer goods, and fed by a humiliating feeling of inferiority 
vis-à-vis the standards set by the West, this form of materialism could now be pursued 
uninhibitedly.135 For the ambitious, well-equipped and well-connected, the prospect of a rapid 
market revolution therefore opened possibilities of affluence and enrichment that in earlier 
times only belonged to the realm of dreams. 
Another issue was that the breakdown of the Soviet system represented a fulfilment of 
the yearnings and endeavours of the numerous global adversaries of the Bolshevik-Soviet 
experiment. The right-wing liberalists, who had gained enormous successes in international 
politics over the previous 10-15 years, saw the breakdown of Soviet socialism as the ultimate 
triumph of their teaching of a maximally unregulated market and a non-intervening state.  
For foreign proponents of liberalism, who indeed exerted enormous influence on the 
new team of emerging politicians and ideologues in Russia, it was of utmost importance both 
to prevent a restoration of the Communist rule in Russia, but also to facilitate the 
implementation of the recommendations of the so-called Washington Consensus in the former 
socialist countries of Eastern Europe. A rapid dismantling of state-run businesses and 
transition to the market would combine these two aspirations.136  
Furthermore, liberalisation of the market would undoubtedly appear attractive to 
economic and administrative managers of the former nomenklatura. As shown, these 
influential actors in the post-Soviet context had already sensed the taste of ownerless state 
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properties that had appeared before them during the last chaotic years of Gorbachev’s 
government. It was obvious that nomenklaturchiks, many of whom had developed high 
proficiency in wheeler-dealer businesses during the Soviet years, would not refrain from 
seizing the opportunity when traditional control mechanisms were paralysed with the 
disintegration and demise of the Party.137 Life in the Soviet Union had definitely taught these 
obviously opportunistic followers of liberalism one particular thing: Nothing should be put off 
till tomorrow if the opportunity appeared today!138 
Finally, the extent to which Yeltsin initially could count on popular backing for his 
market reforms was intrinsically linked to the expectations he had raised among the common 
people with the promise of imminent improvement. Yeltsin had obtained broad support 
thanks to his spirited criticism of inequalities and injustices in the increasingly crisis-ridden 
Soviet system, and he had pointed to the market as the way out of the impasse. 
Balancing interests like the above could not have been an easy task and would have 
required a thorough consequence analysis. As a former Party autocrat, transparency and 
participatory planning was, however, hardly Yeltsin’s strongest side.139 Hence, convinced by 
his own young market liberalists and supported by Western advisors and institutions such as 
the IMF, and the World Bank, Yeltsin unflinchingly opted for the Shock Therapy policy.140  
With the implementation of Shock Therapy, the political situation in the country 
rapidly changed. The unprecedented deterioration in the people’s living conditions caused 
plunging confidence in Yeltsin. This also contributed to changing the prevailing attitude 
towards the President in the Supreme Soviet. Led by their Speaker, and the Vice President of 
the country, the parliamentarians evidently felt that the majority was on their side and that 
their time had come. The previous support to the President soon belonged to history, and a 
fierce confrontation between the two branches of the central Russian power unfolded.  
But Yeltsin was no Gorbachev in terms of vacillating in decisive moments. Besides, 
he had no reason to fear losing either foreign support or substantial backing from the domestic 
elite that were benefitting from his reforms. When the Supreme Soviet in September 1993 
                                               
137
 Kotkin, The Soviet Collapse, 117, observes that the “infinite variety” of swindle businesses that “came to the 
surface” during the period in question “eloquently testified to entrepreneurial skills acquired from decades of 
having engaged in extra-plan dealings for both plan fulfilment and personal gain.”  
138
 Kotkin, ibid., 115, describes the disorder of the transition from Soviet to post-Soviet conditions: “Those in 
power rushed to claim assets before the bureaucratic doors shut for good”. However, Kotkin adds: “The doors to 
property appropriation and self-enrichment were only just opening.” 
139
 Åslund, Russia’s Capitalist Revolution, 91, with reference to, Yevgeny Yasin, Rossiiskaya ekonomika: Istoki 
i panorama rynochnykh reform, (Moscow: Higher School of Economics, 2002), 167-68, deplores that “not 
formulating a formal reform program was a serious mistake.” Further he says that (ibid.): “the reformers had not 
thought all their ideas through or agreed on them.”  
140
 For more details on Shock Therapy programme, see page 37-39 below. 
                                                             
 36 
blocked Yeltsin’s initiatives aimed at changing the constitution and furthermore declared that 
the President was deposed, Yeltsin demonstrated his ability to take action regardless of 
legality or violent consequences. The Russian President simply called in the army, which, 
contrary to the tanks that Yeltsin “heroically” withstood in August 1991, actually opened fire. 
The Russian parliament was shelled before the cameras of international news stations until 
everyone in the building had surrendered. A new Constitution, highly biased in favour of 
presidential power, was swiftly drafted and presented for the electorate through a referendum.  
One of the most extraordinary circumstances associated with Yeltsin’s policies was 
that in critical times, he always gained a comfortable result in the elections. In April 1993, in 
the midst of escalating confrontation with the Supreme Soviet, Yeltsin “successfully” 
conducted a referendum of confidence in him and his economic policies,141 and in December 
the same year he got his Constitution through, apparently with a safe majority on his side.142 
But most importantly, with ratings of around 3-5 percent when the presidential campaign 
started in early 1996, Yeltsin “easily” won a second term against his main contester, the rather 
moderate communist leader, Gennady Zyuganov.143 Thus, thanks to the “blatantly falsified” 
1996 presidential elections, Yeltsin remained in office and was able to continue his policies, 
also in regard to vulnerable groups such as at-risk children.144  If prior to these elections there 
had existed an alternative at least theoretically that could have made a difference in terms of 
changed research allocation in society and increased social mobilisation, in our case to 
neglected children, it was demonstrated that Yeltsin and his wealthy supporters would let no 
one but themselves decide in Russia: In addition to massive election fraud, the oligarchs 
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secured Yeltsin’s re-election by channelling around $ 500 million in support of his 
campaign.145 But as “compensation” the oligarchs received temporary control, which soon 
was to become permanent, over shares in ex-state mining industries.146 To quote Robert 
Service:  
Thus the oligarchs, while rescuing Yeltsin, piled up the mountains of their wealth still higher 
and reinforced the dependence of the political establishment upon their favour. The process of 
privatisation, which had always been corrupt, sank to unprecedented depths.147  
 
At the other extreme of the social spectre, as this thesis will substantiate, children neglected 
by an increasingly impoverished and brutalised adult society continued to add to the swelling 
wave of vagrant minors. In basements, on heating pipes, on landings and in attics, they found 
their sanctuaries, struggling to survive with what they could collect from begging and through 
dishonest activities. Under continuous threat of harassment and violence from adult criminals 
and bums, the street children found a perverted comfort in all sorts of intoxicants, alcohol and 
drugs. Their young lives were being hurtled towards certain disaster.  
 
Additional comments on Economic Aspects of Yeltsyn’s reforms 
A central element of the Shock Therapy which affected most Russians deeply was the price 
liberalisations. The monetary overhang from previous years turned immediately into a 
universal cash deficit:  Hyperinflation gobbled up people’s considerable Soviet-era savings. 
To be sure, Russian shops could before long display commodities that in Soviet times seldom 
or never had been “thrown out” through regular retail outlets.148 But the new goods remained 
unattainable for the overwhelming majority of the population. Measly and delayed wages, 
often barter payments instead of cash, along with growing unemployment, made it impossible 
for millions of Russians to cope with the big price jumps that followed the introduction of 
Shock Therapy. Even basic goods, necessary for a life just above the subsistence level, 
became beyond numerous people’s means.  
The liberalisation of trade, another element of Shock Therapy, made it possible for 
well-connected traders with capital in their pockets to earn super-profits. During the first post-
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Soviet period, raw materials were still priced extremely low on the internal Russian market. 
To sell these commodities abroad required special licenses. But in an atmosphere of endemic 
corruption, formal hurdles could be bypassed, provided that the involved biznesmen shared a 
necessary part of their enormous gains with “collaborating” bureaucrats and politicians. In 
addition, profiting by reselling subsided food import was another rent seeking activity that 
must be seen in light of the rampant corruption in the Russian society.149  
Furthermore, the balancing of the consolidated state budget in order to reduce inflation 
and stabilise the currency was essential for Yeltsin’s reformers.150 Price liberalisation played 
an important role in reducing state expenditures in the sense that subsidises were cut. So did 
the 70 percent reduction in military procurements on the part of the state. “For the rest,” as 
Åslund puts it, Yeltsin and his team “tried to keep state subsidies and public investments 
low.”151  But the reformers could not immediately cut transfers and credits to all non-
profitable state industries to the extent they may have wanted. One thing was that the 
increasingly negative social consequences of the reforms strengthened the political opposition 
and therefore made it difficult for the government to act coherently in terms of pushing for a 
policy that inevitably led to massive lay-offs. Another aspect was that the policy of keeping 
life in faltering Russian state enterprises also provided abundant opportunities for “red 
directors,” as well as for intermediaries within the new private banking sector, to borrow 
money from the Russian Central Bank at moderate rates.152  
Finally, for the architects of Shock Therapy, privatisation was of critical importance in 
order to put an irreversible end to the Soviet system with its state-run businesses.153 In August 
1992 the Russian President therefore pronounced his famous words: “We need millions of 
owners rather than a handful of millionaires.” Furthermore: “[T]he privatisation voucher is a 
ticket for each of us to a free economy.”154 However, by the time the voucher privatization 
was put into practice, a “de facto appropriation of state property and asset stripping by factory 
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directors” was underway.155 Largely impoverished by the effects of Shock Therapy, most 
Russians had become cash-hungry. It was therefore an easy match for incumbent red 
directors and Nouveau Riche financiers to get, at the lowest possible price, a significant part 
of the “plebeian” vouchers, thus gaining full legal control of numerous important former 
Soviet assets.156  Instead of becoming the flagship of Russian “People’s Capitalism,” the 
voucher privatisation, which was completed by the summer of 1994, gave the common people 
a relief that meant little more than peeing in the pants to stay warm.  
A second important chapter of Russian privatisation – the handing over to oligarchs of 
industries within the oil-, gas- and other key raw material-producing sectors, kept out of the 
first wave of privatisation – was written when Yeltsin got his second term secured in 1996. 
This privatisation was closely linked to the loan-for-shares scheme, according to which 
oligarchs not only obtained full ownership over some of the “crown jewels” in the Russian 
economy, but also significantly strengthened their grip on Russian politics in return for their 
help in keeping Yeltsin in power.  
Finally, the phenomenon of capital flight added largely to the problems of the Russian 
economy. Wanting to secure the booty of their dealings and not confident of what the future 
Russia would bring, the new buzinesmen transferred enormous sums of money out of the 
country by criminal means.157 
Yeltsin had stated that the “patient” – the Russian economy – would heal after only 
half a year of “shock” treatment.158 The reality, however, turned out to be completely 
different. Instead of progress, the economic decline continued, creating a downturn that was 
unprecedented for any modern industrial society.159  Until it hit rock bottom in 1998-99, there 
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was no sign of substantial economic regeneration or recovery. With the exception of a limited 
number of raw material-producing units enjoying constant demand for their products, very 
few industries managed to adapt successfully to the new quasi-market conditions.160 
Restructuring of the industry towards new products capable of securing continued production 
was far more complicated than the market reformers might have imagined. The formation of 
new businesses in Russia of the 1990s was also modest and could not compensate for the loss 
of traditional workplaces.161  
However, in order for a tiny minority of the population to take advantage of the 
transformations so as to emerge as everything from moderately affluent or top-world-class 
opulent, the surviving economic capacities in post-Soviet Russia were evidently sufficient. 
Therefore, while the Russian reforms, as it will be detailed in the next chapter, brought 
nothing but a formidable social disaster to the overwhelming majority of Russians, a new 
dominating class was established. Alongside fortunate former nomenklaturchiks, who had 
happened to be at the right place at the right time, the new ruling class in Russia was also 
made up of New Russians who had earned their first capital under the chaotic last years of the 
Gorbachev epoch. This “unholy” alliance was wedded by corrupt politicians and bureaucrats 
across the country who also knew how to get their piece of the cake, and without whom few 
buzines arrangements could come about.  
 
Conclusions 
This chapter has substantiated that the societal transformations which Gorbachev and Yeltsin 
presided over created the preconditions for economic collapse and widespread 
impoverishment of the population. A significant part of the nearly 150 million people who 
became citizens of post-Soviet Russia were hit by a protracted societal crisis that few if any 
other nations have experienced in times of peace. In the ensuing chapters, the implications of 
these developments for child welfare and child protection will be explored in detail. 
To begin with, the above narrative has demonstrated how Gorbachev increasingly 
failed to cope with the numerous domestic and international contradictions that characterised 
the Soviet Union he led. Gorbachev obviously pursued a strategy of simultaneously 
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advancing along a broad front. The last Soviet leader was either unwilling or incapable of 
concentrating on essential economic reforms, while, at least temporarily, put aside initiatives 
that inevitably would unleash unmanageable political and ethnic controversies.  
Furthermore, the thesis gives a critical appraisal of Yeltsin’s contribution to social 
welfare in Russia. Although Yeltsin in 1991 inherited socio-economic problems that had put 
Russia in a far more precarious situation than the one Gorbachev was to handle in 1985, the 
first President of Russia took little advantage of the strong cards that had been dealt out to 
him initially. His popular mandate and strong international support were not transferred into 
politics that met the needs and aspirations of the majority of Russians. Instead he embarked 
on a strategy that pushed him into close alliance with Russia’s “robber capitalists,” 162 thus 
imposing on his own people unprecedented hardship, poverty and despair.    
In the understanding of the author, the post-Soviet economic reforms therefore did not 
fail because they were undermined by rent-seeking activities on the part of the new Russian 
economic elite.163 On the contrary it was the Russian President who succumbed to the 
interests of the rent seekers, thereby providing the latter with significant discretionary rights 
to decide the very agenda of the Russian post-Soviet transformation! 164 
With his liquidation of the Party, Yeltsin perhaps wanted to create an image of the 
Law free of Party arbitrariness. At least to his speech writers, Yeltsin’s directive was to 
highlight the non-discriminatory principle of the rule of law, which was applicable to the 
politicians, bureaucrats and the rich. However, Russia, and in particular the USSR, had never 
been a state where the judiciary had been guaranteed real independence. The established 
tradition was that in legal and other conflicts where the interests of the existing order or of 
privileged groups were at stake, the state and the powerful would always gain the upper hand. 
So, while it was one thing to abolish the former overall organising system with all its 
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shortcomings and injustices; it was another to set up an alternative model that disciplined and 
bound the society together.  
The 1990s gave few if any signs of a new value system being adapted by the dominant 
players in politics, bureaucracy and business. The “bank run” on state properties that had 
started under Gorbachev therefore turned into a formidable and uninhibited plundering of 
former state assets.165 No authority could secure a rule-based and transparent transition of 
property rights. Former “nomenklaturchiks” and emerging businessmen tried to get as much 
as possible out of the unguarded “bank vaults” before their gates possibly again closed, 
thereby also setting the standard for the characteristic legal nihilism of the post-Soviet 
years.166  
The assumption of this thesis is that it was not only those officials who had marketable 
state assets under their authority who took advantage of their position; a similar systemic 
negligence of statutory obligations is also assumed to have taken place by analogue, so to 
speak, in social and public health establishments.  
There seem to be no empirical studies that can bring evidence to the issue of how 
serious the reduction in discipline and efficiency might have been in non-marketable Soviet 
and post-Soviet public health organisations and social agencies. However, if the 
disorganisation within this sphere only approximately equalled the extent to which marketable 
Soviet and post-Soviet organisations were “looted,”167 this may provide new information that 
can help in our understanding of the nature and scope of the social crisis in transitional 
Russia. The study of the evolving capacity of the Commission for the Affairs of Minors, 
addressed by this thesis, will expectedly add knowledge to this aspect of the Russian reforms.  
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Chapter 4 
DETERMINANTS OF CHILD NEGLECT AT MACRO AND MICRO LEVELS 
 
Introduction   
The purpose of this chapter is to explore in detail the effects of the Soviet collapse (“Soviet 
collapse” is in this context understood in line with the discussions of Chapter 3) on economic 
and social determinants of child neglect at national and family levels. The chapter begins with 
a review of a number of “leading economic variables.”168 This is in keeping with the 
methodology adopted by UNICEF to explain the immediate causes of the social changes that 
occurred in transitional Russia (as well as in other Eastern European states under transition). 
As the old system disintegrated and a new societal formation emerged, Eastern Europe saw a 
dramatic slump in its gross domestic product (GDP), which UNICEF regards as an overall 
indicator for the negative social development of the region.169 The second section analyses ten 
specific risk factors, i.e. determinants of child neglect at the family or micro level. The 
methodology expands on UNICEF’s research on the transitional societies of Eastern 
European and utilises some key conclusions as established by Dr Vasilii Sereda, a Russian 
specialist on child-neglect issues, in his research. Finally the working hypotheses of this study 
are framed, which will provide the basis for further empirical examinations of the research 
topics of the thesis in the next two chapters.  
 
Leading Economic Variables/Determinants of Child Neglect at Macro Level 
Several analysts of the socio-economic development of Russia during transition (e.g. 
UNICEF) take 1989 as the base-line year. This is linked to the fact that GDP is a fundamental 
indicator of the status of the entire societal organism, and furthermore that the GDP level of 
1989, as will be documented later, was the highest that Soviet Russia had ever reached. This 
also explains why the statistical material used in this thesis often starts with 1989. Indeed, 
while assessing several of the child-neglect determinants, it was difficult to come by data of 
the pre-1989 years; clearly a pointer to the statistical dearth that characterised critical aspects 
of Soviet society, even well into the Gorbachev era.   
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Table 4.1: Annual economic growth in Russia, 1985-1989 170  
1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 
1.8 2.7 1.8 3.7 1.5 
 
Table 4.1 indicates that the official GDP growth in 1985 was a mere 1.8 percent, highlighting 
the alarming condition of the Soviet economy when Gorbachev assumed power. No 
significant growth could be observed in 1986 or in 1987, a factor which probably pushed 
Gorbachev to pursue a more radical approach in his efforts to reignite the Soviet economy. 
The growth of 3.7 percent in 1988 may have been propelled by the limited market reforms 
that were introduced. But these reforms – in combination with the others that Gorbachev 
initiated – resulted in unanticipated internal developments in the USSR, which turned out to 
be counterproductive for a sustained growth. The following year, 1989, was a turning point 
before the downturn began, demonstrating a GDP growth of only 1.5 percent, the lowest 
recorded after World War II. 
As indicated in Chapter 3, the period 1987 - 1989 was characterised by rising 
imbalances in the Soviet economy. Following Gorbachev’s radical reforms, the customary 
shortages became even more ubiquitous, creating civic frustrations and increasing existing 
vulnerabilities. However, with the GDP still growing until 1989, albeit feebly, there could be 
no significant deterioration in the living conditions of Russians – children and youth included.  
Table 4.2: Annual GDP growth in Russia, 1989-1999171  
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999, 1989=100 
0,0 -4.0 -5.0 -14.5 -8.7 -12.7 -4.1 -3.5 0.8 -4.6 57 
 
Table 4.2 provides data on GDP developments in Russia from 1989 to 1999.172 As the 
disintegration process of the USSR picked up pace, the economic crisis worsened with annual 
downturns in GDP of 4 and 5 percent in 1990 and 1991, respectively. But it was with the 
launch of Shock Therapy in January 1992 that the economy indeed plummeted. In 1992, the 
economic decline almost tripled compared with the last year when the USSR still formally 
existed. In 1993, the GDP contraction was 8.7 percent. The economic decline took one step 
back in 1994 when the GDP plunged by 12.7 percent against the previous year. Then in 1995 
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and 1996 the downturn decelerated with a GDP reduction of “only” 4.1 and 3.5 percent 
respectively. The second post-Soviet shock of 1998 is beyond the scope of this thesis. Yet it is 
interesting to note that by 1999, the GDP was 57 percent of what it was ten years earlier.  
The GDP decline of the 1990s was unprecedented for any country in peacetime, that 
is, outside the post-Soviet context. Although it can be argued that some of the industrial 
capacities that were lost might have represented excessive military production, the downturn 
affected all sectors of the economy, from machine building and other heavy industry to 
production of child nutrition (see Chapter 5). Value creation fell across the board and incomes 
dwindled at private, enterprise and state levels.  
Table 4.3: End-of-year inflation in Russia 1992-1996173 
1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 
6.2 7.3 8.4 10.5 53.6 675 2321.6 841.6 202.7 131.4 21.8 
 
The researcher William Moskoff indicates an annual price rise in the range of 6.2 to 8.4 
percent from 1986 to 1988, i.e. before the disintegration started. Inflation soared after 1989 
when the hard-pressed authorities, without any real economic fundamentals in place, began to 
raise salaries to appease a grumbling population. In 1990 inflation thus reached 53.6 percent. 
In the period between January and June 1991, the increase was 90 percent while, according to 
Moskoff, the inflation comprised 650-700 percent for the entire year of 1991. 174  
But it was in 1992, with the removal of price control on most commodities that prices 
skyrocketed and Russians came face to face with the phenomenon of hyperinflation. In 1992, 
the first year of Shock Therapy, inflation reached 2,321 percent compared to the previous 
year. In 1993, the annual price rise dropped and plateaued at 841 percent. Inflation was 
further reduced in 1994 and 1995, reaching a more acceptable low of 21.8 percent in 1996. 
Hence, a relative balance between demand and supply was attained. The reforms thus met the 
objective of eliminating the monetary overhang.175 However, the other side of the story was 
that the overwhelming majority of Russians, almost overnight, lost their personal savings.176 
Money put aside was quickly gone as salaries and bank interests fell far behind the inflation.  
Table 4.4: Annual changes in real wages until 1989177   
1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 
2.1 0.9 2.7 7.3 7.3 
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Table 4.4 indicates moderate pay rises from 1985 to 1987, more or less corresponding to the 
GDP development of these years. From this point of time political turbulence increasingly left 
its imprint on Soviet society. Beginning with 1987, Glasnost made it possible to raise issues 
that in effect undermined the hitherto vigilantly preserved Soviet consensus and stability. As 
mentioned earlier, the authorities resorted to salary increases to alleviate distress. The failure 
of the system to provide supplies that matched the pay rises, however, led to inflation and 
undermined the Social Contract inherited from the Brezhnev era.  
Table 4.5: Annual index of real wages after 1989 (1989=100)178   
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 
100 109.1 102.4 68.9 68.1 63.1 45.5 51.5 
 
Table 4.5 demonstrates that salary increases without real-economic coverage continued into 
1990, but ebbed in the course of 1991. As Yeltsin prepared for radical economic reforms, the 
strategy of containing social unrest by increasing salaries was abandoned.  
With the collapse of the command economy and the introduction of Shock Therapy, 
enterprises soon faltered and many were forced to shut down. As also stated in Chapter 3, 
numerous people lost their jobs and incomes. People’s purchasing power went down 
dramatically in a situation where their savings had been wiped out almost immediately after 
the onset of Shock Therapy.179  
Overall, during the period 1989 – 1996, real wages in Russia were reduced to almost 
half. The fall was particularly sharp between 1991 and 1992, when wages slumped from 
102.4 to 68.9 percent of the 1989 level. A new major decline occurred in 1995 when the real-
wages level constituted only 45 percent of the 1989 level.  1996 recorded a surprisingly minor 
increase in real wages. Whether this was due to statistical inaccuracies or whether it mirrored 
the efforts to have Yeltsin re-elected, is beyond this thesis to assess.   
Table 4.6: Employment ratio (percent of employed population aged 15-59 years)180   
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 
83.6 83.4 81.7 79.6 78.0 70.8 69.7 68.1 
 
There are no statistics available on unemployment during the pre-Perestroika period. With 
Glasnost, unemployment figures started to be recorded. However, Soviet authorities still 
seemed very cautious when publishing such information. The discrepancy that existed 
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between official and real unemployment figures under Gorbachev is assessed by Moskoff. By 
applying a modified version of Okun’s Law on the quantitative relationship between changes 
in the rate of unemployment and changes in GDP,181 Moskoff has arrived at relatively high 
unemployment figures. With correction for the low labour productivity in Russia, Moskoff 
suggests a ratio of one percent rise in unemployment for every one percent decline in GDP. In 
accordance with Moskoff’s assumption,182 the alleged Soviet GDP decline of 12 percent from 
January 1991 until October 1991 should correspond to a rise in unemployment by 
approximately 12 percent. This would amount to a total of 13.8 million unemployed in 1991 
as against the official figure of 2 million.183 A more conservative estimate, utilising the 
official GDP reduction of 9 percent from 1989-1991, would imply an unemployment growth 
of 9 percent, still far beyond the modest deterioration indicated for this period in Table 4.6.   
Hence, Table 4.6 shows an unrealistically low reduction in the work force taking into 
account the dimensions of the economic downturn. Several factors may have contributed to 
the assumed inconsistency between the real number of unemployed and the official figures. 
Firstly, it was only in 1991 that “unemployment” became an officially acceptable category 
after having been regarded as “parasitic” activity for nearly 70 years. Secondly, the incentives 
for registering at an employment exchange office were few; the system was new and 
unknown, and there “was a low probability of receiving an unemployment benefit even if a 
jobless applied for it...” as well as “a low probability of an unemployed person obtaining a job 
through the employment service”.184 
According to Steven Rosefielde, the Russian statistical authorities, “after claiming for 
years that unemployment in the nineties was just a few percent” did, by the end of the 90s, 
admit that “the figure was in the mid teens”.185Discussing the situation in Russia of the late 
90s, Rosefielde claims that “the real unemployment rate was closer to 25 percent, a figure in 
line with a 45 percent fall in GDP”.186 
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Hence, there are no precise figures on unemployment in Russia during the first years 
of Yeltsin’s economic reforms. However, if Okun’s law in the interpretation referred to earlier 
is applied, the real unemployment rate would have increased by 14.5 percent in 1992 and by 
8.7 percent in 1993, equalling the GDP contraction of those particular years. In any event, the 
research referred to corroborates the assertion that official Russian figures are heavily 
deflated: The real figure might therefore be somewhere in between these extremes, perhaps in 
the range indicated by Rosefielde in his research.187  
All parameters discussed above indicate a growing number of Russians living under 
the subsistence level, or to put it more bluntly, living in poverty. The word “poverty” as such 
had not existed in official Soviet discourse pertaining to the situation in the country. Until the 
late 1980s, references in Soviet publications to domestic bednost’ (poverty) were 
unimaginable. But researchers could make mention of malolbespechennye (not sufficiently 
provided for) families, for the purpose of defining minimum wage rates and family 
supplements, etc.  
Table 4.7: Average Wage and Poverty Threshold (calculated in 1987 roubles)188  
 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 
Average Wage 214 231 246 266 239 148 147 127 97 109 
Poverty Threshold 75 74 78 88 94 47 51 50 53 50 
 
Table 4.7 provides figures on the official subsistence levels as existed from 1987 to 1996. For 
comparison, the table also gives average wages corrected for inflation over the same period. 
Interestingly, the authorities calculated the criteria for subsistence level differently before and 
after the system change. In terms of spending patterns, food accounted for approximately one-
half of a poor family’s total expenditure until 1990-91, whereas after 1991 nutritional items 
comprised more than two-thirds of the expenditure to stay above the poverty line.189  
The World Bank economist Branko Milanovic has attempted to calculate the number of poor 
people in Central and Eastern Europe before and after the system change.190 He uses the same 
criteria for all countries, namely a purchasing power of 4 “international” USD per person per 
day, or 120 international USD per month. A purchase-power parity (PPP) exchange rate is 
used for each country, representing the amount of units of local currency needed to buy USD 
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1 worth of basic goods at international prices.191 Table 4.8 shows the comparable poverty 
development in Russia before and after 1991 according to this method.192  
Table 4.8: Estimated poverty in Russia, 1987-88 and 1993-95193  
 1987-88 1993-95 
Poverty headcount (%) 2 50 
Total number of the poor (million) 2.2 74.2 
 
An interesting disparity occurs when comparing the number of the poor in Russia according 
to the fixed criterion for subsistence level applied both to the period before and after 1991 
(Table 4.8), on the one hand, and the lowered poverty criteria introduced by the Russian 
authorities after 1991 (Table 4.7), on the other. Whereas Milanovic’s calculation method 
implies that poverty after 1991 embraced around half the population, the official poverty 
criteria resulted in far fewer people living below subsistence level. According to information 
from the Russian Ministry of Labour, the population living in poverty made up 26 percent in 
1992, 29 in 1993, 25 in 1994, 29 in 1995, and about 25 percent in 1996. 194   
Table 4.9: Distribution of earnings: Gini coefficient195  
 1987/88196 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 
Gini coefficient 0.24 0.271 0.269 0.325 0.371 0.461 0.446 0.471 0.483 
  
Throughout the Soviet period, Russians had become accustomed, for better or for worse, to a 
relatively high degree of equal distribution of wealth. With the exception of top Party bosses 
and others who enjoyed huge fringe benefits and other unofficial privileges, the USSR was 
characterised by the phenomenon of uravilovka (prerogative for excessive wage-levelling).  
With unparalleled rapidity, from 1991 the gap between the haves and the have-nots 
widened. Consequently, one can assume that the condition of poverty, which about half of the 
population abruptly ended up in living, must have been more difficult to accept when 
accompanied by the highly unfamiliar income and living standard inequality that came to 
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characterise post-Soviet Russia. Table 4.9 demonstrates the sharp social polarisation that 
developed over the period 1987 to 1996, expressed in a changing Gini coefficient.197 
Table 4.10. Government expenditure as percent of GDP198 
 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 
GDP Development (for comparison) 0,0 -4.0 -5.0 -14.5 -8.7 -12.7 -4.1 -3.5 
Public Social Expenditure - 10.1 7.4 7.3 8.4 9.0 7.7 - 
Public Expenditure on Health 2.6 2.3 2.4 2.5 3.2 3.2 2.4 - 
Public Expenditure on Education 4.7 3.5 3.6 3.6 4.0 4.5 3.4 - 
Family and Maternity Allowances 0.3 0.3 2.1 0.6 0.5 0.8 - - 
 
Finally, state finances must also be taken into consideration as an overall determinant for 
child neglect, closely related to the concept of leading economic parameters. First, it must be 
emphasised that before 1991-92 several social and cultural benefits for the people were 
provided by the enterprises and by the organisations where they were employed. Data on the 
situation before 1992 regarding the value of inputs offered by these service providers,199 as 
well as on the pre-1989 level of governmental expenditures for social and cultural purposes, 
were unfortunately not available for this thesis. There is, however, no indication that there 
were any significant cuts on these budget lines before 1989. The substantial changes must 
have started with 1989. An accelerating GDP contraction, along with growing rent-seeking 
and corruption, clearly suggests that the Russian state saw a dramatically shrinking base for 
its revenues from then on, but especially after 1991.  
According to Åslund, the state revenues in Russia did fall from about 40 percent of the 
GDP in early 1992 to about 33 percent by late 1996.200 It goes without saying that with a 
rapidly declining GDP, various social and cultural budget lines would have required a 
considerable increase in terms of their percentage share of the GDP if they were to guarantee 
at least the same level of social services, etc. as it had been until 1989. But with the growth in 
caseloads of vulnerable people, all in need of support from the Russian state, the 1989-level 
of social and cultural service provisions soon lost its relevance as a point of comparison. 
Table 4.10 demonstrates that no such substantial increase in state expenditure for state 
services occurred after 1989, even in terms of the percentage of a shrinking GDP. Although 
one of the proclaimed objectives of Shock Therapy was to obtain financial stabilisation, major 
cuts in the state expenditure (e.g. reductions in investments and subsidies, as well as in 
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military spending), there was obviously some space for minor adjustments in terms of the 
percentage share other budget lines had of the overall governmental budget. This might 
explain the relative increase in public spending that for example health, education and family 
allowances saw after 1991. But again, this was an increase expressed in percentage of a 
rapidly shrinking GDP, and the tendency was only partial.  
The outline in this chapter of a number of leading economic parameters, along with 
the assessment of both poverty and relevant state funding, allow for unequivocal conclusions 
to be made. Firstly, few if any of the analysed macro socio-economic indicators vis-à-vis 
children’s well-being started to go in a negative direction before 1989. Between 1989 and 
1991 the GDP started to decline, and with this a number of other leading economic 
parameters also started to show a downward trend. Thus this period saw the creation of 
preconditions that would lead to child neglect.  
It was, however, with the advent of the Shock Therapy in early 1992 that the leading 
economic parameters changed radically. Russia went into a period of unprecedented downturn 
in terms of its economic and social performance. The majority of Russians were deprived of 
their incomes and savings, and a significant part of the population lost their jobs or at least 
became functionally unemployed. More than half of all Russians fell below the subsistence 
level and were therefore subject to impoverishment.  The Russian state became equally 
insolvent. State revenues plunged in tandem with the contracting GDP. Furthermore, as 
indicated in Chapter 3, the state was stripped of incomes and profitable assets, both through 
rent-seeking as well as privatisation by which it, among other things,  handed over some of its 
most precious natural resources for little more than nothing to the new ruling class of Russia. 
 
Risk Factors at Family, or Micro, Level 
The second section of this chapter explores how the negative socio-economic occurrences as 
identified earlier translated into micro determinants that presumably led to the emergence of a 
new wave of neglected and abandoned children in Russia’s big cities and towns. A central 
methodological challenge in this chapter is to identify those determinants of child neglect that 
are particularly potent in terms of causing changes at the level of manifested Child Neglect 
Phenomena. The most comprehensive and continuous studies on children’s living conditions, 
or well-being, in Central and East European countries, from late 1980s onwards, have been 
done by UNICEF under the Monee Project. As part of this project, numerous reports and 
analyses have been published. 
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All countries in Central and Eastern Europe that had adopted the Soviet model of 
socialism to varying degrees are included in the UNICEF monitoring. Although historically 
and culturally different, these countries had in this context the following points in common: In 
the period between 1989 and 1991 they underwent a relatively abrupt departure from a system 
of planned economies and one-party rule, proclaiming the introduction of market economy 
combined with representative democracy and respect for human rights. 
It is important to underline that the UNICEF monitoring has no specific emphasis on 
the most extreme form of child neglect, or absence of child well-being, i.e. the condition of 
children who in reality had been abandoned by the adult society. In other words, UNICEF’s 
research does not direct any explicit attention to the causes and manifestations of street 
children.201 UNICEF’s scope is definitively much broader. The benchmark for UNICEF’s 
observations and analyses of the evolving living conditions of children in Central and Eastern 
Europe is associated with the concept of child well-being, which, in turn, is derived from the 
UN Convention on the Child’s Rights. The UN Convention builds on the idea that all children 
are entitled to a life in which all requirements for an adequate childhood are fulfilled, and are 
formulated so as to address a broad spectre of needs, including physical needs (food, shelter, 
health, protection, etc.), as well as emotional, social, educational and spiritual needs.202  
At first glance it might therefore appear as if certain rights of children, as well as the 
UNICEF risk factors associated with them, set standards that are far too elevated as far as 
street children are concerned. On the other hand, it is obvious that the eight main categories of 
child risk that UNICEF has identified as typical for the transition societies are interlinked and 
interdependent. The risk categories are: poverty; war and dislocation; environmental 
degradation; health and health service deterioration; changes in family formation, including 
rising family-breakdown rates; falling access to education and rising truancy; youth lifestyle 
and health, including an increase in drug abuse and the occurrence of sexually transmitted 
diseases; and juvenile crime.203 First, these risk factors are interlinked due to the fact that in 
the given historical context they must be understood in light of one homogeneous causality; 
the 20th century European socialist states as well as their succeeding transitional societies. 
Second, several of the mentioned risks are interdependent in the sense that some factors 
contribute to strengthening others.  
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As examined in the first section of this chapter, UNICEF points at the “strong 
correlation” between a number of indicators for the above risk factors on the one hand, and 
“leading economic variables” on the other.204 Furthermore, UNICEF stresses that poverty is to 
be considered the main risk factor, strongly influencing the conditions under which children 
typically resided during post-socialist transition.205 Supported by its monitoring and analyses, 
UNICEF uses the increase in juvenile crime during this period as a case to demonstrate how 
various risk factors might influence one another. According to UNICEF, the probability of 
juvenile delinquency increases with the presence of a number of risk factors both at the family 
level (e.g. poverty, divorce, and parental dysfunctions) as well as at the personal level (e.g. 
increasing truancy, alcohol consumption, drug use, etc.). UNICEF states that all the 
mentioned risk factors influencing crime amongst minors “heightened during the 
transition”.206  
Moving closer to a concretisation of those micro-risk factors or (child neglect 
determinants)207 that are particularly detrimental and contribute to pushing children onto the 
streets, the thesis will now turn to some of the risk factors described in the Scale for 
identification of risk factors for children living in families by Dr Vasilii Sereda.208 Drawing 
on a life-long research and practical work devoted to vulnerable children, and over the past 
two decades to street children, Dr Sereda has developed a scale for risk factors causing gross 
child neglect. In a range from one to ten, ten represents the highest possible degree of risk. 
The 10 factors and their respective weighted risk are: parental misuse of alcohol – 10; parental 
drug addiction – 10;   parental child abuse (violence) –-10; maternal asocial behaviour – 10; 
unemployment for both parents – 10; multi-child families – 9; disadvantageous psychological 
climate in the family – 8;   single-parent family – 5; incomes for the family significantly 
below the subsistence level – 6; bad housing and hygienic living conditions – 5. 
Obviously, the street-children risk factors suggested by Dr Sereda fall within the scope 
of the broader and more general UNICEF child risk factors of the transition period in a way 
that make the former a special case of the latter. Consequently, the causal dependence of the 
UNICEF transition risk factors on leading economic determinants, as well as the 
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interconnection between these risk factors, remains valid as far as the street-children risk 
factors as established by Dr Sereda are concerned. 209 
Several of these risk factors have been put to very little, if any, empirical research, 
especially from a longitudinal perspective. This complicates the process of assessing data on 
the dynamics of these risk factors over the period studied. Hence, a practical “compromise” 
must be reached between the availability of information, on the one hand, and the relevance of 
the various risk factors, on the other. In order to assess the trends, which the ten risk factors 
followed, a classification will be made according to the level of research conducted on each of 
the factors. A consideration of the literature reviewed for the thesis may allow for a division 
of the risk factors into four main groups: No studies exist; limited studies exist; indirect data 
exist; specific data exist.     
i) No studies exist: (maternal asocial behaviour - 10; disadvantageous psychological 
climate in the family – 8).   Dr Sereda has in conversations with the author of this thesis 
explained that in the Russian context, the following mainly single-mother attributes are 
associated with the risk factor “maternal asocial behaviour:” extreme cases of mainly single-
mother sexual promiscuity including prostitution; frequent misuse of alcohol and drugs; 
“unwillingness” to take on traditional work; and dirty, disorderly homes. According to Dr 
Sereda disadvantageous psychological climate in the family has to do with an extremely 
negative emotional relationship between certain, again, most often single mothers and their 
children. If the birth of the child in question was an “accident” and the child was unwanted in 
the first place, and if the mother continues to strongly regret the child’s existence, this might 
lead to a very destructive environment for the child to grow up in.  
While it seems difficult to define exact indicators for measuring the prevalence of this 
particular risk factor, not to mention to find precise data pertaining to it,210 it is obvious that 
the phenomena behind such a risk factor are at least partially linked to, and overlap with, 
several other risk factors discussed in this chapter. For the purpose of this thesis it is therefore 
assumed that most of the risk factors mentioned by Dr Sereda will be discussed under topics 
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such as parental misuse of alcohol and drugs, unemployment, bad housing and hygienic living 
conditions, and single-parent families.  
ii) Limited or no systematic empirical data: (parental child abuse – 10).   Domestic 
violence in general and child abuse in particular were among the many social and 
criminological topics that were withheld from public discourse in the pre-Glasnost Soviet 
Union. Although the veil was partly lifted during the Gorbachev era, the study of child-abuse 
in Russia was not included in Russian medical and human service literature till as late as 
1995.211 Yet it seems beyond doubt that domestic violence has been and remains a serious 
problem in Russia. As the American researcher Sharon Horne demonstrates in a study, there 
was a dramatic rise in domestic violence against women in Russia from the late 1980s until 
the mid 90s.212 In her research, Horne refers to data indicating the following dynamics in 
terms of women killed by their male partners: In 1989 a total of 1,623 women were murdered; 
in 1990 the figure went up to 1,914 women; and in 1991, 5,300 women had been killed. These 
figures pertain to the entire USSR. After the system changed the number of women who lost 
their lives under such circumstances in Russia alone, which constituted half the population of 
the former USSR, increased dramatically. In 1993, a total of 14,500 women were murdered 
by their partners; in 1994, the figure went up to15,000 women; and in 1995, it had climbed to 
16,000 women. If compared to analogous figures in other countries, e.g. the 1,423 American 
women who in 1992 where murdered by their male partners in a country with twice the 
population of Russia, the gravity of domestic violence in Russia becomes more evident.  
When assessing the figures on partner violence against women, the phenomenon of 
latent crime must definitively be taken into consideration. In Russian criminology, latent 
crime is understood as unreported crime, or reported crime that is not duly followed up by law 
enforcement intervention, and constitutes a significant part of the total crime scenario. 
Increasing corruption and failing efficiency on the part of the police and judiciary during the 
post-Soviet transition period are two reasons why many crimes went unreported. Another 
reason was that public trust in law enforcement agencies dwindled; people did not think it was 
worth their while to report crimes. Clearly, the militia was not proactive in curbing crime, and 
in some cases it could even turn the incident against the aggrieved person and use it as a 
pretext for extortion. According to a study carried out by Konstantin Goryainov, chief 
researcher at the Russian Ministry of Internal, crime latency of this period is estimated at 70 
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percent. Hence, official criminal statistics may reflect only 30 percent of the real 
criminality.213  
The latent-crime factor therefore provides important indications of the actual scale of 
child abuse: First, although children are not directly involved in the phenomenon of partner 
homicide, the latter is clearly indicative of the general level of violence that was prevalent in 
Russian homes and therefore of child abuse in the period between 1987 and 96. Second, while 
underreporting might be less significant when it comes to such manifest crimes as murder 
(although murders can be written off as “accidents” or “disappearance” and therefore not be 
properly accounted for), it is especially high when it comes to “less noticeable” crimes such 
as child abuse. 
This assumption is confirmed by a dissertation on sexual abuse of minors written by 
Galina Yegoshina in 1999. Yegoshina reviews data, collected in 1993 by a psychological 
crisis centre for juveniles in St. Petersburg, suggesting that around 30 percent of those 
surveyed had experienced sexual abuse. However, only 10 percent of these minors had 
contacted the police.214 Furthermore, in a specific survey undertaken by Yegoshina and 
comprising roughly 338 children of the senior grades in comprehensive schools in the Russian 
republic in Marii El, the results were similar. A total of 76.9 percent of the respondees had 
been victims of “physical or psychical violence,” including 4.2 percent who had experienced 
sexual violence. But only one pupil had contacted the police. A total of 44.1 percent of the 
interviewed emphasised that they had no confidence in the police, in the prosecution 
authorities, or in the courts.215  
Another source of latent crime related to child sexual abuse is indicated in a study by 
Grazyna Lasuk in 1989. Lasuk notes that “at times” a mother might be fully aware of the fact 
that the stepfather or father is raping or even “cohabiting” with her daughter. However, she 
neither reports the criminal acts nor confronts the perpetrator for the fear of losing the 
breadwinner of the family.216 
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Child abuse and its relationship with other major risk factors such as poverty and 
alcohol, forms the interdependent risk-factor complexity referred to above as a central 
element in the UNICEF methodology for understanding the deteriorated child welfare 
situation during post-socialist transition. This methodology is indirectly supported by 
empirical findings in the referred studies on sexual abuse of children, conducted by Lasuk and 
Yegoshina. First, in this period sexual crimes in Russia thrived in socially disadvantageous 
environments. Although neither of the works focuses on child abuse within families, the 
studies state that those committing sexual assault on minors largely originated from non-
educated, under-privileged, and poor-resource settings. For example, Lasuk concludes that 
children who have been victims of violence committed by stepfathers, fathers or relatives “as 
a rule” originate from socially disadvantageous families.217  
Lasuk and Yegoshina’s findings harmonise with the assumption that deteriorating 
living conditions, at least in the context of the Russian transition from plan to market, 
increased the incidence of domestic child abuse. Their findings are explicit when establishing 
a clear correlation between sexual assault against children and alcohol consumption on the 
part of the perpetrator. Lasuk’s studies from Tatarstan of the late 1980s established that 62.8 
percent of the offenders were under influence of alcohol at the moment of the misdeed. Less 
than ten years later, according to Yegoshina’s empirical studies in Marii El, 69.2 percent of 
the sexual assaults on minors were committed by drunken criminals.218 Hence, in the tradition 
of Russian binge drinking, there is a clear link between drinking and violent behaviour 
towards children.219 It may be assumed therefore that increased heavy adult drinking in the 
Russian transition context will increase the risk for children to violence and abuse. 
Although there seems to be no hard evidence to gauge the scope of the evolving child-
abuse problem in Russia, the various “circumstantial evidences” assessed above point to a 
clear conclusion: After 1991 there was a significant increase in real (in contrast to reported) 
cases of domestic child abuse.  
iii). Indirect data is available: (unemployment of both parents – 10; multi child 
families – 9; family income significantly below the subsistence level – 6; bad housing and 
hygienic conditions – 5). The family-level risk factors such as unemployment of both parents 
as well as family income significantly below the subsistence level are conceptually so close to 
                                                                                                                                                   
Law. (Kazan: Kazan State University, 1991), 147. 
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 Lasuk, Sekusal’nye posiagatel’stva, 167. 
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 Lasuk, Sekusal’nye posiagatel’stva, 156; Yegoshina, Sekusal’nye posjagatel’stva na maloletnykh, 136. 
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 WHO, “Interpersonal Violence and Alcohol in the Russian Federation.” Policy Briefing. (WHO: 
Copenhagen), 4: “In the Russian Federation, alcohol consumption has been noted to be involved in the 
perpetration of violence generally as well as in specific types of violence.”  
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the corresponding macro-socioeconomic risk factors (or determinants) presented above that a 
separate discussion of these is hardly required. Also the risk factor multi-child families –
defined in Russia as families comprising three or more children – must have developed in 
parallel with the worsening poverty situation in the country. Moreover, as incomes dwindled, 
multi-children families were obviously worse off simply because they had more mouths to fill 
and fewer resources at their disposal.220 Child allowances in Russia were so modest that such 
entitlements, if received at all, could by no means compensate for loss of job and income.221  
When it comes to the risk factor bad housing and hygienic conditions, it must be 
emphasised that the ubiquitous housing shortages, including the extensive and persistent sub-
standard dwelling conditions that characterised the Soviet Union throughout its history, did 
not change for the better when the Soviet economy started to collapse after 1989.222 One of 
the most distinguishing macro-economic developments of this period was the extraordinary 
drop in public and industrial investments.223 There is no indication that investments in 
construction of new housing or repairs of old housing stock were higher than in other sectors 
of the economy. On the contrary, apart from Moscow and perhaps a few other cities where 
construction of prestigious buildings for the new and small Russian elite did not stop during 
the post-Soviet economic crisis, the housing standard for average citizens across the country 
deteriorated significantly during the 1990s .  
The post-Soviet privatisation of people’s flats must be mentioned. According to the 
researcher Tova Höjdestrand, who wrote her PhD on “Homelessness and Humanness in Post-
socialist Russia”,224 the privatisation of housing often resulted in frauds and extortions.225 Due 
to manipulations by owners and intermediaries, several Russians lost their privatised flats. 
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 “Child Poverty in Russia: Alarming Trends and Policy Options”, (Moscow: UNICEF, 2005)30. This UNICEF 
report of 2005 on poverty in Russia (referring to the transition period in general) published by its Russian 
bureau, states that for families with three or more children there is a 90-95% probability of being impoverished. 
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dissertation.  (University of Stockholm: Department of Social Anthropology, 2005). 
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 T. Höjdestrand, “The Soviet-Russian Production of Homelessness”, “AntroBase.com” 2003, 10. 
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Many people had to move in with their relatives or acquaintances; in several cases this created 
stress and frustration in the overcrowded homes. Others ended up as bomzh’y226 adding to the 
increasing army of homeless persons in post-Soviet Russia.227 Some parents brought their 
children with them into this state of homelessness, thereby creating new manifested cases of 
street children.  
In conclusion, it seems probable that the developments associated with this category of 
risk factors were not very divergent from the trends established for other leading economic 
parameters as well as for family risk factors hitherto discussed. After minor changes until 
1988-89, a more significantly negative development became a fact, increasingly so after 1991.  
iv) Specific data is available: (parental alcohol abuse – 10; parental drug addiction– 
10;   single-parent family – 5).  As far as parental alcohol abuse is concerned, it should first be 
emphasised that there were conflicting views vis-à-vis alcohol in Soviet politics.228 On the 
one hand, “classic” bolshevism viewed drinking as a remnant of past class societies where the 
privileged class had nurtured destructive alcohol habits among the suppressed and toiling 
masses so as to keep them passive and indifferent to their lot. On the other hand, the tradition 
among Russians (as well as among many other peoples living in the USSR) of celebrating 
holidays and other events with alcoholic beverage could not be ignored even by ideologically 
prohibitionist Bolsheviks. Hence, drinking as a phenomenon did definitively not vanish under 
Soviet power, although its root causes, according to Marxist orthodoxy, had been eliminated. 
In contrast, socially harmful drinking thrived. Especially after World War II, alcohol-related 
problems became detrimental to the country’s economy as well as to its social fabric.229  
One of the most controversial policies associated with Gorbachev as the new Party 
leader was the radical anti-alcohol policy that he launched.  In terms of the measures that were 
employed, the campaign largely surpassed former Party initiatives against alcohol. Still, as 
demonstrated in the first section of this chapter, the Soviet economy did not receive a new 
growth impulse. However, the drastic production cuts and extensive reduction in the number 
of alcohol outlets, in particular over the period 1985-1987, did have several wide-reaching 
consequences. To take the unintended ones first, the anti-alcohol campaign gave rise to an 
explosive growth in the consumption of samogon (moonshine) and various substitutes. At the 
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for children’ situation in families. In 1940 women accounted for 4 percent of all heavy drinkers, by 1960 the 
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same time, state finances were damaged. But also important, the anti-alcohol policy largely 
contributed to undermining popular trust in Gorbachev’s reforms. People felt that the most 
accessible way of finding pleasure under “mature” socialism – that is, to take a drink or more 
whenever there was an occasion – became virtually impossible due to the many restrictions 
imposed on alcohol. While the desperate and chronic alcoholics resorted to samogon and 
chemical substances, the moderate had to abstain. In both cases the authorities were blamed.  
As demonstrated in Attachment III to the thesis,230 there was indeed a considerable 
drop in the total alcohol consumption during the first few years under Gorbachev. Moreover, 
statistics testify the measureable improvements in people’s physical and psychical health as 
well as the reduced number of cases involving serious crime.231 However, these positive 
results were evidently not sufficiently appreciated by the population who therefore did not 
support the strict anti-alcohol measures. The active anti-alcohol politics could not be 
sustained. Already by late 1988, the Party leadership signalled that the policy of hard-hitting 
methods in the struggle against alcohol was abandoned. The result of this turnaround was that 
legal alcohol production again went up and numerous alcohol outlets were reopened.  
More than three years of alcohol drought, coupled with long and humiliating queues for legal 
drink, often in vain, released an accumulated demand for liquor. This resulted in a surge in 
consumption which exacerbated existing social dysfunctionalities of the late Soviet society. 
Perhaps even worse for Russia, reasonable temperance measures seemed to have been 
fundamentally discredited for a long period to come.  
Nearly 90 percent of all alcohol that Russians drink has traditionally been in the form 
of spirits, and drinking is typically done in binges rather than in frequent or moderate dozes, 
such as in high-consumption countries in the Mediterranean region.232 Moreover, the arena of 
drinking has most often been inside the typical tiny Russian apartment in the midst of the 
family. Important to emphasise, the Russian consumption pattern therefore enhances the 
potentially negative impact of alcohol beyond the sheer per-capita amounts of pure alcohol 
consumed. Adult frustrations and stresses, augmented under the influence of crisis and 
alcohol, therefore pose threats to the welfare and safety of the family, in particular of the 
children. (Confer the above discussion of the risk factor “parental child abuse.”) 
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Annex III clearly demonstrates that there are no exact data on how much alcohol 
Russians actually drank; there are only several possible methods of estimation. One of the 
interesting questions arising from this data is why official sales (Column 2) never caught up 
with the level recorded prior to the anti-alcohol campaign. It seems reasonable to believe that 
with the traditional strict control mechanisms in place, Soviet figures for wholesale and retail 
trade did more or less reflect the amount of alcohol that was produced industrially. The 
situation must have changed: As the anti-alcohol campaign lost its steam and people’s fear of 
authorities evaporated with Glasnost, unofficial trading became rampant. Yet, the most radical 
change occurred when Yeltsin abolished the state monopoly on alcohol beverages in 1992.233 
Green light was thereby given to an alcohol market that in practical terms became 
unrestrained. Hence, the bulk of the alcohol sale evaded official registration with the 
consequence that there are no credible statistics on the quantity of alcohol consumed.  
Typical of the obvious discrepancy between official statistics and the real level of 
alcohol intake is the fact that over the period 1991-1993, in the midst of Shock Therapy, 
official figures for consumption of alcohol show a declining tendency. Furthermore, the 
calculations of the two Russian researchers Nemtsov and Treml indicate that alcohol 
consumption during the first years of Shock Therapy only caught up with, but never exceeded 
the level that existed in the pre-Gorbachev period (see Annex III, column 4 and 5). In light of 
the changed level of social tensions and stresses that the population experienced in these two 
periods, such a trend in alcohol consumption does not seem plausible.  
The proxy methodology for indicating the real level of alcohol consumption, suggested 
by the American specialist on alcohol and crime in modern Russia, William A. Pridemore, 
might therefore bring us closer to the real alcohol consumption rates during transition:  
… the point is that by using a proxy we are not estimating the amount of actual alcohol 
consumption. Instead, in the absence of reliable information on alcohol consumption or heavy 
drinking, one can search for another indicator, such as deaths due to alcohol poisoning that 
should be closely related to the level of heavy drinking. Therefore, those years in which 
poisonings are higher should be those years, in which heavy drinking is higher[…]. Thus, you 
have an alternative indicator (i.e., a proxy) for drinking, but you do not have an actual estimate 
(e.g., 8 or 10 or 14 litres) of the level of consumption.234 
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In one of his numerous articles on the impact of the transition as well as of heavy drinking on 
homicide and suicide rates in Russia, Pridemore presents a figure indicating graphically the 
overall and sex-specific combined alcohol-related death rates per 100,000 persons in Russia 
over the period 1956-2002.235 The logical implication of the author’s proxy methodology 
applied to this figure must be that the estimate of the per-capita alcohol consumption in 
Russia around 1994-1995 might perhaps be 60 percent higher than it was in the first half of 
the 1980s.236 Such an increase would correspond to the difference in alcohol-related mortality 
between the two time periods in question. A conservative estimate of the average alcohol 
consumption per capita for the pre-Gorbachev years, made on the basis of Annex III, would 
approximately be 13 litres. If we add 60 percent to this level, we could get a per-capita-
alcohol consumption for Russia of the first post-Soviet years of around 20 litres. 237 
On the basis of the above it seems pertinent to raise the question whether there was 
systematic under-reporting on several social phenomena, engendering imprecise social 
statistics such as seems to be the case with data on alcohol consumption. It appears likely that 
the quality of statistical services deteriorated in Russia in parallel with the general 
disorganisation of the Russian society: underfunded, overloaded, demoralized and often 
corrupted agencies could hardly produce credible and representative reports (the increasingly 
ineffective police force has been discussed in connection with latent crime).  Thus, in a 
country characterised by ubiquitous political opportunism and lack of independent 
monitoring, cautiousness indeed seems prudent when dealing with official statistics.  
In conclusion, people were drinking less immediately after 1985, simply because it 
became much more difficult to get alcohol. Official sales plunged, but the unsatisfied demand 
resulting from this was partially compensated for by increased illegal production and sale of 
alcohol, as well as by new intoxication substitutes. These additional sources of, and 
distribution channels for, alcohol and substitutes lasted beyond the period of the anti-alcohol 
campaign, creating new and more non-transparent consumption patterns. When the anti-booze 
campaign died out, alcohol intake rose again and was largely driven by a suppressed demand 
from the “prohibition period.” The increase in drinking as the social crisis in Russia widened 
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had also to do with established cultural patterns of resorting to booze as a means of escaping 
unfriendly realities. The official alcohol figures for the period after 1988 were definitely 
deflated, as reflected in Annex III to this thesis.  
The discussion on the risk factor parental alcohol abuse has been more detailed and 
extensive than on the other micro-level risk factors. The reason for this is simple: Alcohol 
drinking is and always has been a part and parcel of Russian culture. The circumstances 
accompanying the dissolution of the Soviet Union therefore took binge drinking to 
unprecedented levels and produced unprecedented adverse effects.  In my understanding, 
extensive drinking, not least due to its extremely deteriorating effect on all other risk factors 
studied, therefore was the causal factor that more than any other led to mass child neglect.  
Parental drug abuse. Drug addiction in Russia did not emerge as a social curse only 
with the collapse of the Soviet Union. According to an article in Pravda, already by 1987 as 
many as 46,000 persons in the whole USSR were registered with the medical diagnosis of 
drug addiction.238 That the problem was on the rise with the general social crisis that was 
under way from the late 1980s, is clearly demonstrated in Attachment IV to the thesis. Both 
crimes in general and crimes related to drugs skyrocketed (Figure 1). Figure 2 reveals a 
similar development in terms of the number of persons who were addicted to drugs.  
Two other things are also clearly displayed in Figure 2. First, although a growing 
problem in the 1990s, drug addition did in quantitative terms play a secondary role as a risk 
factor for child neglect when compared to alcohol. Whereas in 1996 a little more than 50 drug 
addicts were registered per 100 000 Russian city dwellers, the analogous figure for alcoholics 
was 1650.  Second, similarly to the evident under-registering of alcohol misuse (confer the 
falling trend during the first half of the 1990s according to Figure 2, which blatantly 
contradict the conclusions of the previous section concerning alcohol consumption), there 
must have been a significant unregistered drug addiction.  
In Attachment IV, Figure 3 (“Number of all special hospitals and special policlinics; 
including number of narcological hospitals”) and in Figure 4, (“Number of hospital beds, 
including psychiatric and narcological hospital beds”), the increasing failure of the Russian 
society to offer treatment to the addicted is demonstrated. In 1991-1996, when Russia was 
riddled with the adverse effects of Shock Therapy, the number of hospitals and beds 
designated for addicted persons declined, thereby exacerbating the evolving addiction crisis. 
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The harmful impact of parental drug abuse, as well as of alcoholism, on children’s 
well-being is of course beyond any doubt. There is little or absolute no predictability, material 
security, care and love, or educational follow-up in the lives of children living under such 
conditions. As more parents became addicted, their children could increasingly escape the 
tribulations by taking to the streets.  
Single-parent families. We are now at the last of the risk factors for extreme child 
neglect as suggested by Dr Sereda. Sereda has given the lowest grade, i.e.5, to this particular 
risk factor (along with the factors bad housing and hygienic conditions). Obviously, a single-
parent family cannot per se expose a child to greater risks of gross negligence than other 
families; that is, given that the remaining circumstances of a single-parent family are 
conducive to child well-being. Conversely, if the family is in a critical situation, a change 
from two responsible and constructive child caregivers to a state of single parenthood will 
inevitably increase the level of vulnerability for the child/children in question.239   
As shown in UNICEF’s statistics, reproduced in Attachment V,240 there was a clear 
tendency from 1989 to 1996 (the years 1987-1989 are not included in UNICEF’s research) 
that more and more families became single-parent and, consequently, an increasing share of 
Russian children were living with only one parent.241 The crude marriage rate fell from 9.4 
per 1000 mid-year population in 1989 to 5.9 in 1996; the divorce rate increased from 42.1 per 
100 marriages in 1989 to 64.9 in 1996; the annual rate of children affected by parental divorce 
rose from 11.9 per 1000 population aged 0-17 years in 1989 to 15.9 in 1994, 15.4 in 1995, 
and then, somewhat incomprehensibly, to 12.5 in 1996; and lastly, the share of non-marital 
births rose from 13.5 percent of the total live births in 1989 to 23 in 1996.242   
Consequently, there were an increasing number of children, particularly after 1991, 
who were brought up in single-parental families. Children with only one parent – who was 
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most probably unable to work outside the home and who was entitled to only limited if any 
social support – almost inevitably faced more dire consequences of poverty than children in 
multi-parent families living under similar circumstances.  
 
Summary and Framing of Hypotheses  
The leading economic parameters reviewed in this chapter have been relatively well covered 
by statistic data. In contrast, the analysis of the literature has shown that the longitudinal 
development of the risk factors at family level is far less mapped. It is therefore largely a 
fragmentary picture we have been able to restore. However, for some of the most potent risk 
factors, such as parental alcohol and drug misuse as well as parental child abuse, it has been 
possible to identify data which reveal increasingly negative trends. For other risk factors, the 
analyses have indirectly substantiated that a similarly negative development must have taken 
place.   
 The main findings of Chapter 4 can therefore be summarised as follows: First, 
although undoubtedly signalling a widening systemic crisis, the macro-economic problems in 
the Russian society until 1989 were still relatively limited. Similarly, the path followed by the 
micro-level risk factors from 1987 to 1989 does not indicate any dramatic social corrosion. 
Second, the year 1989 was a watershed in Russia’s macroeconomic performance. In 1990 the 
economic downturn had become evident, and in 1991 the trend had strengthened. The 
analysis of the micro-risk factors over the years 1989-91 has, however, not provided 
overwhelming documentary evidence of a strong deterioration with direct impact on 
children’s living conditions.  Third, after 1991 the Russian economy plummeted into ruin. 
Although there is a lack of statistical material and a continuous and probably increasing 
underreporting on several indicators, this chapter documents a considerable deterioration of 
the living conditions of vulnerable families corresponding to the development of the macro-
economic parameters.  
 
Taking into account the information presented so far in the thesis, including the data provided 
in this chapter, the hypotheses on the evolving child neglect scale can be framed:  
 
Hypothesis 1: In 1987-1989 the child-neglect scale was relatively stable, or had increased 
only slightly; but from 1989 to 1991 this negative tendency showed greater intensity. 
Hypothesis 2:  The Child-neglect scale in Russia deteriorated dramatically in 1992-1996. 
 
The rationale behind the hypotheses on the KDN capacity was spelled out in Chapter 2 and 3. 
The Commissions for the Affairs of Minors was an integrated part of the Party-led rule that 
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permeated Soviet society. KDN unified not only a number of societal entities such as child 
welfare services, education, law enforcement, health, judiciary, etc., but also Soviet societal 
organisations such as Komsomol, dwelling and parental committees, and cultural and sport 
organisations. As such, KDN was connected, coordinated and disciplined by the invisible 
hand of the Party.  
The USSR lapsed into a period of increasing volatility following Gorbachev’s 
radicalisation as a reformer around 1987. With Glasnost, the weaknesses of the Soviet Union 
were exposed to open criticism, and the hitherto unquestioned propaganda picture of an 
infallible and historically unequalled Soviet socialism started to crack. As a consequence, the 
ubiquitous conformity pressure abated and the largely fear-based discipline in the society 
slowly dissipated. This was also true at operation level in social agencies like KDN.  
 
Hypothesis 3: While continuing in its previous mode until 1987, KDN henceforth faced 
growing challenges. From 1989 to 1991, KDN showed signs of weakening efficiency.  
 
With the elimination of Party-based government after August 1991, the overall organisational 
principle of the country was fundamentally transformed. Against a backdrop of economic 
breakdown and exploding social dysfunctionalities, trends that had been increasingly 
discernable towards the end of Gorbachev’s period in office were brought to a logical 
conclusion. The departure of Party rule had wide-reaching consequences for the management 
of the state apparatus, enterprises, as well as for societal institutes like KDN; and was not 
countered by an alternative, constructive and humanitarian organisational principle for the 
Russian society. On the contrary, lawlessness flourished, and there were few if any signs of a 
laborious business community or innovative industries, a viable civil society, including 
autonomous parties, independent unions or other mass-based interest groups. Furthermore, 
Russia did not see the emergence of a new social ethos, which could inspire both elite and 
common people, thus balancing the strong nihilistic tendencies that followed in the wake of 
70 years of hyper-paternalistic Party monopoly.  
 
Hypothesis 4: After 1991, KDN was enfeebled. It lacked overall leadership, resources and the 
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Chapter 5 
MANIFESTED CHILD NEGLECT – Normative Documents and Secondary Sources 
 
Introduction  
This chapter starts the process of examining how the two research topics of the thesis (child 
neglect scale and KDN capacity) evolved over the period included in this thesis. This will be 
achieved by conducting an empirical assessment of the working hypotheses framed at the end 
of the previous chapter. In this chapter, two categories of sources are addressed: normative 
documents243 and secondary sources, such as research and analytic publications, but also the 
analytic parts of normative sources.244  
The examination of the two categories of sources is conducted theme-by-theme and is  
divided into two subperiods of this study: 1987-1991 and 1992-1996.245 It goes without 
saying that the respective normative documents cannot per se provide exhaustive information 
on various aspects of a given legislation, such as the degree to which the legislation was 
actually implemented or its real impact. An interpretation is therefore required. Hence, 
analytic material, along with contextual data established in previous chapters, will be of 
indispensable importance.  
 
The subperiod 1987 to 1991 
It is hardly common to view concern for the country’s child-neglect situation as a major 
motivating factor for Gorbachev, when deciding upon his strategies as the new leader of the 
Soviet Union. For example, the famous Anti-Alcohol Decree of May 1985, although 
indirectly pointing at several of the material deficiencies in Soviet society, which hat caused 
excessive drinking;246 stops short of saying anything about growing family dysfunctionalities 
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as a factor associated with people’s growing alcohol consumption.247 Nevertheless, 
Gorbachev’s utterances in his programmatic book of 1987 on Perestroika demonstrate that the 
Soviet leader, with the introduction of glasnost, openly acknowledged interconnections, 
concealed in the Decree of 1985, between family and societal developments:  
We have discovered that many of our problems – in children’s and young people’s behaviour, in 
our morals, culture and in production – are particularly caused by the weakening of family ties 
and slack attitude to family responsibilities. (…) One of the most urgent social tasks for us - also a 
major task in the anti-alcohol campaign – is to improve the health of the family and enhance its 
role in society.248 
From this statement it is obvious that, by the time Gorbachev started his more radical reforms 
in 1987, the child welfare situation in the country was certainly not satisfactory, and that the 
development trend hardly could have been other but negative. 
 
The Decree of June 1987 on children left without parental care   
In fact, when perusing decree No 872 of 1987, calling for fundamental improvements of the 
life of orphans and children left without parental care, the impression of a Soviet child-
welfare and protection system in crisis is not only confirmed; a further upgrading of the level 
of urgency in the situation seems required.249 Launched as a typical Party-managed 
mobilisation campaign, involving state organs as well as community actors, the Decree at the 
same time also heralded the introduction of glasnost (openness) and self-criticism within the 
area of child-welfare.250 
Similarly to Stalin-era Decrees on child care,251 scathing blame is indeed laid at the 
doorsteps of those parents whose child-raising had failed so fatally, that their children had 
ended up in alternative care arrangements. Interestingly, the Glasnost directness, when 
criticising the involved practitioners in the child-care work, also somewhat echoes Stalin’s 
managerial harshness: It was the “indifference to the fate of orphans and social orphans” from 
authorities at all levels, but also lacking attention to child welfare, on the part of societal 
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organisation and Soviet enterprises, that had made it possible for the neglecting parents to get 
away with “impunity.”252   
While stating that the authorities and other parts of Soviet society involved in child 
care conducted “extremely insufficient” work in terms of strengthening the family and 
“enhancing parental responsibility in matters of child-rearing,” the focus of the Decree was 
definitely on the critical situation in residential institutions. The Decree asserted that “weak” 
Party and state control of institutions for orphans had resulted in “shameful anti-pedagogical 
practices, undermining of children’s feelings of self-worth, abuses, embezzlement, the 
grossest violations of financial and labour management and sanitary conditions.” 253 
As far as of the working hypotheses of this study are concerned,254 the 
abovementioned Decree (No 872) established that, by 1987, there was an alarmingly low 
level of attention and care provided to the most vulnerable child population, i.e. those who 
already had lost parental care. Implicitly, the Decree therefore made clear that there was a 
considerable reason for concern over what would happen - if the overall situation with Soviet 
families should deteriorate - to those groups of children who already were critically at risk of 
becoming socially orphaned due to the behaviour of “persons who scorned their parental 
obligations and misused the humanity of Soviet legislation.”255   
While criticising failures and lacking responsibility in the way Soviet authorities, 
parents, and the society at large, treated the weakest groups of children, the Decree of 1987 
brings little or no evidence regarding the unlike manifestations of urgent child vulnerabilities. 
It does not even mention words like vagrancy, homelessness or delinquency. However, the 
extremely critical tone of the Decree leaves little doubt as to the increasing seriousness of the 
problems associated with children left without proper or any parental follow up.  
In fact, the secondary literature accessed suggests that the vulnerability of these 
children, at the point of time the Decree of 1987 was issued, definitely appeared also in the 
form of child vagrancy. For example, in Psychical milieu-disadaptation of minors, a study 
published in 1986, the Soviet researcher Almazov describes in detail the psychological 
motives of those children who are inclined to flee their homes. While noting that children 
from more advantaged milieus might escape their parents for various psychological or purely 
adventurous reasons, Almazov obviously recognises a link between social problems and the 
appearance of child vagrancy.  
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It seems, however, that Almazov tends to downplay social problems as the causal 
factor in this regard, thus reflecting an ideological line that by 1986, before the onset of 
glasnost, obviously was not supposed to be crossed.256 In any event, Almazov points at 
psychological, rather than material reasons for a child from a disadvantaged family to go on 
the run.  According to Almazov, a child from this kind of milieu “not seldom flees home not 
because he is poorly fed or badly treated;” what the child allegedly feels burdensome is “to 
belong to a socially disadvantaged family.”257  
When it comes to the scale and trend of the problem, Almazov evades any details, but 
suggests clearly that child vagrancy is much more than individual and separate incidents. In 
fact, he narrates a type of situation whereby children, finding together in a common feeling of 
discomfort with the condition in their homes, ultimately may end up as street children:  
Spending their free time playing together, they “explore” all corners suitable for living 
(basements, garrets, dugouts, collectors for heating pipeline). The feeling of mutual support 
grows stronger between them. A decisive moment arrives when one of them faces a rapid 
deterioration of their family situation.  The first escape “crushes” the psychological barrier 
keeping them from abandoning their homes, and the orientation of the children changes 
drastically. Minors start taking active steps in this direction, looking for new places of settlement. 
They establish contact with street children from other districts and undertake steps to secure 
financial means for their next escape (this time without any definite cause). 258 
An equally dramatic picture of the street-children situation of the pre-Gorbachev period is 
drawn by Nechayeva, polemicizing against the official view of the Brezhnev era implying that 
street children as a phenomenon “practically speaking did not exist”.259 Nechayeva notes that 
“among stray children and youthful travellers” in the MVD reception and distribution centres, 
one could also meet minors “who had long forgotten about their own homes, spending their 
time anywhere and making a living through begging, prostitution and thefts.” As indicated by 
Nechayeva, the problem of child vagrancy and homelessness continued to exist, but it was 
diminished, as she puts it, “drawn into the shadow,” and was not dealt with seriously.260If this 
is a correct understanding, street children represented basically a marginal problem during the 
Brezhnev years. Consequently, most vagrant children were probably taken care of earlier or 
later by state services and offered alternative placement. Those who continued a life on the 
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street and did not perish until they became adult bomzh'y,261 were obviously so few that they 
did not create major challenges for authorities or the public.  
A possible interpretation of Decree No 872 of 1987, including its dramatic calls for 
action to remedy an unacceptable situation, is therefore that the problem of juvenile vagrancy 
and delinquency, although not explicitly mentioned by the Decree,262 by that time actually 
had grown to such an unacceptable level that more drastic actions had to be taken. Such a 
reading may find support in a research article of October 1987 by the Russian child-protection 
specialist, S.A. Belicheva. In her study, Belicheva presents findings from a study of the 
preventive work carried out by KDN in Tyumen city and Tyumen oblast in western Siberia. A 
key assumption of the research is that the “tendencies of increased crime among minors which 
is observed in individual regions of the county, included in Tyumen oblast” is a testimony of 
the “low effect of the educational-prophylactic work [of KDN]”. 263 
Another aspect of the Decree of 1987, with an obvious bearing on the hypotheses, is the 
fact that it was launched in the Soviet tradition of top-down national initiatives. Accordingly, 
and this is repeatedly emphasised throughout the Decree; it was the Party, by mobilising 
relevant state organs along with community players like Komsomol, the Labour unions, 
enterprises, the media, the intelligentsia, to mention but a few; who was to take the main 
responsibility to see that the set objectives of the Decree were achieved.  
However, as shown in Chapter 2, involving various Party-subordinated community actors 
in child-protection work had for decades been the main methodology when addressing child 
welfare issues in the USSR. The problem was that by 1987, as Decree No 872 convincingly 
demonstrates, the established system did not respond to child-care challenges in an adequate 
manner. Moreover, there were signs already from the 1970s, that Party-led community 
services had “acquired a formalistic character.”264 Nevertheless, Decree No 872 left little 
doubt that its endeavour to cope with the difficulties in child-care depended precisely upon a 
revitalisation of the Party-led mechanisms of social mobilisation.  
With the benefit of hindsight, it is also evident that the issue of funding of the 1987 
initiative was an extremely weak point. The Decree listed a wide range of measures that were 
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to be carried out in order to fundamentally improve the obviously crisis-ridden Soviet child-
care system.265 Needless to say, success would require complex and huge investments. The 
funding schemes for the project were, however, not defined in detail. On the contrary, Decree 
No 872 calls for an increased role of Party-managed mobilisation mechanisms like 
Communist Sobotniki,266 as well as “voluntary” contributions from state enterprises; including 
the method of using “shefstvo.” 267  All these forms of resource mobilisation were evidently 
only credible with a Party effectively in command of a network of subservient community 
organisations and other actors.  
 
Commissions for the Affairs of Minors, KDN  
The Decree of 1987 definitely constitutes a major milestone in Soviet child care, suggesting a 
much more open and active attitude of the new Party leadership. Still there were several 
aspects of child protection that were left uncommented.268 In the context of the thesis, it is of 
particular significance that the central agency of Soviet child protection, the Commissions for 
the Affairs of Minors, KDN, is fully ignored by the Decree. Hence, as Gorbachev pushed 
ahead with his more radical reforms, Decree No 872 does not bring any direct evidence as to 
how KDN actually functioned. However, when taking into consideration the very poor 
performance appraisal the Decree gives of the various constituent parts of Soviet child care, 
one may, by extrapolation, conclude that KDN hardly could make up any exception in this 
regard.  
Such a conclusion is also in line with the main findings in Belicheva’s referred article of 
1987. Her study contains numerous observations of inadequate and ineffective methods used 
by KDN to detect, prevent and follow up cases of child neglect. Belicheva notes:  
[KDN] did in practical terms not apply a differentiated approach when picking methods of 
exerting educational and prophylactic influence. What tends to predominate are verbal impacting, 
[such as] various forms of reprimands and scolding, often done in a tactless manner that is 
offending for both parents and children.269   
Belicheva also criticises KDN for its lacking capacity beyond dealing with individual cases:  
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[KDN] did find almost no space to its most important functions such as coordination and 
leadership of the entire system of early [child-neglect] prophylactics, including inspections [the 
inspections of the militia for juvenile affairs], schools, PTU [industrial technical secondary 
schools], enterprises, extra-curricular institutions etc. 270  
In the reviewed normative documents which cover the late Soviet period KDN as such seems 
to be fully ignored.271 This does not imply that there was no legal activity in relation to 
organisational aspects of child-care services. One initiative with relevance to the working 
hypotheses is the new position of Children’s School Inspector for the Protection of Childhood 
(hereinafter: children’s inspector), introduced in a Decree by the USSR Ministry of Education 
in 1988, and promulgated in the Russian Soviet republic in July the same year by a circular 
letter from RSFSR Ministry.272 The ministerial order announced that there should be at least 
one children’s inspector for every raion (i.e. municipality), with one extra inspector for every 
5000 child inhabitants (i.e. minors from 0 to 18 years of age) in the given raion.273  
Among other things, the children’s inspectors were assigned to “detect and secure 
placement of children left without parental care or in need of assistance from the state”, that 
is, in the latter case when parents failed to “secure the necessary conditions for [their 
children’s] upbringing and subsistence.”274 The children’s inspectors were furthermore tasked 
with “attracting public inspectors for the protection of childhood,” as well as with providing 
voluntary community workers with “methodological guidance and control.”275  
The implication for the hypotheses of this information is as follows: First, by 
strengthening the organisational set-up of social workers dealing with child neglect in 
families, the authorities signalled that the current child-care situation was not handled 
satisfactorily. Second, in the Decree of 1988 there was no mention of adjoining services 
involved in this field, in particular KDN; neither are the children’s inspectors of the Militia, 
nor of the institute of public educators, referred to the above mentioned Decree No 21.276 This 
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might indicate a continued lack of coordination and holistic approach in the field of child 
protection.277 Third, the effectiveness of the children’s inspectors, as well as of virtually all 
Soviet-era social services working with risk-group children, was dependent on mobilisation of 
volunteers, in other words, of a continued functionality of the Party-led model.   
In her quoted work, Judith Harwin, touches upon the Decree on the children’s 
inspectors. Referring to an interview she had with the Principal Specialist in law of the 
RSFSR Ministry of Education, A.Z. Dzugaeva, Harwin conveys that by May 1991, “90 
percent of all local authorities still only had between 1-2 professional inspectors and the push 
to expand above two officers was particularly unsuccessful.”278 To illustrate the discrepancy 
between the real, and the required, number of children’s educators, Leningrad can be taken as 
an example. In 1991, there were living, a total of 1,112 600 minors in the 18 raions of the city, 
which represents approximately 62,000 minors per raion.279 If the ratio of one inspector per 
5000 child habitants had been observed, there should therefore have been 12 children’s 
inspectors in each of the 18 raions.280 There is no research on the real numbers of children’s 
inspectors in Leningrad. However, if the city in this respect coincided with 90 percent of the 
rayons in Russia, there might have been one or two inspectors in these huge municipalities.  
There is furthermore definitely no available information as to the extent to which the 
professional children’s inspectors succeeded in attracting voluntary assistance in their work, 
such as their job description required.  But if the assumption that Soviet voluntarism was bred 
and could only be maintained in an atmosphere of Party-imposed discipline is correct, the 
answer to such a question seems indeed self-evident.  
When it comes to Gorbachev and his efforts within the area of child-neglect issues, 
credit should, arguably, first of all to be granted for making the concealed life of children’s 
institutions and gloomy reality in at-risk families better known to the Soviet public.281 As the 
discussion above indicates, the resultativeness appears, however, to be meagre in terms of 
legislative reforms with real impact on the way in which the Soviet child-care system was 
structured and run. Such a conclusion can clearly find support in Harwin’s work: “[T]he 
pattern and organisation of services at local and central government level did not look very 
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different at the end of the Gorbachev era from at the outset. The old structures remained in 
place, largely discredited, but as yet there was nothing new to put in their place.”282   
 
The 1990 Decrees on Income Security 
In a context of a widening economic crisis, the Decree of April 1990 on benefits to child 
families is undoubtedly of interest as regards the working hypotheses.283 To begin with, it 
should be emphasised that this normative document was issued by USSR’s Supreme Soviet; 
not with the participation of the CPSU Central Committee, as the Decree of 1987 had been. In 
itself, this might have marked a shift from an all-embracing Party rule, to a legitimation based 
on a legislature with at least a partial, popular mandate.284 Moreover, neither in the April 
Decree nor in a follow-up order of November the same year,285 there is any mentioning of 
mobilisation and involvement of community actors. With a view to the hypotheses, it should 
be noted that these facts corroborate an assumption that, by the time of the 1990 Decrees, 
Party-lead community work in the area of child welfare had significantly weakened or ceased 
to exist altogether.286  
It is also interesting to observe that the discourse of the Decrees of 1990, when 
compared to the Decrees of 1987 analysed above, seems more modest and to-the-point. The 
typical Soviet ambitiousness in terms of achieving a total solution to the identified problem is 
toned down. However, in the introduction to the 1990 Decree, it appears that some of the 
declamatory style was kept. As the country plunged into an ever deeper political and 
economic chaos, and no feasible program for an exit from the crisis was in sight287 
Gorbachev’s administration wanted nothing less than “solving, within a short period of time, 
the most pressing problems of families, mothers and children,” as well as “enhancing the 
social protection of the least supplied child families.”288 Yet, the task of keeping afloat the 
most crisis-ridden child families, did not appear to be that urgent. The April 1990 Decree 
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actually granted the USSR government a period of no less than 6 months, regarding some of 
its elements up to 8 months, to present changes to existing legislation.289 
The 1990 Decrees launched new allowances, a range of others were extended and 
upgraded in an apparent attempt to keep pace with the inflation, and, for the first time, Soviet 
benefits were pegged to minimum wages.290 However, in spite of the somewhat elevated aim 
of “enhancing the social protection of the most vulnerable families,”291 the 1990 initiatives 
seemed, realistically speaking, to be more like a reactive measure intending to compensate for 
the economic hardship that child families increasingly must have experienced. 
Or to put the discussion directly into the context of the hypotheses: the 1990 Decrees 
could only contribute positively to the country’s overall child-protection balance sheet, if the 
measures prescribed actually improved the income security of families with children.292 
Conversely, if the Soviet government for various reasons failed to deliver, then the Decrees 
demonstrated that the enfeebled Soviet authorities in reality were without leverage in terms of 
containing the negative impact of the crisis on the most exposed risk-group children.  
First, the effect of the Decrees was naturally dependent on the extent to which the 
target groups actually could access allowances they evidently were entitled to. Although no 
study is available on this aspect, some critical questions may be raised: E.g. for the category 
single-parents, the Decrees listed a number of general, as well as specific documentation 
requirement. In case of formal divorce between the spouses, the mother typically left with the 
children could probably, relatively and easily, produce attestation regarding her matrimonial 
status. But documents had also to be presented proving that alimony was in reality not being 
received from the former husband. Furthermore, if formal divorces became more frequent 
during the 1980s and later, the societal crisis definitely also brought about an increase in the 
number of fathers who just disappeared from their families, for never more to return. 
Therefore, in the typical Soviet-Russian atmosphere of bureaucratic arbitrariness, it could 
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indeed be a hard task to substantiate that you and your children actually were left without a 
breadwinner.293  
Second, another unexplored aspect of the implementation of the 1990 Decree seems to 
be whether the narrowing financial latitude of the Soviet government really could allow for 
social benefits at a level that, as a minimum, could sustain the status quo in the household 
budget of a vulnerable child. With a plunging GDP, galloping inflation, as well as an 
increasing international indebtedness and budget deficits, this could not be an easy task.294    
 
UN Convention on the Rights of the Child – the child neglect status of 1990-91  
Under the circumstances prevailing after 1989, any legislative effort aimed at improving the 
country’s child-care system must have suffered from lacking realism. One normative initiative 
of the late Gorbachev period must yet be mentioned. In June 1990 the USSR ratified the UN 
Convention on the Rights of the Child.295 There is no documentation indicating that the Soviet 
adoption of the Convention, in response to the growing social challenges the country faced, 
had to do with a possible firm determination on the part of the authorities to secure an 
improved legal base for child protection,.296 On the other hand, the adoption of the 
Convention made Russian authorities formally accountable to the international community for 
their handling of child-welfare issues. Among other things, Russia had to submit reports, for 
submission to the UN, on the progress of the country’s child-protection work towards the 
objectives of the Convention for the Rights of the Child.297 
Although hardly resulting in any immediate and tangible improvements in Soviet child 
care, the Child Convention occasioned already in May 1990 (before it was formally ratified 
by the Supreme Soviet) certain law revisions which definitively are of interest for the 
assessment of the working hypotheses.298 As a matter of fact, the revisions where evidently 
“also prompted by the needs of the real life [author’s highlighting] when the number of 
children, associated with [issues under] the protection of the child’s rights, grew by the 
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day.”299 One amendment to the Law of May 1990 assigned children the right to approach 
foster-care and guardianship authorities in case of parental abuse.300 A second amendment - 
and this was obviously the more realistic option in case of grave child neglect - prescribed 
procedures for urgent removal of a child from her/his family “in extraordinary cases when the 
life and health of the child was directly threatened.”301  
To restore the empirical observations that these amendments obviously were triggered 
by, and furthermore explore what the “needs of the real life” really were about, and how they 
could become so urgent; the remainder of the subsection will attempt to take stock of the 
broader child-neglect status in Russia as the Soviet era drew to an end.  
In fact, there were several extremely negative developments in Soviet Russia of this 
period intimately associated with a deteriorated childhood environment. In the 
abovementioned report on the “Conditions for Children in Russia, 1992 (Social Portrait),302 
information is rendered on a number of aspects of children’s living conditions, mainly 
covering the late Soviet years. One of several indications of growing problems in this regard 
was the rise in juvenile crime since 1987.   
Table 5.1: Dynamics of registered crimes committed by minors.303 
1987 1988 1989 1990 
116.000 133.000 163.000 166.000 
 
The report on the conditions for Russian children emphasises, however, that criminal statistics 
covering the period can not be understood without due consideration of the phenomenon of 
latent crime.304According to the estimates of the report, the real level of juvenile crime is 2.5 
to 3 times higher than in official statistics.”305  
Clearly indicative of growing parental child neglect, including parental disinterest in their 
children’s whereabouts, are the comments of the report on the trends that juvenile crime had 
followed recently. One thing was that there had been an increase in the relative share of 
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younger age groups like 14-15 year-old children, girls included. Even more serious, however, 
was the character that juvenile crime had acquired, obviously over the past few years:  
There is a steady increase in the number of crimes that are not of situational, but of intentional 
nature, having nothing to do with usual motivation of children (mischievous tricks, etc.), but 
nurtured by mature feelings: greed, cruelty, sadism, acerbated aggression, urge to get drugs, 
control certain territory, extremism, etc. Finally, adolescents have started committing new types 
of crimes which they did not practice before: weapon and drug dealing; brothel keeping, trading 
in prostitution; armed assaults and robbery of foreigners; kidnapping and other forms of 
blackmailing under aggravating circumstances; (…)306 
Also Judith Harwin brings revealing evidence of a deteriorating situation in several Russian 
families over the Gorbachev years. By utilising unspecified information from an unpublished 
survey from the Russian Office of the Procuracy, Harwin discloses that “[s]uicide rates 
among minors were (…) rising, as were rates of child abandonment and child abuse.”307 
Furthermore, with reference to reports submitted to the RSFSR Council of Ministers,308 
Harwin notes that the number of missing children, an indicator obviously including cases of 
runaway children, increased from 20 200 in 1985 to 33 700 in 1989.309  
That child and juvenile vagrancy and homelessness, the ultimate degree of not only 
parental neglect, but also societal neglect of children, had become an everyday and permanent 
occurrence in Russian cities in the course of the very few years, is plainly established by the 
referred report “Conditions for Russian Children, 1992.”  
The crises that have emerged in the society have a tremendous impact on families, (…). All this 
nurtures social abandonment. Over the past two-three years, the notion of “social orphanhood” 
has acquired new features and resulted in a new category of outcasts, the waifs. These are 
children who, for various reasons, have escaped from their families and boarding institutions. For 
large cities located on the cross-roads of social and national conflicts, such “gavroches” represent 
a complex problem.310 For example, officials of Saint-Petersburg Mayor’s Office know 500 
addresses where such runaways can be spotted at any time.311  
The data cited in the preceding paragraphs provides indisputable evidence of an increasing 
incidence of child neglect in the late Soviet society. At the same time, however, there are also 
available indicator values that, under “normal” circumstances, should have resulted in 
diametrically opposite conclusions. This is illustrated in the following table. 
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Table 5.2: Indicators of societal intervention related to child neglect, as well as new cases of 
children left without parental care.312   
 
1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 
Parents deprived of their parental right 16.700 11.700 8.100 6.100 5.900 6.400 
Parents on police register due to “negative 
influence on their children”  
216.500 188.900 168.800 154.100 137.500 120.400 
Children removed from their parents 
without deprivation of parental rights 
   1400 1500 1500 
New notifications of children left without 
parental care  
60.500     49.100 
If the period 1985-1990 is taken as a whole, Table 5.2 demonstrates a development whereby
 
fewer mothers and fathers were deprived of their parental rights, and fewer saw their children 
removed from them without court rulings. According to the table, also a declining number of 
parents were supervised by the police, and there were fewer children in 1990, than in 1985, 
that effectively were left without parental care and follow up. Theoretically, all these 
indicators suggest that the underlying child-neglect problems underwent a positive 
development. Only one indicator, the number of parents deprived of their parental right, bears 
witness to a deteriorating child-neglect environment after 1989. 
For sure, the reduced indicator values registered over the years 1985 – 1988 might 
partially be explained in light of real improvements that took place in families following the 
decreased drinking, that the anti-alcohol campaign brought about.  As discussed in Chapter 4, 
the effects of this campaign were, however, soon lost. For the period after 1987, the official 
figures rendered in Table 5.1 bear a convincing testimony of a dramatically deteriorated child-
neglect environment. If one in addition takes into consideration the dimension of latent crime, 
which, during these years, evidently increased in parallel with the erosion of the existing 
system; one will arrive at much higher crime rates. Consequently, the real level of child 
neglect was correspondingly higher than reported in statistics. As also documented in this 
chapter, these were years when street children eventually became a more manifested part of 
the interior of Russian cities. 
Hence, there is an obvious discrepancy between, on the one hand, the data of Table 
5.2., most of which are actually suggesting an improved child-neglect development over the 
period 1985-1990; and, on the other hand, the empirically based picture outlined in the 
preceding paragraphs, verifying that the opposite actually was the case.  
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Harwin suggests three sets of explanations for the apparent paradox of a lower state 
intervention and community involvement, as well as fewer children on record as needy, in a 
situation where, in reality more children and minors actually were in need of assistance. The 
last of the three is immediately dismissed by Harwin, namely that children were looked for 
through charity instead of by the state. In her opinion this was “very unlikely,” since the non-
governmental sector was “still embryonic and in no position to take any serious inroads into 
the extent of unmet child need.”313 The two other causal explanations that Harwin offers, i.e. 
that “agencies were carrying out their child welfare and protection obligations less 
efficiently”, and that “agencies [were] less interventionist as part of a deliberate policy shift 
emphasising diversion from state care,”314 seems to the author of the thesis to bring much 
clarity in the causality of the situation described above, although certain modifications and 
additions are required.  
To take the last model first, Harwin suggests that a reduced state interventionism had 
to do with officials averting committals of neglected children to state care arrangements. She 
does herself, however, immediately turn this hypothesis down as “speculative” in view of lack 
of any documentary evidence. According to Harwin, there was no indication that children’s 
inspectors or others involved avoided to proceed in neglect cases in fear of seeing children 
ending up in inadequate orphanages, which, as a result of the “glasnost campaign [that had 
been carried out] on the major deficiencies in residential care,” evoked negative 
associations.315  
Secondly, there is obviously a missing link in Harwin’s approach. She appears to be 
clearly supportive of the hypothesis that the growing manifestation of child neglect was 
associated with agencies becoming less efficient. But Harwin seems to base her approval of 
this explanation exclusively on the fact that the state, represented by children’s inspectors 
appearing in smaller number than planned (conf. the discussion on page 73 on Decree No 21 
of 1988), did not manage to detect and arrange for a sufficient number of children who were 
grossly neglected by their parents.  
In view of the above, Harwin must have ignored at least two important circumstances: 
The Soviet system had in the post-war years had at its disposal a huge pool of Party-managed 
agencies and other community actors involved in detecting and following-up of neglected 
children. (Confer the up to nine million volunteer social workers of the 1970s that Harwin 
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indicates; see page 20 above.)  It does therefore not give sense to focus only on the failing 
capacity of one of several actors as the explanatory factor for the breakdown in the 
surveillance of at-risk families by community agencies.  
The dismal child-neglect reality of the late Soviet era, including the failure of the 
society to take action, is obviously nothing but a testimony of the entire Soviet child-care 
system in full disarray. In fact, earlier in her study on Russian children and the state, Harwin 
had indicated the obviously fundamental causes of the emerging crisis. Reviewing the set-up 
of family support and surveillance that existed in the USSR of the 1970s and early 1980s, she 
notes that the “system was provided through state and social agencies and was closely 
interlinked to the Party.”  She also explains: “The influence of the Party was one of the most 
striking features of the child-care system and it was still intact in the early 1980s.”316  
To continue where Harwin stops, and thereby largely summing up the discussions 
pertaining to the two working hypothesis on the first subperiod (1987-1991) of the thesis: The 
Party quickly lost strength and soon abdicated altogether. At the same time, following the 
disintegration of the economy, the pressure on at-risk families increased. Very soon, the child 
protection system, in this study represented by the Commissions for the Affairs of Minors, 
was therefore left without the Party, which, with its sticks and carrots, had kept the whole 
machinery together. In sum, the empirical analyses of the chapter have documented an 
increasing mismatch between the growing needs of vulnerable children for protection and 
assistance by the society (i.e., increased child-neglect scale), on the one hand, and the 
decreasing intervention offered by the society (i.e. reduced KDN capacity), on the other.  
 
The subperiod 1991 to 1996 
The manifested appearances of child neglect, and the obvious failure of the declining Ancien 
Régime to handle the situation, definitely point towards a sharpening of the statements of 
either of the hypothesis on the subperiod 1987-1991. Evidently, the starting point for post-
Soviet Russia within the area of child care and child protection must therefore have been 
extremely unfavourable: As the country headed towards the post-Soviet economic and 
organisational precipice, the child-neglect situation got increasingly out of control. The ability 
of the Russian society to provide cushion in terms of absorbing an increased pressure on 
children’s wellbeing, if this was to happen, had dwindled significantly.    
As an additional documentation of the critical situation in Russia at the point of 
intersection between Soviet and post-Soviet order, an article by the Russian child researcher 
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I.F. Dementieva should be mentioned. Published in the September 1991 issue of 
Sotsiologicheskie Issledovaniia (Sociological Studies), the article “Orphans – Problems of 
Survival”, among other things, provides a contemporary view of what is expected from the 
imminent, radical economic reforms. Dementieva focuses on the growing number of children 
who had become orphans over the last decades. She emphasises, however, that the current 
growth, contrary to earlier waves of orphans, was characterised by the fact that only five 
percent of the orphans actually were without parents. The causes for the social orphanhood 
are said to be alcoholism, drug addiction, “parasitism” (tuneyadstvo), as well as an increasing 
number of mothers abandoning their children to state institutions. Dementieva predicts an 
immediate, further deterioration resulting from the “forthcoming cardinal changes in the 
economy (introduction of market relations, privatisation etc.).” In particular, she expects that 
price rises will have significant impact on disadvantageous people, “pushing them beyond the 
poverty line.” In turn, this will lead to “a fall in people’s moral standard and norms,” 
prompting increased criminality and violence with an ensuing rise in the number of children 
abandoned as well as of parents deprived of their parental rights.317   
However, Dementieva makes clear that the degree to which such consequences will 
appear will depend on “how thoroughly legislative acts on the transition to new economic 
conditions will be considered.” She concludes on this account: “A balanced and holistic 
(vsestoronnii) analysis of the indicated social side effects is required.”318   
 
Child poverty 
One general assumption of the study is that when Russian authorities introduced measures 
aiming to remedy poverty, this was prompted not only by a general perception of increased 
poverty (that is, linked to phenomena such as economic decline, unemployment, falling 
purchase power etc.), but also by observations of an increased incidence of child neglect. The 
author therefore regards legislative activities in this field as a response also to evolving child-
neglect phenomena like child abuse, child runaways, vagrancy and delinquency.  
With the evidence of a dramatic deterioration of both the general and concrete aspects 
of poverty towards the end of the Soviet period, any Russian government would have to 
undertake normative initiatives within the area of income security and poverty relief. The 
following discussion will focus on these normative schemes as well as on their impact, or 
possibly lack thereof, on the evolving child-neglect situation in the Russia. This will 
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contribute to bringing more clarity in terms of the further trajectory that the problem child-
neglect scale followed, as the country embarked on its path of radical societal transition. 
Child poverty was a major challenge, which the upcoming Russian regime attempted 
to address, while still entangled in a dual power struggle with Gorbachev’s faltering central 
power of the USSR.319 On the eve of the system change, the Russian government was in such 
a precarious position that it evidently could not provide for the most basic needs of large 
segments of Russian children. This is illustrated by a Decree related to the nutritional status of 
infants, promulgated by the RSFSR government in June 1991: 
In the Russian Federation an increasing number of children are in need of supplementary feeding 
or breast-milk substitute. According to information from the RSFSR Health Ministry, of the 2.2 
million children that are born annually, 60 percent have health deviations. The supply of child 
nutrition under 3 years has to be improved without delay.320 
Needless to say, the situation did not change for the better with the sharp economic downturn 
throughout 1991, and, not least, following the launching of the Shock Therapy in January 
1992. By that time fully in charge of the situation in Russia and doubtlessly observing the 
impact on the population (not least on children) of own policies, Boris Yeltsin, in a 
presidential Decree of June 1992, instructed the Government and executive organs country-
wide to prioritise the task of “securing survival, protection and development of children.” The 
Russian leader also requested executive authorities at all levels “to take into consideration 
foreign-currency and raw-material resources when budgeting for the development of 
production of child-related goods, investment in construction works, as well as for other tasks 
[related to children].”321  
A governmental Decree of August the same year followed up and concretised the 
aforesaid presidential Decree. However, by changing the accent from developing and 
investing in production of children’s goods to purchasing medicaments and food 
internationally,322 the governmental Decree implicitly demonstrated lack of feasibility of  
Yeltsin’s initial scheme. On the other hand, amidst enormous budget deficits, foreign debts 
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and a virtually unrestrained rent seeking,323 the Russian government can itself hardly have 
seriously assessed the realism of its own intention to secure the necessary currency resources 
for the purposes listed in its own Decree. Besides, by instructing regional authorities in all 
corners of Russia to “define categories of families who are in urgent need of supplies of 
foodstuffs, specific child items, medicaments and hygienic material”, as well as to ensure that 
these families “were catered for accordingly”, the Decree of June 92 reflects an increasing 
desperation in the handling of the child-poverty situation in Russian families. 324  
Three years on, as the poverty widened, the “Law on state allowances for citizens 
having children” was signed, opening for at least nominally more comprehensive benefits for 
child families.325  According to the Law, the cut-off point for regular allowances was raised 
from one and a half year to 16 years for working youth, and to 18 years for youth under 
education, offering families with children within this age interval an allowance per child 
equalling 70 percent of a minimum wage. Single parents would receive 50 percent more.326 
With Russian state finances in growing disarray, and with the official ideology 
preaching budget balancing, the very fact that the government introduced costly reforms, like 
the abovementioned, says itself probably much about of the character of the exacerbated 
poverty, including increased child neglect. However, the question is whether allowances in 
the order of 70 percent of a minimum wage would make much of a difference to unemployed 
families without other sources of income.327 And furthermore, was actually the Russian 
government in a position to honour the entitlements it had granted to child families!  
Interestingly enough, the Russian authorities provided largely themselves answers to 
questions like the ones indicated above. Of crucial importance in this regard is the normative 
document Fundamental directions of the state social politics on improving the situation for 
children in the Russian Federation until the year of 2000 (National plan for the interest of 
children), published in September 1995, (below referred to as National Plan or Plan).328 As 
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background for the numerous objectives it set and measures it launched, the Plan offers 
apparent comprehensive and holistic analysis of the widening child-welfare crisis in the 
country.329 The National Plan is therefore interesting as a point of orientation in the further 
assessment of post-Soviet normative initiatives and their bearing on the hypotheses.330  
In particular, the National Plan provides an appraisal of the effect of the normative 
initiatives visited above, for example of the programme on developing an industry for child 
nutrition. The status on the measures associated with the attempts to “solve the problems of 
child food industry” is summarised in the following way: “There is a serious gap between 
declamatory measures and the unsatisfactory level of their realisation.”331   
The National Plan makes equally critical remarks as regards the effect of previous 
legislative initiatives in the area of support provision to child families. In particular it 
mentions the “Law on state allowances for citizens having children,” which, according to the 
Plan, in fact had formalised regulations in place already since 1.1.1994.332 Concretely 
mentioning the allowance of 70 percent of a minimum wage for each child below 16 years 
and the topping with an additional 50 percent for single mothers, the Plan, however, states: 
“in a number of regions the payment of allowances are made with considerable delays, which 
negatively impacts the current income in families.” 333 
Benefitting from more data available, Nechayeva, in the 2001 study Russia and its 
Children (Child, Law and State), offers further details on the indeed limited reach the child 
allowances turned out to have. Noting that a “first-glance” impression might have been that 
there was a “tangible” support to minors in Russia, Nechayeva furthermore asserts that this 
was only “seemingly”. She sets forth: “In practical terms it [i.e. the support] doesn’t give 
anything; by 01.01.97 the average amount of support provided per child represented 14 
percent of the minimum subsistence level, and the amount per single-parent child was 21,4 
percent.” She adds that the “miserable allowances” in reality were paid with great delays in 
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several Russian regions: “Per 1.1. 1998, the indebted payment amounted to 15.3 billion 
roubles (which constitutes 87 percent of the annual allowance payments).”334 
A bureaucratically cautious, but yet unambiguous characterisation made by the 
National Plan of the attempts by the Russian government to improve social welfare 
provisions to destitute families may recapitulate this subsection: “The process of establishing 
a new social guarantee, and mechanisms for its realisation, are not keeping up with the tempo 
of the economic transformations [of the country], thereby increasing the social vulnerability 
of families, in particular of the children.”335 Hence, the government acknowledged that its 
own attempts, which largely had been motivated from an intention to mitigate the widening 
child-neglect problems in Russia, could not even modify the increasingly negative trend in 
this regard.  
 
Deviant behaviour among minors  
As ever more families were detrimentally affected by the economic reforms, a growing 
number of parents, along with their children, faced insurmountable problems.336 Or as the 
National Plan sums up after almost four years of reforms: “a severe contradiction has arisen 
between the necessity of securing normal live activities and development of each child, and 
the inadequate economic possibilities of the majority of families.”337  
Meanwhile, many children therefore developed deviant behaviour patterns as a 
reaction to poverty, alcoholism, violence and abuse. For example, in the course of only one 
year from 1992 to1993, in an atmosphere of increasing latent crime and shrinking capacity of 
the police; the number of minors detained for crime, offences and vagrancy, and then placed 
in the reception–distribution centres of the militia, nevertheless rose from 35.500 to 59.000.338  
The Russian state had evidently to do something in response to growing juvenile 
deviant behaviour and its immediate root cause, i.e. parental neglect. Against this background 
the Presidential Decree of September 1993 must be understood. In the Decree, Yeltsin, among 
other things, called for the creation of specialised institutions for minors in need of social 
rehabilitation, including new type of institutions for juvenile delinquents.339 Besides, the 
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government was instructed to present, within three months, legislative projects for new social 
services and the mentioned rehabilitation centres.340  
Translated into the realm of the hypotheses, Decree No 1338 confirmed that the 
authorities, by 1993, had not managed to develop capacities to handle the rising caseload of 
children in urgent need of alternative placement. Hence, there were children on the street that 
the society was not able to take care of. Furthermore, the government recognised that the legal 
base for child protection had not kept pace with the changes taking place in society.  
As to the actual effect of Decree No 1338 of 1993, the Nation Plan again offers 
essential information. Although with a degree of prudence characterising the Decree of 1993 
as a “principally new approach to protection of the rights of children who find themselves in a 
particular difficult situation,” the National Plan, in the same breath, nevertheless states that 
“the practical result of the measures undertaken by the state to halt negative processes within 
the child environment are insufficient.”  The plan sets forth: “[T]he potentially effective forms 
of assistance to these children are only embryonic and require great attention as well as 
support in terms of financing and personnel.”341   
A far more clear-cut statement on the existence of beznadzornost (child vagrancy) than in 
the Decree No 1338 of 1993 can be found in Decree No 1696 of 1995, “On the presidential 
programme Children of Russia” of 1995. In this document the precarious status of large 
segments of the child population, but also the causality between poverty and vagrancy, are 
indeed asserted straightforwardly:  
Children’s nutritional status has become deteriorated; their access to extra-curricular education, 
culture and adequate holiday has been slashed. Child vagrancy (beznadzornost), crime and 
narcomania are on the rise. The problem of social orphanhood is deteriorating; the majority of 
contemporary orphans are the children who have been abandoned by their parents.342  
 
In 1995, one year after the programme Children of Russia was launched, the National Plan 
presents more concrete material, statistically confirming the deteriorated situation for children 
at risk. The document provides in particular official figures, for the period 1991-1994, on the 
annual growth in the number of children below 18 years left without parental care. As appears 
from the table below, there were in 1994 a total of 446 000 of these kids of Russia. Evidently, 
there was a steep rise in the number of children who, at least according to official statistics, 
could be forced to live on the streets, if they were not taken care of, by the society: Only from 
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1993 to 1994, a total of 102.000 minors become socially or otherwise orphaned, a number that 
represented almost a fourth part of the total number of children left without parental care.343   
Table 5.3: Newly registered children left without parental, annual figures344 
1985 … … 1990345 1991 1992 1993 1994 
60.500   49.100 59.000 67.000 83.000 102.000 
 
How many of these children who actually became manifested street children is not known. 
However, when comparing the information in Table 5.3 with the survey of the evolving 
capacity of the Russian society to take care of children who for various reasons were left 
without parents (see Table 5.4. below), it becomes evident that, even with the official figures 
in mind, a growing number of children had no other alternative but live on the streets.  
Table 5.4. Annual alternative placement capacity of children left without parental care346 
  1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 
Total placement capacity  100 99 96 98 102 109 116 123 
 
Table 5.4 documents that from 1989 until 1991, in a period when the socio-economic 
situation in Russia rapidly deteriorated, the number of children actually accommodated in 
various residential institutions or in host families, actually sank. Subsequently, from 1991 to 
1996, the total alternative placement capacity slowly grew, but at a completely different pace 
than the officially registered growth in new cases of children left without parental care.  
 
The National Plan does not confront the rising number of deviant children with the relative 
decrease of Russia’s capacity to take care of its own children. Yet the National Plan does offer 
interesting explanations regarding the direct causal relationship between the way in which the 
transition in Russia was conducted and the growing child-welfare crisis in the country. In 
particular, the Plan points at the “abrupt change of social stereotypes and transformation of 
moral values,” which, in combination with “objectively deteriorated life conditions for the 
majority population,” had prompted a “surge in [cases of ] psycho-emotional overload.” In 
turn, this had caused “widened crisis phenomena in the family” characterised by:  
abrupt growth in the social disadaptation of children, their early alcoholisation and drug and 
alcohol addiction, amoral behaviour and delinquent actions; intensifying of the problem of social 
orphanhood; re-emergence of child besprizornost [genuine child homelessness] as a social 
phenomenon; a threatening growth in child and juvenile delinquency; as well as a growth in the 
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number of children who have become victims of criminal harassment, exploitation and sexual 
violence.347 
 
Commissions for the Affairs of Minors (KDN) 
The 1992 Law on Education of 1992 comprises, inter alia, provisions on how the educational 
system shall handle matters related to children with deviant behaviour or otherwise requiring 
particular attention in terms of corrective measures.348 The Law prescribes in detail under 
what circumstances pupils can be expelled from schools, and who in that case are responsible 
for deciding the further placement of such children.349 Furthermore, the Law clearly states that 
minors above 11 years, having demonstrated “deviant behaviour” and committed “public 
dangerous” crimes, could be placed in special learning and upbringing institutions “only upon 
court decisions.”350   
Remarkably, the Commissions on the Affairs of Minors is neither mentioned in the 
paragraphs referred to here, nor in the entire course of this law. However, according to the 
non-repealed Decree on KDN of 1967, KDN was indeed responsible for coordinating also 
educational authorities in cases involving particularly “difficult” children who, due to deviant 
behaviour, were in need of special follow up, and ultimately, alternative placement.351  
It is true that the wide powers entrusted to KDN in this regard had been criticised 
earlier, for example, by a specialist commission appointed by the RSFSR government in 
1990.352 But nothing suggests that KDN’s prerogative to make decisions on placement 
matters had been formally revoked by 1992, when the Law on Education was promulgated, or 
for that case at any point of time during the reign of Yeltsin. A major study devoted to the 
contemporary “administrative-judicial” functions of KDN (actually the only research work on 
KDN identified in addition to the abovementioned article of 1988 by Belicheva), i.e. the 2002 
Candidate’s Law Dissertation by Yekaterina Korchagina of the Omsk MVD Academy, is very 
clear on this account. Already in the introduction, Korchagina states that, by 2002, there had 
not been carried out any revision of KDN, allegedly leaving the institute out of step with the 
reforms at state level of the Russian society. According to Korchagina this had given reason 
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for “well-based doubt” as to the “legitimacy” (dopustimost) of KDN to apply “measures of 
state coercion against minors and their parents.”353 
The fact that KDN is completely omitted in the Law on Education might raise the 
question whether Russian lawmakers, by 1992, at all reckoned with the existence of KDN. 
Furthermore, if this was the case, the reason might well have been that KDN was perceived as 
inactive; possibly in conjunction with a view by the immediate post-Soviet authorities that 
KDN was a moribund relict of the former system.  
However, in the discussed Presidential Decree (No 1338 of 1993) on prevention of 
child vagrancy (beznadzornost’) and juvenile delinquency, KDN was definitely mentioned. 
The post-Soviet authorities assigned nothing less than the overall coordinating role for the 
child protection to the Commissions for the Affairs of Minors, thus confirming a status of 
KDN, which, in its level of ambition, equalled the one KDN had in Soviet times.354  
In strictly legal terms, however, there should have been no necessity to publish a 
Decree like No 1338 of 1993, stating the continued validity of the Soviet statues of KDN. As 
said, the legislation on KDN had in fact never been repealed. On the other hand, if KDN in 
practical terms largely had discontinued its work or only functioned to a limited degree, and if 
child-neglect phenomena increasingly caused problems for the post-Russian authorities as 
well as for the society at large; a reminder of the existence of KDN to local and regional 
executive authorities must indeed have been pertinent.  
Presidential Decree No 1338 of 1993 instructed furthermore the Russian government 
to prepare, within three months’ time, a legislative bill to the Russian parliament on 
amendments and additions to the 1967-statues of the KDN.355 This is noteworthy at least for 
two reasons: First, the fact that the KDN statutes yet by 1993 had not been revised to better 
cope with the growing mass child-neglect problems, witnesses of a very limited de facto role 
of KDN at least over the past few years. As repeatedly underlined, KDN had been specially 
tailored for the Soviet societal design. This included extensive involvement of the multitude 
of Party-led societal actors in child protection work, a resource that evidently was defunct by 
the time of the 1993 Decree. An unreformed and unreconstituted KDN was therefore 
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definitively out of tune with the post-Soviet realities and could not be capable to cope with the 
dramatically increased and different child-neglect challenges. 
Second, by instructing the government to urgently revise the statues on KDN, the 
Decree provides evidence to a contention that there had not been in place any functioning 
monitoring system of the evolving child-neglect situation. That is, the Russian authorities had 
paid little attention to the evolving child-neglect crisis, and were, so to speak, caught by 
surprise. If this had not been the case, a response strategy would have been gradually 
developed in parallel with the changing circumstances, and no legal-base urgency in terms of 
review and reassertion of the role of KDN would have occurred.  
Another question is whether the statutes of KDN actually were revised, following the 
Decree of September 1993. The matter of the fact is that later that very month of 1993, 
Yeltsin, by employing military force, dissolved the Russian Supreme Soviet and subsequently 
had the Russian (RSFSR) constitution changed. Amongst the political and financial battles 
then unfolding, it seems that the Russian governing elite had little or no attention for the issue 
of reorganising and improving the system of child-neglect prevention. In any event, it has not 
been possible to find any indication that, in the immediate aftermath of the constitutional 
crisis of 1993, the directive of the 1993 Decree to revise the KDN statutes had been followed 
up. Moreover, the survey of legislation relative to KDN in Korchagina’s abovementioned 
dissertation of 2002, contains no legislative item suggesting that the statutes of KDN actually 
were revised after 1993.356 
The only legislative activity pertaining to KDN in the period between 1993 and 1995, 
again according to Korchagina’s survey, was the resolution of June 1994, signed by Prime 
Minister Chernomyrdin, on the issue of an “Intra-Departmental” KDN attached to the Russian 
government.357 In fact, the resolution makes clear that a KDN “had been created” at the level 
of the central government in order to “secure a coherent approach in terms of solving the 
problem of preventing vagrancy and unlawfulness by minors,” as well as of “protecting their 
[the minors’] rights and lawful interests.” In a specific reference document (polozheniia) to 
the Intra-Departmental KDN, which was annexed to the resolution, the tasks of the intra-
departmental KDN were further spelled out. The central KDN should, in particular, prepare 
relevant initiatives for the Russian government, as well as assist KDN in the various 
administrative entities of the Russian Federation.   
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However, the concept of KDN at central government level was nothing new; the KDN 
statues for the RSFSR of 1967 did also contain provisions for this.358 Hence, if a top-layer 
KDN had to be re-established in June 1994, this proved that there had been no functioning 
KDN at governmental level in at least the immediate period prior to that particular point of 
time. In other words, to the extent KDN really existed or were active by 1994, at least in parts 
of the Russian Federation; there had been no central KDN to guide and monitor the work of 
the subordinate KDN structures across Russia.  
In terms of the actual implementation of the abovementioned KDN-related Decrees of 
1993 and 1994, the repeatedly consulted National plan for the interest of children appears 
again to provide useful information. In section 3.6 of the Plan, aspects of the status of KDN’s 
work are considered as per September 1995 (when the Plan was issued). To begin with, the 
National Plan lists a number of overall child-welfare issues that were to be successfully 
addressed in order to secure “socialisation and adequate rehabilitation, and integration into the 
society” of children who found themselves in “especially difficult circumstances.”  According 
to the Plan, Russian authorities should therefore “prepare necessary legislative bills aimed at 
protecting the rights and interests and children living in particularly difficult.” In this respect, 
KDN was the obvious target. That is, the Plan required that “mechanisms for individual child 
protection had to be improved [author’s emphasis] in the context of assessments and decisions 
[regarding minors] undertaken by the Commissions on the Affairs of Minors. Finally, the 
National Plan called for “the creation of these commissions everywhere.”359  
The implication for the hypotheses of the abovementioned seems to be as follows: 
First, with the National Plan, Russian authorities reaffirmed a principal commitment to KDN: 
Regardless of how Commissions functioned in real terms before and after the Decree No 1338 
of 1993, the KDN institute was designated to have a crucial role in the activities of the state in 
the area of prevention of child neglect. In other words, by making the success of its attempts 
to tackle the growing child-neglect challenges so dependent on an institute that at best 
functioned distinctively unsatisfactorily, the Russian authorities demonstrated a high degree 
of vulnerability towards a foreseeable future that bore few, if any, signs of improvement.   
Second, the precarious position of KDN is also accentuated by the call for legislative 
initiatives which are reiterated by the Plan. Consequently, nothing seems to have been 
undertaken in terms of legal-base reform of KDN following the Decree of 1993. There is 
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moreover no evidence in the Plan that at least some Commissions in Russian regions might 
have been reinvigorated as a result of support received from the re-established KDN at 
governmental level.  
Finally, the point in the Action Plan requiring the establishment of KDN in all places 
(povsemestno) provides undeniable evidence that, by 1995, the Commissions must have 
ceased to exist at least in a significant number of places. Tacking account of a certain element 
of embellishment in official Russian documents like those analysed above, especially due to 
the political sensitivity of child policies, one can not disregard the possibility that KDN had 
discontinued its work in a great number or even majority of regions and municipalities 
throughout the Russian federation. 
The inference that KDN, following the system change, did not exist in several Russian 
regions during a certain period of time, corresponds with a central observation made by 
Korchagina in her abovementioned dissertation. Setting the context to the “period of the 
fundamental renewal of the Russian statehood which followed after the fall of the USSR,” she 
states: “As a result, the work of several Commissions became weaker and in a number of 
cases they completely discontinued their activity.”360  
An even more unequivocally negative characterisation of the state of affairs of the 
Russian child-protection work of the 1990s was made in 2005 in a candidate’s dissertation in 
history by Yekaterina Nazarova ( of the Krasnodar Academy of MVD). In her study, Struggle 
against deviant behaviour and crime in the youth policy of the Russian Federation (1991-
1999), Nazarova writes that the “ruling elite of Russia” could not decide on “whether a 
specific youth policy was necessary.” The authorities therefore adopted a number of separate 
programmes that all were “chronically unworkable.” “In practical terms,” the result was “a 
complete absence of financing, which predecided a youth policy that remained 
declamatory.”361  The main conclusion of Nazarova is formulated in the following way:  
The research showed that prophylactic work at state, federal and regional level to prevent youth 
deviation and crime was almost not conducted. All preventive activity (help to homeless, victims 
of sexual and other criminal violence, drug addicts and persons realised from penitentiary 
institutions as well as others) were carried out by Non Governmental Organisations [NGOs] and 
private persons.362 
If Nazarova’s assessment of the effectiveness of the state child-protective agencies is to be 
believed, it seems obvious that the total activities aimed at assisting seriously neglected 
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children indeed must have been limited, at least during the first post-Soviet period. Although 
the first voluntary organisations by 1991 had started to establish projects aimed at providing 
new services such as temporary shelters and support to vulnerable families, the capacity of the 
humanitarian NGOs operating in Russia was limited. To once more quote Harwin on this 
account, Russian NGOs were “still only embryonic and in no position to make any serious 
inroads into the extent of unmet child needs.”363   
Harwin’s observation is concretised in an article by one of the few other Western 
authors who have explored the modern Russian street children problem: In 1994-1995, the 
British researcher, Sarah Cemlyn, in association with Tanya Vdovenko, examined some 
aspects of the situation for street children in Saint Petersburg. The authors list four various 
NGO shelters for street children with a total capacity of 100 children, against the estimated  
20,000 street children of the city, who “survive by their wits, sleeping where they can in the 
underground stations, derelict building and public toilets.” 364 Still the authors do at least not 
understate the role of the role of NGOs in assisting street children: “NGO responded to a 
public policy vacuum in pioneering services, and they fulfil a crucial role. However, it is clear 
that they cannot meet the needs of up to 20,000 street children.”365  
 
Conclusions 
To briefly conclude, the analyses of this chapter have as yet attempted to establish 
empirically-based data on the development (over the period 1987-1996) of the child-neglect 
scale (research topic 1), and of the capacity of the Commissions for the Affairs of Minors 
(KDN) to solve its statutory tasks (research topic 2). Overall, the scrutiny of legislative and 
secondary sources did not present findings that appear to contradict the assertions of the 
working hypotheses of the thesis. However, some of the findings obviously require further 
clarifications of certain aspects of the hypotheses. In particular, this concerns the 
characterisation of the starting level of the research topics (i.e. the situation in 1985-1987), as 
well as gradient of the trend that the research topics followed.  However, before a final fine-
tuning of the working hypotheses is carried out (see Chapter 7), Chapter 6 will proceed with 
an analysis of the available primary sources associated with KDN’s work.  
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Chapter 6 
MANIFESTED CHILD NEGLECT – SOURCES LINKED TO KDN’s WORK 
 
Introduction and methodology for the chapter   
As detailed in Chapter 1, primary sources linked to the work of the Commissions for the 
Affairs of Minors (KDN) could be accessed for this study, only in two Russian regions, 
St.Petersburg/Leningrad and Arkhangelsk oblast/city.366 Consequently, annual reports and 
other available documents associated with KDN’s activities from these two regions, form the 
basis for the following comparative analyses of how the work of this key child-protection 
institute evolved over time. In this chapter, the working hypotheses,367 which were tested 
against legislative and secondary sources in Chapter 5, are therefore further assessed before 
final conclusions regarding their validity are drawn in Chapter 7 of the thesis.  
Two regions out of a total of 89 entities in Russia is a relatively small “sample.” Still, 
St.Petersburg/ Leningrad and Arkhangelsk oblast/city represent a relative diverse territorial 
selection and should definitely give indications of national trends. Challenging in terms of the 
representativeness of the material, however, is also the absence of complete annual series of 
documentation.368 Yet, most critical for the examination of the sources is the now established 
fact that, as the old system collapsed and the new post-Soviet order rapidly descended into 
socio-economic disaster, KDN progressively weakened. Consequently, the Commissions 
could not manage to cope adequately with the growing child-neglect problems. If not 
otherwise convincingly documented throughout the forthcoming examination, primary 
sources related to KDN’s proceedings are therefore assumed to provide merely additional 
nuances to the picture of the child-neglect scale already established by the thesis.  
When it comes to assessing the hypotheses on the changing KDN capacity, the value 
of the primary sources on KDN is far less problematic. For example, quantitative data on 
KDN’s examination of individual child-neglect issues may concurrently provide information 
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on the quality of the work of the child-protections institute in this regard: If there is an evident 
under-reporting on a given indicator (e.g. if KDN data suggests decreasing number of cases 
handled in a period when child neglect evidently was on the rise), this points clearly towards 
declining quality in the work of the societal institute. Furthermore, factors like the sheer 
number of indicators included in an annual report, but also the typographic and technical 
standard of the report, will, in addition, give an indication of how a given KDN entity 
functioned. There are indicators that also directly concern KDN’s work. Examples of these 
are: number of sessions conducted in the course of a given year, number of child-related 
institutions checked by KDN, or number of volunteers involved in its work. Comparative 
analyses on the basis of such quantitative indicators require, however, a degree of caution. 
Given the falling quality of KDN’s work, the fact that one child-related facility (e.g. 
correctional school) was inspected, or one community volunteer mobilised, was hardly the 
same in 1985 as it was in 1995.  
Before turning to the concrete analysis of the indicator tables, some general comments 
should be given to what I will call overall variation factors. Methodologically, such factors 
may help conducting a first-line assessment if encountering contradicting tendencies in the 
material. In other words, in cases where some indicator values deviate from the overall trend, 
both in the context of the given region, but in particular from the overall national trend 
substantiated in the course of this thesis, these variations factors may distinguish minor 
deviations from the possibly significant ones. 
In principle, variation factors can be associated with a number of imaginable 
circumstances, such as for example economic dissimilarities. That is, there might have been 
differences between, or within, territorial entities, e.g. differences in the number of enterprises 
and work places that for various reasons were preserved throughout the reforms of the 1990s. 
Furthermore, discrepancies in the KDN material, in particular when it comes to the first 
chaotic years of the 1990s, can perhaps be explained by diverse degrees of local leadership 
intent, or ability, to maintain aspects of Soviet-era mechanisms, such as child-protection 
schemes. Also factors like varying degrees of personal commitment to child protection work 
may obviously have been put to use. Finally, the attitude of the bureaucracy may have been 
mixed in terms of reporting on issues like KDN: While some public servants wished to be 
honest, others might have attempted to doctor data, including lowering requirements to 
accuracy in order to deliver according to own or others’ expectations. 
In the context of this thesis, the empirical realities behind the variation factors 
suggested above can naturally not be assessed. In order for this study to avail itself of the 
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primary sources on KDNs work, the overall assumptions for Russia as a whole must therefore 
be maintained as a starting point. Consequently, the material pertaining to the work of KDN 
in the five municipalities included in the analyses of this chapter are initially interpreted in 
light of the findings made in Chapter 5. If the established trends are confirmed, minor 
divergences in the material can then be explained by utilising variation factors like those 
suggested. However, should more substantial inconsistencies arise from the forthcoming 
analyses; the working hypotheses of this study must of course be accordingly adjusted.  
 
Analysis of KDN material from five municipalities 
On the basis of the available annual reports from each of the five raions included in the below 
analyses I have compiled five indicator surveys,369 containing indicators which I have found 
are of particular relevance for the research topics of this study.370  The indicators included in 
the indicator surveys are grouped into three categories according to the type of information 
which is conveyed: data on minors followed-up by KDN; data on parents assessed by KDN; 
data on the scope and character of KDN’s work. Within these three groups, a few selected key 
indicators are highlighted and converted into percentage values, indicating the development 
over time of the particular key indicator. The annual performance values of the key indicators 
are compared with a baseline value, representing a starting point which is set at 100 percent. 
For Kalininskii, Lomonosovskii and Isakogorskii, the baseline year is 1985, i.e. the first year 
containing data on these raions. For Leninskii and Oktiabrskii, the base-line year is 1989.  
Finally, seven key indicators are selected and analysed, one-by-one, in the seven key 
indicator tables that are given below. Each table contains longitudinal data on one particular 
key indicator from each of the five raions focused in this chapter. The seven key indicators 
are: number of minors assessed; number of runaway or vagrancy cases registered; number of 
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Kalininskii. All accessed material linked to KDN’s work in Arkhangelsk is stored in the Gosudarstvennyi Arkhiv 
Arkhangel’skoi Oblasti  (GAAO). Below follows the archive references of all annual KDN reports included in 
the seven key indicator surveys. 1. Leningrad/Saint Petersburg: a) KDN, Kalininskii raion, belongs to Fond 
4793, Opis 8. The files (dela) are (with corresponding year): 748 (1985); 795 (1986); 837 1987; 905 (1988);  974 
(1989); 1046 (1990); 1113 (1991). b) KDN, Oktiabrskii raion belongs to Fond 4914, Opis 8. The files (dela) are: 
205 (1989); 434 (1990); 45 (1992); 88 (1993). c) KDN, Leninskii raion, belongs to Fond 4900, Opis’ 5. The files 
(dela) are: 43 (1989). 108 (1990); 168 (1991). From 1992 the Fond is 5835 and the Opis’ 1: The files are: 104 
(1992); 187 (1993) 2. Arkhangelsk city/oblast. d) KDN, Isakogorskii okrug, belongs to Fond 2063, Opis’ 2. The 
files (dela) are: 5194 (1985). 5373 (1986); 5556 (1987); 5695 (1988).  From 1992 the Fond is 1137 and the Opis’ 
1: The files are: 16 (1992); 23 (1993); 33 (1994); 40 (1995). e) KDN, Lomonosovskii okrug, belongs to Fond 
2063, Opis’ 2. The files (dela) are: 5194 (1985). 5373 (1986); 5556 (1987); 5695 (1988).  From 1992 the Fond is 
1145 and the Opis’ 1: The files are: 12 (1992); 31 (1993); 31 (1994); 31 (1995). 
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assessed minors with drinking problems; number of minors referred to correctional or other 
residential institution; (all four key indicators pertaining to Category 1: data on minors 
followed up by KDN); parents on KDN record; parents deprived of their parental rights 
(pertaining to Category: 2 data on parents assessed by KDN); and, finally, voluntary social 
workers involved in KDN’s work (Category 3, data pertaining to KDN’s work). 
 
Table 6.1. Key Indicator 1. Minors assessed by KDN, in percent of baseline year371 
  1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1992- 
Kalininskii 100 94 105 96 79 79 68         78 65 97 80 
Oktiabrskii     100 97  142 76      109 
Leninskii         100 105 92 99 94           96 
Isakogorskii 100 76 98 107    46 40 37 60    46 
Lomonosovskii 100 110 121 123       165 57 111 74       102 
 
If KDN had functioned optimally and captured all neglected minors in need of protection and 
support, Key Indicator 1 would have adequately reflected the changing number of neglected 
minors in the society. With the number of manifested cases of child neglect on the rise, the 
indicators of Table 6.1 should therefore have demonstrated increased values from the late 
1980s and throughout the 1990s.  
Both for 1989-1991, as well as for the years after 1991, Table 6.1 provides, however, a 
picture of a predominately declining number of minors assessed by KDN, at least after 1988. 
On the other hand, the material also contains some apparently significant deviations from this 
trend (conf. Oktiabrskii in 1992, Leninskii in 1990, 1991 and 1993; as well as Lomonosovskii 
in 1992 and 1994). For sure, particularly in 1992, under the first impact of the shock therapy, 
the tendency towards the growth in the numbers of children handled by KDN might reflect a 
real ad-hoc mobilisation on the part of KDN. At any rate, it does not seem probable that the 
most noticeable divergences in the table (i.e. the indicator values for 1992 of the two 
neighbouring and presumably homogeneous peers Oktiabrskii and Leninskii, or 
Lomonosovskii and Isakogorskii, respectively) are caused by objective factors such as diverse 
economic activity and employment levels in the various raions. Therefore, in view of the 
unstable performance of both Oktiabrskii and Lomonosovskii after 1992, a plausible 
explanation to the variations in the material might be greater or lesser in degree of incidental 
and unsustained bureaucratic conscientiousness in both real work and reporting tasks.  
                                               
371
 This table and the following tables (Table 6.1. – 6.7.) are compiled on the basis of the information comprised 
in the archive material referred to under footnote 369, p. 98. The last column in the tables is the average 
percentage change in the course of the post-Soviet period against the Soviet-period base-line year. 
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Certainly, the annual reports that Table 6.1 is based upon, do not reveal information on 
the quality of KDN’s assessment of individual child neglect cases, or how this aspect of the 
work evolved over time. No protocols from KDN sessions of any of the five raions included 
in the study have been seen by the author, neither in original nor in copy. The author has, 
however, perused original KDN files from proceeding of the Leningrad raion Krasnoarmeiskii 
for the period 1989-1991.372 The impression from this material is clearly that, the quality of 
the documentation attached to the personal files deteriorated during these three years, 
especially in 1991: It seems that the forms were filled in ever more rapidly and rudimentarily, 
the militia reports became shorter, and the KDN intervention towards the children and their 
parents became more formalistic and limited. 
So, while the child-welfare conditions of the country objectively deteriorated, KDN in 
these raions, only with minor and probably insignificant exceptions, assessed a decreasing 
number of child-neglect cases. The inference of this is evident: As a source of information, 
the data contained in Table 6.1, cannot contribute to any further mapping of the real child-
neglect scale. In terms of assessing the hypotheses on KDN capacity, however, the material 
brings clear evidence of a KDN institute increasingly failing to fulfil its mandatory tasks. 
 
Table 6.2:  Key indicator 2. Registered cases of child runaway and vagrancy  
  1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1992- 
Kalininskii 100 88 129 86 57 100 50         124 52 7 61 
Oktiabrskii     100 91  164 91      127 
Leninskii         100 500 1200 800 300           550 
Isakogorskii 100       150  225 525    300 
Lomonosovskii 100                           0 
 
Chapter 5 has already concluded with a growth in the number of street children, probably 
beginning from around 1989.373 With adequate work of KDN, this should naturally have been 
reflected in a survey like the one of Table 6.2. Indeed, at first glance it might appear as if 
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 The material from Krasnoarmeiskii raion - stored in TsGASP, Fond 3539, Opis’ 1, (dela) (with 
corresponding year): 947 (1989); 1033 (1990); 1072 (1991) - shows that KDN sessions were held every second 
week. A sitting was typically attended by from four to eighth members representing the militia and other 
authorities (education, health, social), occasionally also public organizations. KDN called minors and their 
parents to hear cases related mainly to various delinquencies (theft, drinking, hooligansim, juvenile bulling, 
truancy, etc.). Since more than 30 inidivudal cases were assessed during one sitting, little time was given to each 
of them. A militia report was presented, and the invited family members were briefly interviewed. In the 
overwhelming number of cases, the evaluation resulted in reprimands or small fines (10-20 roubles) for the 
offending minors. For having allowed their children to get out of control, the parents were typically “sentenced 
to” public censure or fines. In the files reviewed, there were no examples of KDN referring children to 
correctonal insitutions. Nor was any case initiated on deprivation of parental rights.  
373
 Chapter 5, p. 79. 
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Table 6.2, at least partially, documents such a growth. However, if one, first of all 
concentrates on the largest of the municipalities represented, the highly populated Kalininskii, 
the overall trend conveys much the same picture as this raion did in Table 6.1: First, the surge 
in cases of runaway children in 1987 might well have been a result of increased Party-driven 
attention to orphans and abandoned children following, Decree No 872 of 1987 “On measures 
to radically improve…” (see p. 64 above). Second, the relative top in the number of detected 
vagrants that occurred in Kalininskii in 1990 - after two years of relatively low “catches” of 
street children (perhaps illustrating the short-lived effects of the 1987 campaign) – might be 
seen as a last cogent mobilisation, by utilising Soviet-era tools, against an apparently 
appalling surge in urgent child-neglect cases.  
What happened with the work of KDN in Kalininskii raion in the years between 1991 
-1996 could not be revealed through this study. Whether or not the KDN in Kalininskii 
actually functioned in this intervening period, and whether or not it actively addressed the 
manifested street-children problem, must therefore be a matter for future research to explore. 
What is proven, however, is that the child-welfare situation in Russia significantly 
deteriorated throughout the 1990s. For this thesis it might therefore suffice to suggest that 
KDN’s percentage performance of 124 in 1996, against the pre-crisis level 100 of 1985, must 
have fallen considerably short of the real level that the street children problem had reached 
after years of widening socio-economic and family crisis. Hence, if the years following 1991 
were characterised by a high degree of idleness on the part of KDN in Kalininskii; the relative 
high indicator value in 1996, on the other hand, might have mirrored possibly increased 
efforts on the part of the Russian authorities to halt the galloping child-neglect problems.374  
When it comes to the strong percentage fluctuations in terms of runaway children over 
the years 1989-1991, in Leninskii raion, this may reflect a real increase in the number of 
child-vagrancy cases. Yet, with only one runaway child registered in 1989, the baseline year, 
the statistical upsurge in child vagrancy that apparently ensued in 1990 and 1992 becomes 
less “impressive”. More characteristic for the assumed failing ability of this particular raion 
KDN to adequately tackle the real street-children problem, is, however, the declining trends 
of 1992 and 1993, two years when Shock Therapy hit at-risk families with relentless force.  
A few remarks on Arkhangelsk: The reason for the data dearth in Table 6.2, both for 
Isakogorskii and Lomonosovskii, is not known. Isakogorskii, however, demonstrates a growth 
                                               
374
 President of Russia: Fundamental directions of the state social politics on improving the situation for 
children in the Russian Federation until the year of 2000 (National action plan for the interest of children), 
Decree No 942, (Moscow, 14.09.1995) p. 85. The presidential re-election campaign of 1996, entailing certain 
social initiatives, can also have played a role in this respect (see p. 36).  
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in the number of street children registered by KDN for 1992, 1994 and 1995. An explanation 
to this may be that Isakogorskii KDN, in spite of the overall tendency of failing capacity 
during this period, kept so much of its functionality that it managed to handle more street 
children over the crisis-ridden first post-Soviet years than it had during the only year 
accounted for before 1992, the yet relatively stable year of 1985.  
In sum, Table 5.2, provides further evidence of a failing KDN; this time in terms of 
detecting and taking care of vagrant children. But there are also nuances: Occasionally KDN, 
through increased registering of individual cases of runaway children, demonstrated a degree 
of human and organisational capacity that, although definitely only partially, reflected the 
growing caseload of child-neglect from the late 1980s.  
 
Table 6.3:  Key indicator 3. Registered drinkers among minors passing through KDN  
 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1992- 
Kalininskii 100 106 106 82 111 119 111         117 122 54 98 
Oktiabrskii     100 75  55 93      74 
Leninskii         100 97 59 77 94           86 
Isakogorskii 100 163 103 94    42 32 0 0    18 
Lomonosovskii 100 94 85 98       58 40 0 0       25 
 
An obvious assumption for the interpretation of Table 6.3 is that, there is a positive 
correlation between child neglect and alcohol misuse of minors: neglected and abandoned 
children, in an alcoholised society like Russia, tend to resort to drinking and other means of 
intoxication. Overall, except for the real reduction in drinking during the Gorbachev anti-
alcohol campaign (which statistically, however, could lead to increased indicator values in 
this respect due to more attention to the problem and higher detection rates), one should 
therefore, analogously to the deteriorating living conditions, expect more at-risk minors 
misusing alcohol.  
It goes without saying that a well-organised and well-resourced KDN institute in this 
situation should have addressed a growing number of cases involving juvenile alcohol 
consumption. However, apart from minor tendencies to the contrary, which may be left 
uncommented in the light of the explanations given to similar statistical variations under the 
first two tables, the trend of Table 5.3 is definitely one of a declining number of alcohol-
related cases registered by KDN. Yet again the KDN material does not reflect a real 
deterioration in children’s welfare, but only KDN’s own failure to cope with the challenges. 
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Table 6.4: Key indicator 4. Referral of children to residential institutions  
  1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1992- 
Kalininskii 100 233 141 126 104 67 11         0 33 7 13 
Oktiabrskii     100 81  50 8      29 
Leninskii         100 6 0 238 131 6         125 
Isakogorskii 100 113 125 50    38 0 0 0    9 
Lomonosovskii 100 125 213 200       50 0 0 0       13 
 
 
Alternative placement of neglected children would in the context of the Russian crisis be 
required for two main reasons: First, if children resided at home with their parents, the need 
for a safer place to live in could be triggered by such increasing risk factors, as domestic 
violence, parental heavy drinking, drug addiction as well as psychic disorder, but also 
intolerable living conditions due to poverty (see Chapter 4). Second, in cases of manifested 
child vagrancy, as well as of other forms of deviant child behaviour (such as delinquency and 
crime), the authorities were legally obliged, as a last resort, to secure alternative placement of 
these minors in correctional and other boarding institutions. Theoretically, with a KDN 
institute fulfilling its mission, a growth in the statistics of referrals should therefore have been 
registered in Table 6.4.  
The statistical material of KDN’s actual work provides evidence of the opposite. In 
general, there was a considerable drop in the number of referrals, both after 1989 and after 
1992. The only deviation from the main, declining trend in this regard is observed for 
Leninskii in 1992. However, in the absence of concrete information on the causes for the 
unexpected jump to the 1992 level (from almost no referrals in 1990, and absolutely nil in 
1991), one may suspect that there have been at play a combination of registration errors and a 
one-time mobilisation in response to the first dramatic effects of the 1992 Shock Therapy. In 
any event, the rapid reduction in the number of referrals in 1993 and 1994, in a situation 
where the socio-economic conditions further deteriorated, indicates that the high 1992 figures 
at best represented efforts that could not be sustained. Besides, Table 6.4 does not provide 
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Table 6.5: Key indicator 5. Parents on KDN records  
 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1992- 
Kalininskii 100 36 36 35 27 32 40         117 117 74 103 
Oktiabrskii     100 72  72 79      76 
Leninskii         100 129 83 83 88           85 
Isakogorskii 100 72 65 77    29 34 0 0    16 
Lomonosovskii 100 84 107 95       140 147 0 0       72 
 
With a well-functioning KDN, a deteriorated child-neglect environment would imply a 
growing number of parents placed on KDN records: The more frequently parents jeopardise 
the well-being of their children, the more families should be brought under KDN surveillance.  
However, beginning with 1985 and continuing into the post-Soviet years, Table 6.5 
demonstrates no substantial tendency of increased KDN interventionism in relation to risk 
families. As for Kalininskii, the minor increase from the extreme low of 1990, to a slightly 
higher level in 1991, is definitely too insignificant to change this impression. Neither can the 
meagre 17 percent rise of 1996, against the 1985 level, indicate any degree of adequacy in 
KDN’s response to a problem that by 1996 perhaps had grown manifold.  
The tendencies of the data on the two Arkhangelsk raions are indeed conflicting. On 
the one extreme, Lomonosovskii KDN monitored in 1993, at least nominally, almost fifty 
percent more families than it had done in 1985. In 1993, in Isakogorskii raion, on the other 
extreme, only around one third of the comparable 1985 number of families were on KDN 
record.  With this vacillation in the material, significant registration errors cannot be ruled 
out. The 1992 and 1993 figures for Lomonosovskii raion do therefore not justify any 
modification of the main interpretation of Table 6.5: The KDN material does not, or only 
faintly, reflect the evolving, real child-neglect scale. It does, however, bring additional 
evidence of KDN’s lacking capacity in terms of monitoring and supporting needy families.  
 
Table 6.6: Key indicator 6. Parents deprived of their parental rights  
  1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1992- 
Kalininskii 100 100 33 58 27 10 10         0 0 0 0 
Oktiabrskii     100 59  112 112      112 
Leninskii         100 60 53 100 87           93 
Isakogorskii 100 57 52 24    5 0 0 0    1 
Lomonosovskii 100 29 18 0       0 0 0 0       0 
 
One definite consequence of the deteriorated childhood environment in Russia was that 
growing child abuse and other examples of extreme child neglect had put an increasing 
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number of children at serious risk, whilst living with their families. In the most extreme and 
irreparable family situations, the only option for the authorities, in particular for the 
Commissions for the Minors Affairs, should have been to have the children in question 
removed from their parents.  
However, this kind of intervention required at least two types of capacities on the part 
of the child protection and welfare agencies: First, there had to be a monitoring system in 
place to register families, where the situation was about to get out of control. Second, the 
society had to offer children, in critical need of placement outside their homes, a real 
alternative. With a collapsing state of social welfare, it is obvious that these capacities were 
underdeveloped or not present. The consequence for KDN and specialised agencies was most 
probably that they resigned before a problem that largely exceeded their capacity. Hence, 
sensing that the required resources to follow up a potential deprivation case, failed, or just 
lacking the necessary degree of personal commitment, KDN, along with specialised agencies, 
might therefore in several cases simply have turned a blind eye to the families in dire crisis.375 
Table 6.6 substantiates that three of the five raions unequivocally failed to respond to 
the widening crisis, by more frequently than before, resorting to deprivation of parental rights 
as an ultimate means of guaranteeing the children’s rights. Only KDN in Oktiabrskii and 
Leninskii apparently attempted to mobilise additional resources in this respect. However, 
while Leninskii never surpassed the base-line level of 1989, a year when the child-neglect 
crisis evidently was far more benign than it became in 1992 and 1993, Oktiabrskii KDN was 
able to deprive only twelve percent more persons of their parental rights in 1992 and 1993 
than in 1989. In sum, it seems that KDN, and, for that case, the entire Russian society, did not 
manage, even in an approximately adequate fashion, to mobilise the resources required if the 
growth in number of child-neglect manifestation was to be effectively countered. 
 
Table 5.7: Key indicator 7. Voluntary social workers  
  1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1992- 
Kalininskii 100 741 476 449 311 294 32         0 0 0 0 
Oktiabrskii     100 108  254 285      269 
Leninskii         100 193 93 75 146           111 
Isakogorskii 100 41 18 12    0 0 0 0    0 
Lomonosovskii 100 31 52 44       7 8 0 0       3 
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 This interpretation was indirectly confirmed by child-protection authorities in Vyborgskii raion in 
St.Petersburg in 2005 (5.10.05) during conversations the author was involved in when participating in a 
Norwegian film team collecting documentary material on the situation for street children in St.Petersburg.  
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As repeatedly stated in this thesis, Party-mobilised, voluntary community workers and 
community organisations were assigned a central role in Soviet child protection. This was part 
of the characteristic and omnipresent organisational web that bound the Soviet society 
together and made it work. As the Party gradually lost its grip on society not long after 
Gorbachev had started his radical reforms, this network also soon weakened and rapidly 
dissipated. In this respect Kalininskii, with its half a million inhabitants might prove typical in 
terms of the trajectory that the voluntary element of KDN followed over the period studied.  
As shown in Annex VII,376 KDN had in 1985, the year Gorbachev was elected general 
secretary of the CPSU, a total of 103 public educators. In addition 103 shefy were also 
mobilised for KDN in the raion. The surge in Kalininskii from 1985 to 1986 in the number of 
social volunteers (from 206 to 1527! persons) is remarkable also because it occurred before 
the Decree of 1987 “On radical improvements…”. The indicated development might therefore 
have reflected the general impetus of Gorbachev’s initial campaigning when assuming power 
(perhaps in combination with unknown factors, such as possibly changed reporting criteria). 
Although lower than in the record year of 1986, the number of volunteers continued at a very 
high level also in 1987 and 1988 (with 981 and 924 persons, respectively). However, as 
Gorbachev increasingly faced economic and political challenges, his campaigns obviously 
lost momentum. In the context of KDN in Kalininskii, it seems that this development was 
echoed in the reduced number of volunteers; first the number declined moderately (with 641 
and 605 persons in 1989 and 1990, respectively) and in 1991, it plunged to 65 voluntary 
social workers in a total child population below 16 years of around 100 000 persons.377  
As noted, it has proved impossible to access KDN data for Kalininskii raion relative to 
the years 1992-1995. The details on what happened with the volunteers as the system changed 
and the Party web disappeared, remain therefore uncharted. In any event, for the period after 
1995, when KDN reports yet again become available, there is no information on voluntary 
participation in the raion’s child protecting work.  
Behind the seemingly surprising trend, that the municipalities Isakogorskii and 
Lomonosovskii (Arkhangelsk city) demonstrate after 1995 a reporting peculiarity is hidden. 
For unknown reasons, the institute of shefy was not included in the annual reports after 1985 
for Lomonosovskii (with 238 shefy in 1985),378 and after 1986 for Isakogorskii (with 135 
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 Annex VII, page 132-33. 
377
 The data on total youth population comprise children below 16 years and are taken from: Sankt Petersburg, 
Statisticheskii ezhegodnik 2006, (Sankt Petersburg: Federal’naia sluzhba gosudarsvennoi statistiki, 2006), 17.   
378
 GAA 2063/2, file 5194; (list 107); and 5373 (list150).  
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shefy in 1985 and 41 in 1986).379 Therefore, over the period 1985-1988, the number of 
obshchestvennye vospitateli (community educators) in the two Arkhangelsk raions followed a 
development path that was not fundamentally different form the one of Kalininskii in 
Leningrad. That is, for the four-year period 1985-1988, there were respectively 21, 23, 28 and 
19 social educators in Isakogorskii;380 and 26, 82, 136 and 117 in Lomonosovskii.381 
According to the available data, it seems that the breakdown in the institute of voluntary 
community workers in two Arkhangelsk raions occurred only with the post-Soviet 
circumstances.  
The only raions that demonstrate an apparent strengthening of the voluntary element 
in child protection after the collapse of the USSR are the two St.Petersburg municipalities, 
Leninskii and Oktiabrskii. However, behind these figures, there might be some of the 
abovementioned variation factors at work. In particular, it may be questioned whether the 
criteria for reporting on social educators remained the same after the system shift: Both the 
material reviewed from KDN’s work in Krasnoarmeiskii raion raion in St.Petersburg and 
some of the material from Arkhangelsk indicate that social educators were real individuals on 
whom requirements were placed.382 When looking at the figures behind the percentages in 
Table 6.7 (Oktiabrskii reports to have had at their disposal 110, 120, 300 and 370 public 
educators for the years 1989, 1990, 1992 and 1993, respectively),383 one may, however, 
wonder whether the very rounded-off character of the figures are coincidental, or whether 
they represent in the best case collective.  
In an ideal situation where KDN were fully and continuously adjusted and adapted to 
the changing needs for child-protection intervention, the number of social educators, mentors 
(shefy) and other social volunteers working with KDN - would reflect the changing amount of 
children in need of support. Not surprisingly, such a reading can hardly be made from Table 
6.7. If there, in a few cases, as for example in Oktiabrskii, appear to be a tendency of growth 
in the number of volunteers involved in KDN’s work after 1991, this may, as indicated, be a 
result, at least partly, of changed criteria and relaxed reporting requirements.  
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 GAA 2063/2, file 5194; (list 96);  and 5373 (list 150).  
380
 GAA, file 5194; (list 96);  and 5373 (list 150): file 5194 (list 110); and 5373 (list 16). 
381
 GAA, file 5194; (list 107); and 5373 (list150);  file 5556 (list 159); and 5695(list 107).  
382
 That community educators were real individuals in the late Soviet period is evident from the files analysed 
from Krasnoarmeiskii raion in St.Petersburg (see e.g. TsGASP, 3539/ 1/ 947). The material reflecting the 
appointment of the voluntary social workers comprises information on age (several of them were in fact already 
pensioneers) and membership of organisations (Party, Comsomol, Union). Similar analyses are also in some of 
the documents attached to of the annual reports of KDN’s work in Arkhangelsk oblast and city.  
383
 TsGASP 4914/8, file 205 and 434 (1989-90) and 5835/1, file 45 and 88 (1992 and 1993). 
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Hence, the key indicator of Table 6.7 adds little new information to the knowledge of 
KDN established throughout the examinations of the other key indicators tables: Instead of 
mobilising community support for the growing number of needy children, the Commissions 
demonstrated increasing organisational paralysis and inability to fulfil its mandate.  
 
 
Additional comments and conclusion  
Almost none of the accessed documents indicate that KDN was involved in statutory tasks 
like overall coordination of other agencies or initiation of proposals pertaining to child 
protection. For example, in the abovementioned archive files from Krasnoarmeiskii KDN 
(covering the period 1989-1991), documents were deposited containing examination of 
individual cases of hooliganism and delinquency. The only exception is a few documents on 
appointment of “public educators,” (incidentally, as the documents show, the appointment of 
public educators sharply declined towards 1991).  
There are, however, a few documents in the material reviewed, that reflect a certain 
analytical tendency on the part of KDN. These are found in some of the annual reports for the 
period after 1992 pertaining to Arkhangelsk. Amidst a cautious language, the otherwise 
subservient Russian bureaucracy show signs of candid analysis of the current child-neglect 
situation in the region. For example, in an attachment to the annual KDN report of 
Isakogorskii raion for 1995, the militia accounts for its effort to curb juvenile delinquency and 
crime.384 The militia notes an alleged reduction in less serious law-breaking involving 
youngsters. But at the same time a distinct growth in the number of heavy crimes is 
registered: Accordingly, in 1995 a total of 60 serious crimes have been carried out by minors, 
against 33 in 1995. The militia further reports that every third crime had been committed 
under the influence of alcohol. This is said to represent a reduction of 39 percent against the 
corresponding 1994 figures. Moreover, the report notes that a great number of the young 
delinquents and criminals are involved in criminal gangs. But of the gangs on the militia 
records, only one had for “various reasons” been dissolved in 1995:  The report sets forth: 
To disband such groups is extremely difficult. This is due to the fact that in [Arkhangelsk] oblast there 
is one single special school [i.e. residential correctional institution] which has a capacity of only 80 
pupils. The departure from upbringing work with the youth; [the departure of] societal organisations 
from prevention of juvenile delinquency; [as well as ] the reduction [in the number] of clubs and various 
activity circles for youngsters; is also considerably impacting [the level of] juvenile crime.385   
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 GAAO, Fond 1137, opis’ 1, del 40, list 34 
385
 Ibid. 
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The above statement by a constituent member of the Commissions, the militia, is related to 
one of the most serious forms of child neglect, that is, minors involved in crime and criminal 
gangs. Through the militia report, KDN, and implicitly Russian authorities at large, actually 
make a number of interesting admissions. Together these admissions largely summarise the 
above discussion of the key indicators of KDN’s work:  
First, by presenting overwhelmingly incoherent and illogic information, and leaving it 
uncommented, the militia indirectly admits that it is not speaking the full truth. An example of 
this is the improbable claim that, in a context where heavy crimes almost doubled annually 
and the general societal crisis only widened, juvenile delinquency, combined with drinking, 
allegedly had declined from the previous year. Hence, the militia acknowledges that the 
tendency towards improvement is nothing but a result of low registration and low 
investigation rates. In other words, here is an example of the phenomenon of latent crime: 
The reality behind the obvious inconsistencies in the material is simply that the militia had not 
taken action in other criminal cases than the very serious ones, cases that just could not be 
ignored. This observation has a clear bearing on the issue of the official Russian statistics of 
the period: When first-line agencies like the militia, and for that case the principal child-
protection institute, KDN, increasingly failed to do their job, the statistical data collected by 
these actors could reflect little more than the tip of the iceberg.   
Second, the report admits relatively explicitly that the Russian child protection system 
did not possess the necessary resources even to deal with well-known child-neglect cases, 
such as for example, criminal youth gangs which were under surveillance. The reason that no 
action is taken by the law enforcement agency is that, in a region with 1.5 million inhabitants, 
there was only one special school where delinquents could be placed.  
Third, and this is perhaps the most outstanding piece of information in the material; 
the memorandum of the militia attached to the 1995 annual report of KDN in Isakogorskii 
okrug in Arkhangelsk, does point, although cautiously, at an overall cause behind the 
problems the militia experienced with the youth. What is to blame is the breakdown of the 
Soviet-era network of after-school activities and the numerous volunteer community workers.  
Closing the chapter, it can therefore be concluded that the primary sources linked to 
KDN’s work, while largely confirming the main direction of the working hypotheses of the 
study, also brings important nuances to the analysis of how the inter-agency structure evolved 
from 1985-1996. We have observed a child protection institute that increasingly failed to take 
action on behalf of vulnerable children. The deterioration in KDN’s performance is evident 
already by 1989, but increases dramatically after 1991. Or to put it differently, we have seen 
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evidence of a widening scissors effect: The magnitude of child-protection issues in the society 
and the level of KDN interventionism moved in different directions. Instead of demonstrating 
the ability to address the exploding number of child-neglect cases, the Commissions for the 
Affairs of Minors, which during the entire period under study was assigned the leading role in 
the era of child protection, imploded under the impact of the societal crisis.  






The thesis moves from a narrative synthesis of issues pertaining to street children in the 
USSR from 1917 to 1985 (Chapter 2), to a detailed discussion of the general political 
determinants of child-neglect in Russia from 1985 to 1996 (Chapter 3). Combined, Chapters 2 
and 3 constitute a historico-political backdrop against which to understand the emergence of 
mass child neglect around 1990. If these two chapters present overall determinants, Chapter 4 
offers a survey of specific determinants of the evolving child-neglect crisis. Further, as a 
means of linking the analysis of the child-neglect environment, i.e., the causal level of the 
model studied (Chapters 2-4), with the actual manifestations of child neglect, i.e. the 
resultative level (Chapters 5-6), four working hypotheses are framed at the end of Chapter 4. 
These hypotheses are in turn assessed against empirical material stemming from normative 
and secondary sources and primary sources (Chapters 5 and 6).  
Within this structural framework, the thesis pursues its overall research objective (i.e. 
to analyse the causality of the recent surge in the number of street children) and specific 
research objective (i.e. to assess the significance of the weakening and banning of the CPSU 
for the emergence of the third wave of street children in Russian history) by analysing how 
the two research topics at study - child neglect scale, and KDN capacity - evolved over time 
under the impact of the changing child-neglect environment.  
Below follows a review of the main findings of this thesis. To start with, in order to 
indicate the general causal platform from which the phenomenon of street children of the 
1990s emerged, the thesis offers a brief outline of the Soviet legacy in this respect. Thereafter, 
certain aspects of the working hypothesis with particular relevance for the research objectives 
of the thesis are discussed on the basis of the findings of the preceding chapters. This leads to 
consolidated reformulations of the hypotheses. Finally, outstanding research tasks are 
indicated before a few conclusive remarks are provided as to the degree to which the thesis 
has reached its objectives.  
 
Soviet Legacy and child protection  
In periods when the USSR was hit by a severe crisis - be it self-inflicted or caused by external 
forces or nature - child vagrancy and homelessness tended to erupt as an open, festering 
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wound. In more quiet periods, child neglect as a social problem occurred rather with latent 
acuteness; so to speak concealed beneath the surface of society.  
Prompted by diverse causes, cohorts of displaced children existed in Soviet Russia 
more or less continuously from the 1917 Revolution until the beginning of the 1950s. During 
most post-war decades, probably from the mid-fifties up to the end of the 1980s, it seems that 
mass child neglect in the form of roaming waifs largely disappeared and was met only 
occasionally and in small numbers.  
Ideological dreams of seeing juvenile delinquency and other signs of child 
disadaptation dwindle, as Soviet society allegedly approached Communism, did not become 
reality. While post-war reconstruction and the (failed) endeavour “to catch up with and 
overtake” the West brought improvements for millions of people, Soviet society remained 
basically one of chronic shortages and enormous stress. Huge groups continued to live in 
crammed and sub-standard dwellings with little access to material and cultural benefits. If 
combined with the growing binge drinking that evolved over the post-war period, such 
circumstances could provide fertile ground for increased child abuse and neglect. 
Decades of authoritarian Party monopoly on political and social initiatives in the 
USSR had resulted in an unprecedented degree of statism, arguably bolstering traditional 
passiveness and fatalism among Russians. The statism was reflected in the domain of child 
welfare in the dramatically increased state empowerment with regard to socialisation and 
education of children. It might be that the unprecedentedly strong state paternalism 
contributed to divesting some alcoholised parents of the last remnants of self-restraint: 
regardless how severely a child was subjected to harsh and careless treatment, the state was 
always there to take care of the child when the parents failed.   
Acknowledging that child neglect was a problem that required strengthened efforts by 
the entire society if it was to be brought under control and ultimately reduced, the Party 
decided in 1961 to establish the Commissions for the Affairs of Minors (KDN). The aim of 
this key institute in the area of child protection was to coordinate community actors and 
relevant state agencies; initiate new working methods; but also implement practical 
mechanisms aimed at preventing, detecting and alleviating child neglect wherever it might 
appear. 
 
Aspect 1 of the hypotheses: Analysis of the starting point of the research topics  
At the start of the work with this thesis, the assumption was that the Soviet child protection 
system, coordinated by KDN, functioned more or less adequately until the Party started to 
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lose its grip on Soviet society, that is, until around 1987.  The degree of knowledge on the 
pre-Gorbachev period, as I had previously explored, did not therefore allow me to deduce 
assertions relative to the specific starting points for the two research topics when framing the 
working hypothesis for the period 1987-1991. Consequently, to specify the state of affairs by 
1987, both in terms of child-neglect scale as well as KDN capacity, was a task that had to be 
dealt with as part of the review of the empirical material in Chapter 5 and 6.  
Indeed, the scrutiny of normative documents and research literature in Chapter 5 
provided important new information in this regard. In particular, the Decree of 1987 on 
“fundamental improvements” of the country’s child-protection system revealed “indifference” 
towards vulnerable children on the part of the Soviet society, including Party, State, 
community actors, as well as a significant number of parents of at-risk children. The 
abovementioned Decree therefore convincingly proved that the criminological visions of the 
1950s and 60s had not materialised:  modernisation of society (conf. building of 
“Communism”, later downgraded to “Developed Socialism”) had not resulted in a 
minimisation of problems like juvenile delinquency. On the contrary, the Decree cogently 
stated that child-neglect problems were unsatisfactorily handled, and that the Soviet child-
protection system did not function in line with its intentions. As research literature 
additionally suggests, by 1987 child neglect and KDN-capacity failure had reached such a 
degree of acuteness that the number of street children was notable, albeit on a limited scale.  
Therefore, by the time Gorbachev decided to move towards more radical reforms, the 
child-neglect and KDN challenges had become so grave that immediate improvements 
definitely were required in order to avoid an open crisis. Either hypothesis on the first 
subperiod (1987-1991) should therefore be fine-tuned. A new consolidated element should be 
added to these hypotheses:  
 
Already by 1987, the level of child-neglect and failing KDN capacity was so critical that a 
further economic downturn and organisational destabilisation would have to entail dramatic 
consequences.  
  
Aspect 2 of the hypotheses: Analysis of the research topics from 1987 - 1991  
The 1987 Decree demonstrated top Party determination to include the issue of child welfare 
into the country’s reform agenda. What is noticeable, however, is that the strategy offered to 
achieve improved conditions for vulnerable children this was one of traditional Soviet 
mobilising. It was therefore clear that the push towards upgrading of the country’s child 
protection and care system was entirely dependent on a reinvigorated system of Party-
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managed community actors that, as shown in Chapters 5 and 6, already by the time of the 
Decree showed distinct signs of fatigue and disarray. Included in the campaign was also the 
call for Soviet enterprises to provide increased funding, through the shefstvo institute, to 
orphanages and other social schemes. In short, the huge social and financial investments, 
which were required to secure radically improved child welfare, could only become reality if 
the Soviet system and its economy gained new strength.  
However, at the same time as the 1987 Decree was launched, Gorbachev introduced 
the most fateful element in his reforms: Glasnost. Whatever had been its original intentions, 
the Glasnost policy soon turned into an avalanche of criticism against present and past Soviet 
practices. In particular representatives of non-Russian nationalities used this opening to 
invoke old and new grievances. Perhaps the Union could have survived this sudden 
awakening of nationalist fervour and non-conformist onslaught that now followed, that is, if 
the economy were strong or at least in a stage of recovery. But as both Chapter 3 and 4 
substantiate, the opposite was definitely the case. Increasing political turbulence and conflicts 
accelerated economic disintegration and fuelled discontent. The Soviet Union soon faltered on 
the brink of financial insolvency. The Party, instead of setting the agenda for the country, 
became disorganised and was pressed into a corner. Very soon, following the failed coup of 
August 1991, both the Party and the whole Union were formally dissolved. This meant that 
any plan aimed at improving the country’s system for provision of child protection and care, 
like the Decree of 1987, was doomed to fail. The societal crisis that evolved, first slowly, then 
accelerating, gave no space for improvement of children’s living conditions. On the contrary, 
the thesis has provided evidence of deteriorated values of a number of child-neglect indicators 
after 1987.  
Encapsulating the period from 1987 until 1989, it must first of all be emphasised that 
the pressure on Soviet child welfare was dramatic already by 1987. Importantly, this year was 
the point of time when the anti-alcohol campaign lost it impetus and people again began to 
drink more. The year 1987 was furthermore the point of time when Glasnost pushed away the 
largely deceiving ideological curtains that people had been living behind for decades, 
entailing a surge of non-conformism and defiance in society. Simultaneously, Gorbachev did 
not manage to deliver on the promises he had made, creating widespread frustration and 
hopelessness. The Soviet Union remained in a state of economic and social stagnation brought 
upon the country and its people by the failed policies of previous leaders. The combination of 
these factors might explain both why vulnerable children became increasingly exposed to 
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risks in their families, but also why KDN failed to respond to the growing number of 
neglected children in an adequate fashion.  
 
After 1989, the economic slump, along with growing organisational disorder (following the 
erosion of Party-based government) and territorial disintegration led to a dramatic speeding 
up of the processes that had been discernible from 1987. Chapter 3 and 4 demonstrates the 
correlative development between faltering political leadership, on the one hand, and 
economical and social deterioration, on the other. As part of this, drinking soon reached pre-
Gorbachev levels. However, in a context of economic collapse, galloping inflation, incipient 
mass unemployment and corrosion of Soviet social-welfare schemes, the social costs of 
alcohol abuse became incomparably more serious than before for the society and in particular 
more detrimental for at-risk children. Chapter 5 traces manifestations of growing child neglect 
after 1989 and states, among other things, that in cities like Leningrad there were already 
observed more substantial concentrations of vagrant children.  
Primary sources stemming from KDN’s work (scrutinised in Chapter 6), can only 
provide limited evidence as to the real scope and trend of child neglect after 1989. As argued, 
the decreasing organisational coherency and reduced discipline in society gave rise to a more 
distinct scissors effect. Although the KDN-primary sources examined may allow for 
conflicting interpretations, the prevailing tendency is nevertheless that the Commissions for 
the Affairs of Minors demonstrated a reduced level of activities.  
In other words, the bank-run mentality, which spread amongst asset-holding 
nomenklaturchiks as the Party withdrew from its commando posts, was presumably echoed in 
the social sector as well. Once strictly Party-managed, also social agencies and institutes like 
KDN were increasingly impacted by collapsing instruction and monitoring mechanisms. But 
contrary to those who found themselves in marketable enterprises when the collapse set in, 
social workers and administrators had few if any hard assets that could be acquired. 
Nonetheless, in an increasingly crisis-ridden and individualised context, underperformance at 
work or merely ignoring one’s job duties could also be considered as a gain.   
The empirical material provides evidence of an increasingly anaemic KDN after 1989, 
substantiating that the growing number of children who were neglected were also ignored by 
the child protection establishment of the Soviet-Russian society. As Chapter 5 and 6 further 
demonstrates, the time span 1987-1989, as well as 1989-1991, represented a more negative 
trend for both research topics under scrutiny than the one postulated in the original working 
hypotheses. It is evidence to state that the organisational disintegration of the society 
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increased the negative effects of the socio-economic downturn. Consequently, either 
hypothesis on the first subperiod (1987-1991) must be sharpened:  
 
Over the period 1987-1989, the negative child-protection trend observed by 1987 could not 
be halted. Moreover, both the scale of child neglect and the capacity of KDN were negatively 
impacted by continued societal stagnation, mounting frustration, and growing organisational 
paralysation.  
 
Over the period 1989-1991, the economic and organisational foundation under the Soviet 
society started, so to speak, to cave in. No functional replacement was provided. This led to 
an upsurge in social problems, including a significant rise in the child-neglect scale. The 
operational voltage of the omnipresent, Party-managed spider web, which controlled Soviet 
society, was rapidly reduced before it was fully disconnected. Formerly Party-managed 
societal institutes like KDN were increasingly left on their own, under-resourced and 
demoralised.  
 
Aspect 3 of the hypotheses: Analysis of the research topics from 1992-1996 
The expectation of improved living conditions that was raised among millions of Russians 
was undoubtedly the main reason for Yeltsin’s popularity when he emerged as the main 
contender to Gorbachev’s impoverished and discredited Soviet regime. The converted Soviet 
apparatchik did indeed promise that his reforms soon should lift people out of the social 
impasse. Improved child welfare was one of the items included in his reform platform already 
before Yeltsin took over the full reins of power in Russia after the aborted coup of August 
1991.  
Rhetorically, Yeltsin’s revolution was formulated with a strong democratic and 
humanitarian appeal. This increased the risk of a boomerang effect, both psychologically and 
politically, if the first post-Soviet Russian president failed to deliver, just as the last Soviet 
leader had failed. And the backlash came indeed very soon: With the liberalisation of prices, 
privatisation and mass unemployment, most people immediately found themselves deeply 
mired in poverty, but probably also deprived of their last illusions that progress was possible.  
Encouraged to see the popularity of the Russian president dwindling by the day, the Supreme 
Soviet (i.e. the yet existing Soviet-era legislature of the Russian Federation) went for a frontal 
attack of the Yeltsin regime and its policies. The dynamics of politics therefore prompted 
Yeltsin to resort to heavy-handed measures to stay in power. A new Russian authoritarianism 
emerged from his violent dissolution of the uncooperative Supreme Soviet, election 
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manipulations, and an increasingly narrow power base. It was evident that Yeltsin could only 
be kept afloat with support from the new ‘possessing classes’ led by oligarchs who obviously 
had little or no regard for the social conditions of the majority population.  
In terms of political and administrative management under Yeltsin, most former Party 
nomenklaturchiks largely remained in place. Since August 1991 and the abrupt abolition of 
one organisational principle without replacement by a functioning new one, revamped ex-
Soviet bosses and managers at central and local level were freed from any ideological 
imperative, and, to a considerable extent, also from effective vertical control.  
With the dramatic economic downturn since 1989 and the endemic shortages of even 
basic consumer goods, post-Soviet Russia, both at state and family level, had no reserves to 
draw upon when heading towards the total societal implosion that was to come when the 
Shock Therapy was launched in early 1992. Chapter 4 brings incontestable evidence that a 
strong economic and social downturn was under way already in 1991, for so to be 
transformed into an abysmal societal collapse in 1992.  
This development provides the causal background for the deterioration that occurred 
in the life of at-risk children. As hosts of parents were hit by the crisis and responded with 
increased drinking, their children were those who had to bear the brunt of the shock. With a 
collapsing child-protection network, more and more children capitulated before the mounting 
viciousness that faced them. Groups of minors who had resorted to life on the streets during 
the last couple of years of the Soviet era were therefore now joined by much larger numbers 
of children who fled poverty, cruelty, hopelessness and lack of supervision in their homes, or 
in impoverished, derelict, and perhaps brutal children’s institutions.  
As said, the effectiveness of the formerly Party-controlled social welfare schemes 
plunged. Chapter 5 provides broad documentation of an unreformed KDN institute that after 
1991 was left without attention and support from the society while the number of child-
neglect cases rose dramatically. Only sporadic, inconsistent and resultless legal initiatives 
were taken to overhaul a child-protection institute that was increasingly out of touch with the 
new realities.  
As far as the post-1991 years are concerned, there was a striking absence of data, also 
concerning the work of KDN. This fact may of course be related to the degree of disorder in 
archive procedures that prevailed in Russia during the chaotic 1990s. But it may also be a 
confirmation of the suggestion found in the literature, namely that KDN, due to the legal and 
organisational turmoil, in certain places went into a dormant mode.  For the thesis it has been 
possible to access documentation related to KDN’s work in two Russian regions, Leningrad/ 
                                                             
 118 
Saint Petersburg and Arkhangelsk. Concerning the period after 1991, Chapter 6 brings 
evidence of a wholesale reduction in the level of KDN interventionism pertaining to all seven 
key indicators scrutinised: the number of children assessed, runaway or vagrancy cases 
registered, cases of minors with drinking problems, minors referred to correctional or other 
residential institutions, parents placed on KDN record, parents deprived of their parental 
rights, volunteer social workers involved in KDN’s activities. The minor variances that were 
observed in the material were probably due to insignificant and unsustained variation factors. 
The thesis has come to the conclusion that, already by the advent of Gorbachev, a child 
protection crisis was under way. A more serious crisis, however, erupted with the collapsing 
Soviet Union. This fact requires a sharpening of the assertions of the hypothesis pertaining to 
the second sub-period of the thesis, 1992-1996.  
 
Already by late 1991, mass child neglect and substantial KDN dysfunctionality had become 
an undisputable fact. The abrupt plunge in people’s living standard combined with the 
organisational paralysation that occurred following the Shock Therapy, which in turn only 
widened over the ensuing years, threw millions of people into abject poverty. Large segments 
of crisis-ridden parents turned to alcohol or drugs and evidently went into a psychological 
trance whereby the fate of their children appeared as more or less irrelevant. The society, on 
its part, had neither resources, nor resolve, to intervene in order to rescue abused, vagrant 
and homeless children from the destructive and hazardous life on the street.  
 
Final remarks  
The thesis has provided merely a vague suggestion as to the real scope of the child neglect of 
the period (as well as of the organisational failure represented by the collapse of the KDN 
institute). Certainly, when it comes to estimating the number of vagrant and homeless 
children in the 1990s – i.e. whether there were hundreds of thousands or even millions of 
them – this must be left to future research. What is obvious, however, is that this will be a 
formidable task. The lack of substantial statistics in this field is definitely associated with the 
increasing latent crime of the period, which must be understood in light of the phenomenon of 
organisational breakdown and fragmentation which I have focused on in this thesis. In 
particular the work of the militia - the first-line agency in the encounter between authorities 
and abused, delinquent and vagrant children – was strongly affected by this trend. In effect, 
unlawful behaviour by minors (e.g. vagrancy and delinquency), or towards them (e.g. 
negligence and abuse) might in numerous cases have escaped primary recording due to poor 
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militia performance. A future estimate of the real extent of street children in the 1990s will 
therefore most probably have to rely on indirect methods in order to reach results.  
 
Earlier surges in the number of street children in Russian history were caused by dramatic 
cataclysms like war, state violence, and natural catastrophes. The wave of street children that 
started to evolve during the Gorbachev period, for so to explode under Yeltsin, was more a 
result of leadership failure to deal with a systemic crisis that evolved without disasters or 
violent conflicts (the Cold War aside). The thesis contends that the degree of ill-preparedness 
and the lack of foresightedness on the part of the authorities constituted the overall cause for 
the unprecedented social crisis that emerged from the reforms, of which the new wave of 
street children was the most appalling humanitarian tragedy.  
 
However required it might be, in Russia there seems hitherto to be few indications that serious 
research is underway regarding the circumstances of the last street-children wave. It might be 
that the problem is too actual and therefore politically inconvenient to address.  
Obviously, enhanced attention towards the tragic fate of those who carried the heaviest 
burden of the failures and indifference of Russian politicians and the society at large will 
bring little credit to Russia, its leaders and people. If this is correct, we can observe that 
elements of Soviet-era traditions still are alive: If problems of extreme and massive child 
neglect (besprizornost) are caused by Russia’s own policies, this does not trigger openness 
and mass mobilisation to bring relief to the victims.   
 
The thesis has addressed its overall research objective in a way that has rendered the causal 
relationship between the two main levels of the research model overwhelmingly plausible: 
While the broader historic and political child-neglect determinants painted a general causal 
background for the economic and social processes studied, the detailed review of the 
increasingly negative causal factors at family level demonstrated the power with which the 
immediate child-neglect determinants directly impacted children’s lives. At the resultative 
level of the research model, the thesis traced sources of manifested child neglect that evidently 
correlated with the identified negative changes at the causal level. The secondary sources thus 
documented - although incompletely and fragmentarily – both the incipient deterioration 
under Gorbachev, as well as, subsequently, the dramatic aggravation of children’s condition 
that followed Yeltsin’s policies.  Concurrently, both secondary and primary sources provided 
evidence of an increasingly disorganised child-protection system, fully corresponding with 
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the tendencies of disintegration and lawlessness at the political level of society. In particular 
the primary sources pertaining to KDN’s work bore testimony of a progressively collapsing 
social interventionism on the part of Russian authorities. The thesis therefore largely 
substantiated that the failure of the system-straddling KDN institute to take action on behalf 
of neglected minors added force to the social storm that blew crowds of children onto the 
streets.  
 
As far as the specific research objective is concerned, the thesis has argued both logically as 
well as corroborated through evidence that the collapse and dissolution of the state-bearing 
Party, CPSU, hasted the centrifugal and disintegrating processes not only of the Soviet state 
as such (which is beyond any doubt), but also of the country’s societal institutes, such as the 
Commissions for the Affairs of Minors. Without a new, unifying organisational principle and 
shared value system in place, and without the restrictions that the Party had imposed on its 
office holders - perquisites and insider rule notwithstanding - the abrupt removal of the Party 
manifestly prompted increased disorder in society. Years of authoritarian conformism, 
ideological opportunism and eternal shortages, combined with a growing distrust in the future, 
had evidently prepared the ground for impetuous and short-sighted greed. In any event, this 
was what evidently characterised the behaviour of them who, all of a sudden, emerged in a 
position to act virtually unrestrained. For the New Russians, there was little regard neither for 
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Annex 2:  Child-Neglect Indicator Table (confer Annex 1)  
 
Examples of possible indicators relative to the Causal and Resultative levels, as well as to the 
“Dual” level: Child-Neglect Preventive Measures 
 
1. Indicators of child neglect determinants  






-Predictability in society  
-War and violent conflicts 
-Natural disasters 
-Massive state violence 
-Socio-economic collapse 
- Level of political volatility and overall 
tendency towards socio-economic 
deterioration  
- Massive population displacement  
- Epidemics and massive dead  
- Breakdown of societal infrastructure  
• political analysis 
•  statistics 








-Purchase power of population 
-GDP per capita 
-Number of children in unemployed 
families  
-Number of children living under 
subsistence level  
• statistics 
• research  
• publications 
• interviews 






-Parental responsibility  
 
-Housing conditions  
- Divorce rate 
- Number of single-headed households   
- Alcohol abuse, number of cases 
- Drug addition, number of cases 
- Incidence of domestic violence, sexual 
abuse  
-Number of child abandonment  
-Incidence of deprivation of parental right 




• research  
• publications  
• interviews  
• NGOs 
Child Safety  
 
 
- In schools 
- In children’s institutions 
- In relation to other 
authorities  
- Incidence of violence against children 
and child abuse  
-Police child abuse, incidence 
• statistics 
• research  
• NGOs 
• Interviews 














-reporting requirements  
-level of professionalism and integrity  
-number of non-state enterprises 
-tradition of corporate social 
responsibility 
-characterisation law-abidingness in the 
business sector  
-number of CV humanitarian/charitable 
organisations 
-number of employed/volunteers in CS 
organisations 
-characterisation of individual value 
systems (empathy, initiativeness),  
- level of entrepreneurial creativity in the 
population (vs. state paternalism) 
• statistics/ 
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2. Indicators of manifested child neglect and homelessness  


























-Related to schools 
 
-Related to private homes  








-Petty juvenile offences  







-Child Beggars  
-Stray and vagrant children 
-Children sleeping at odd places  
-Health problems 
-Crime committed against street 
children 
-Number of reported missing minors 
-Number of unclosed dropout cases  
-Number of individual cases processed by 
KDN 
-Number and categories of sanctions and 
placements  
-Estimates of underreporting  
 
-Number of minors brought in to police 
stations 
-Number of minors in Receiver/Distribution 
stations (MVD-militia) 
-Number of cases processed legally, 
children convicted 
-Number of individual cases processed by 
KDN 
-Number and categories sanctions and 
arrangements  
-Estimates of underreporting (latency) 
-Number of minors brought to police 
stations 
-Number of minors in Reciever/Distribution 
stations (Priemiki/raspredelitli)  
-Number of individual cases processed by 
KDN 
-Number and categories of sanctions incl. 
placement applied towards minors 
-Estimates of underreporting (latency)  
- Specific social organisation of street 
children communities  
 
• general public 
statistics 
• child welfare 
organisations 
(e.g.KDN) 














• NGO data 
• News, Media   
• Interviews with 
children 
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3. Indicators of child neglect preventive measures.  (Exemplified by the work of the Commissions for the Affairs of 
Minors - KDN) 




































Capacity to follow up real case 




-Quality of follow-up work of 
individual cases  
 
 
-Responsiveness to changing 



















-Role of “non-governmental” 





-Role of individual persons in 
preventive child neglect work 
-Total number of handled cases by KDN 
-Surveys of how cases are brought to KDN 
-Estimates of total child neglect cases 
-Time and resources spent on each child 
neglect case 
-Qualitative assessment of actions taken by 
KDN in each individual case 
-Amount of monitoring carried out by KDN 
regarding implementation of the decisions it 
has taken 
-Amount of monitoring by KDN of impact 
on neglected children of actions taken 
 
 
-Time and resources spent by KDN in 
analysing the evolving child neglect 
situation and on that basis elaborating 
proposals to state organs 
-Number of initiatives taken towards state 
organs in terms of proposing 
revised/improved approaches to child 
neglect preventive work  
-Amount of monitoring by KDN of state 
organs preventive work 
-Amount of monitoring by KDN of state 
organs day-to-day work with neglected 
children (children’s institutions, schools, 
MVD institutions etc) 
 
-Number of public (obshchestvennye) 
organisations taking part in KDNs work 
-Quality assessment of child neglect 
preventive work done by obshchestvennye 
org 
 
-Number of volunteer social workers (shefy, 
obshchestvennye vospitateli etc) involved in 
KDNs work 
-Quality assessment of  child neglect 
preventive work by individuals 




• Material related 
to organisation 
statutory taken 
part in KDN 
(MVD - militia), 
school, health, 
social service 
etc) and other  





• Interviews with 
participants 
KDN’s work as 













                                                             
 125 
Annex III:   Estimates of total alcohol consumption per capita1 
 
Estimates of total alcohol consumption per capita 
1. Year 2. Official 
Sales 
3. Column 2 + 
samogon 
4. Nemtsov 5. Treml 6. Average of 
estimates 
7. Average 
above 15 yrs 
1975 9,88   13,1   
1980 10,51 13,5  14 13,8 17,6 
1984 10,45 13,8 14,63 14,25 14,2 18,3 
1985 8,8 12,3 13,31 13,3 13 16,8 
1986 5,17 10,2 10,77 10,57 10,5 13,6 
1987 3,9 10 10,96 10,7 10,6 13,8 
1988 4,4 8,3 11,57 11,2 11,4 14,8 
1989 5,29 8,7 12,04 11,66 11,9 15,3 
1990 5,56  12,29 11,76 12,2 15,6 
1991 5,57  12,67 12,27 12,5 15,9 
1992 5,01  13,23 13,81 13,5 17,9 
1993 5,00  13,9 14,43 14,2 18,6 
1994 6,8  14,6  14,6 19,0 
1995 6,5      
1996 7,2      
1997 7,5      




Additional comments to Annex II: Column 2 – official Soviet/Russian statistics on alcohol consumption; 
Column 3– official figures (column 2) plus official estimates of moonshine; Column 4 - estimates by the Russian 
researcher Nemtsov; Column 5 – estimates by the researcher Treml; Column 6 – average per capita consumption 
of several estimates calculated by Demoscope; Column 7 – same as under Column 6, but calculated as an 


















1The table is based on: Demoscope Weekly, No 19-20, 2001, (a Russian Internet journal supported, among 
others, by UNFPA and UNESCO) http://www.demoscope.ru/weekly/019/tema01.php  (2.8.2008) 
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Annex IV:    Alcohol- and Drug-related figures        (Figures 1-4) 
 
Figure 1.  Correlation between the total number of crimes and drug related crimes,  




Y-Axis/left: number of general crimes per 100 000 inhabitants; Y-axis/right: Number of cases 
of drug related crime; X-Axis: time line.  
Lower, Green Graph: Number of drug-related crimes. (point of orientation: from the right).  












2The figure is reproduced from an article by Yekaterina Shcherbakova: In the Demoskop Weekly; (No 297-98, 
August – September 2007) http://demoscope.ru/weekly/2007/0297/barom01.php (2.8.2008) 
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Figure 2. Number of urban and rural alcoholics/alcohol psychoses as well as of drug 


















































Number of persons registered in curative and prophylactic health institutions with diagnosis 






















 Yekaterina Shcherbakova: In the Demoskop Weekly; (No 297-98, August – September 2007) 
http://demoscope.ru/weekly/2007/0297/barom03.php (2.8.2008) 
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Figure 3. Number of all special hospitals and special policlinics; 
 including number of narcological hospitals 4 
 
 
Definition of the graphs from above:  
1. Total number of all special hospitals; (to be read from the left)  
2. Total number of special hospitals with policlinics (to be read from the left)  
3. Total number of specialised narcological hospitals (to be read from the right)  
4. Total number of specialised narcological hospitals with policlinics (to be read from the 
right)  
 
Y-Axis/left: Total number of all specialised hospitals;  Y-axis/right: Total number of all 


































Definition of the graphs from the left:  
1. Total number of all special hospitals beds; (to be read from the left)  
2. Total number of psychiatric hospitals beds (to be read from the right)  
3. Total number of narcological hospitals beds (to be read from the right)  
Y-Axis/left: Total number of all hospitals beds;  
Y-axis/right: Total number of psychiatric and narcological hospital beds; 















5Shcherbakova,Yekaterina 2007: Demoskop Weekly, (No 297-98, August – September 2007)  
http://demoscope.ru/weekly/2007/0297/barom04.php (2.8.2008) 
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Annex V:   Single-Headed Families 6 
 
 
 p 181        
 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 
Crude marriage rate (marriages per 1,000 mid-year population) 9,4 8,9 8,6 7,1 7,5 7,3 7,3 5,9 
                  
General divorce rate (per 100 marriages) 42,1 42,4 46,8 60,7 59,9 63,0 61,9 64,9 
                  
Rate of children affected by parental divorce (per 1,000 population 
aged 0-17) 11,9 11,6 13,1 14,3 15,2 15,9 15,4 12,5 
                  
Share of non-marital births (% of total live births) 13,5 14,6 16,0 17,1 18,2 19,6 21,1 23,0 

































6UNICEF. The MONEE Project. A Decade of Transition. Regional Monitoring Report. Florence: Unicef, 2001, 
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Annex VI:   Alternative Placement Capacity (in percent of 1989 level) 7 
 
 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 
Children in residential care (in 1,000s) 505 496 447 430 413 417 428 437 
p 150                 
Rate of children in residential care  
(per 100,000 population aged 0-17) 1254 1234 1116 1083 1057 1083 1133 1184 
p151                 
Rate of children in infant homes (per 100,000 population aged 0-
3) 207 210 218 237 264 290 317 337 
p151                 
Children in care of foster parents or guardians (in 1,000s) 174 171 180 191 201 226 253 278 
p152                 
Rate of children in care of foster parents or guardians (per 
100,000 pop. 0-17) 433 425 452 483 519 589 672 757 
p152                 
Gross adoption rate (per 100,000 population aged 0-3) 130 141 153 179 216 252 226 214 
         
                  
Children taken care of by others than own parents (per 100,000, 
aged 0-17) 2024 2010 1938 1982 2055 2215 2348 2492 
                  
Children taken care of beyond own parents,  



























7UNICEF. The MONEE Project. A Decade of Transition. Regional Monitoring Report. Florence: Unicef, 2001, 
150-152, http://www.unicef-irc.org/publications/pdf/monee8/eng/monee8_annex.pdf,  
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Annex VII:  Indicator Survey, KALININSKII RAION, 1995-1991; 1996-1998 8 
 
 
 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991  1996 1997 1998 
DATA ON MINORS            
Minors assessed by KDN, 
number 
842 794 880 808 669 665 572  328 546 817 
Above figures in percentage of 
1985 level 
100 % 94 % 105 % 96 % 79 % 79 % 68 %  78 % 65 % 97 % 
Of these at work  80 90 127 175 140 139 74  16 24 24 
Of these not working and not 
studying  
42 36 52 56 40 65 90  38  135 
Boys  639 623 684 652 519 523 430 
 
270 461 614 
Girls 203 171 196 156 150 142 142 
 
58 85 203 
Minors below 11 years of age 3 3 11 10  6 7 
 
6 36 46 
Minors between 11 and 14 
years of age 
138 155 152 97 80 124 110 
 
66 127 311 
Minors consuming spirits  140 149 149 115 155 167 155  82 171 76 
Above figures in percentage of 
1985 level 
100 % 106 % 106 % 82 % 111 
% 
119 % 111 %  117 % 122 % 54 % 
Minors using drugs 10 12 27 10 3 2 3  9 29 18 
Above figures in percentage of 
1985 level 
100 % 120 % 270 % 100 % 30 % 20 % 30 %  180 % 290 % 180 % 
Escapes from home/after 1996 
from TsVINP 
42 37 54 36 24 42 21  26 22 3 
Above figures in percentage of 
1985 level 
100 % 88 % 129 % 86 % 57 % 100 % 50 %  124 % 52 % 7 % 
Toxicomania          23 18 
Minors on MVD records for 
delinquency 
956 928 1047 980 881 1078 1039  1180 1099,5 951 
Above figures in percentage of 
1985 level 
100 % 97 % 110 % 103 % 92 % 113 % 109 %  123 % 115 % 99 % 
Of these are going to 
school/studying 




….working 156 194 296 301 311 314 223  118 79 54 
…not working, not studying 27 31 23 23 31 34 104  110 102 96 
Involved in   684 611 611 393 393      




Above figures in percentage of 
1985 level 
100 % 104 % 98 % 82 % 87 % 78 % 64 %  0 % 0 % 0 % 
No of cases, crime 267 260 266 287 276 255 293   0  
Above figures in percentage of 
1985 level 
100 % 97 % 100 % 107 % 103 
% 
96 % 110 %  0 % 0 % 0 % 
Total of apology, warning, 
reprimand, fee   




Employment of minors by the 
KDN referral  
 670 755 1366 1056 997 390     
Е. Placed under public 
supervision 
10 9 6 3 2 2 2     
Conditionally referred to 
correctional institutions  
0 241 239 188 130 105 86  24 34 25 
 
8 
 The material is from, KDN, Kalininskii raion ( TsGASP). 
1985-1991: Fond – 4738; Opis’ – 8; Delo -748, 795, 837, 905, 974, 1046, 113. 
The material on 1996-1998 is received directly from the administration of the raion.  
 




 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991  1996 1997 1998 
Actually referred to 
correctional institutions  
27 63 38 34 28 18 3  0 9 2 
Above figures in percentage of 
1985 level 
100 % 233 % 141 % 126 % 104 
% 
67 % 11 %  0 % 33 % 7 % 
DATA ON FAMILIES            
 Number of families on KDN 
record  
583 208 208 203 157 186 231  684 656,5 434 
Above figures in percentage of 
1985 level 
100 % 36 % 36 % 35 % 27 % 32 % 40 %  117 % 113 % 74 % 
Public reprimand 6 5 - - - - -    0 
Total compensation and fines 213 194 175 140 130 141 235  41  311 
Referred for comrade court  13 48 7 - - - -     
Number of home eviction order 38 95 4 30 14       
Families actually evicted from 
their homes 
20 29 4 14 5       
Parental insane order  32 37 26 9  1      
Number of parents found 
insane 
32 37  9  1      
No of deprivation of parental 
rights orders 
59 103 32 40 24 12 5     
Families actually derived of 
parental rights 
52 52 17 30 14 5 5     
Above figures in percentage of 
1985 level 
100 % 100 % 33 % 58 % 27 % 10 % 10 %  0 %   0 % 
Number of child removal order  9 1  11 3   24   
No of children removed from 
their families 
 7 1  11 3      
DATA ON KDN 
ORGANISATION            
Checked of educational work, 
numbers 
 9 2? Нв 15 8 2     
No of KDN sessions 
throughout the year 
28 28 26 22 20 14 16  17  32 
Educational issues analysed   2 3 2 2 1 1     
Number of inspections of child 
facilities  
27 19 25 24 12 14 6  81   
No of general preventive issues 
discussed  
 23 21 25 15 5 9 
    
Received reports on preventive 
work  
20 8 11 13 15 8 2     
No of functioning public 
inspections on minors 
7           
Shef's working with the youth  103 856 121 306 233 506 -     
Social educators available  103 671 860 618 408 99 65     
Total number of voluntary 
social workers 
206 1527 981 924 641 605 65  0 0 0 
Above figures in percentage of 
1985 level 
100 % 741 % 476 % 449 % 311 
% 
294 % 32 %  0 % 0 % 0 % 
Social educators available, in 
reserve  
23 25 26 30 20 10 -     
Clubs and activity centres 11           
Number of extra-school 
facilities 
 21          
Social teachers  66           
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Archives consulted  
 
1. Annual reports, KDN of, Kalininskii raion (Leningrad/Saint Petersburg):  
(Tsentral’nyi Gosudarstvennyi Arkhiv Sankt Petersburga - TsGASP) 
Year  Fond  Opis’  Delo 
1985  4793  8  748 
1986  4793  8  795 
1987  4793  8  837 
1988  4793  8  905 
1989  4793  8  974 
1990  4793  8           1046 
1991  4793  8           1113 
 
2. Annual reports, KDN of Kalininskii raion for the period after 1996 (to 2005) are seen in  
copies (provided by the administration of Kalininskii Raion)  
 
3. Annual reports, KDN of Oktiabrskii raion (Leningrad/Saint Petersburg):  
(Tsentral’nyi Gosudarstvennyi Arkhiv Sankt Petersburga - TsGASP) 
Year  Fond  Opis’  Delo 
1989  4914  8  205 
1990  4914  8  434 
1992  5838  1    45 
1993  5838  1    88 
 
4. Annual reports,  KDN of Leninskii raion (Leningrad/Saint Petersburg):  
(Tsentral’nyi Gosudarstvennyi Arkhiv Sankt Petersburga - TsGASP) 
Year  Fond  Opis’  Delo 
1989  4900  5  43 
1990  4900  5           108 
1991  4900  5           168 
1992/I  5835  1                104 
1993  5835  1                187 
 
5. Files from sessions of Krasnoarmeiskii KDN’s work (Leningrad/Saint Petersburg):  
(Tsentral’nyi Gosudarstvennyi Arkhiv Sankt Petersburga - TsGASP) 
1989  3539  1           947 
1990  3539  1         1033 
1991  3539  1         1072 
 
6. Consolidated annual reports, KDN of the raions and okrugs (Arkhangelsk city) of 
Arkhangelsk oblast. (Gosudarstvennyi Arkhiv Arkhangel’skoi Oblasti - GAAO) 
Year  Fond  Opis’  Delo 
1975  2063  2  2366-7 
1985  2063  2  5193-4 
1986  2063  2  5372-3 
1987  2063  2  5555-6 
1988  2063  2  5694-5 
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7. Annual reports, KDN of Oktiabrskii okrug (Arkhangelsk city):  
(Gosudarstvennyi Arkhiv Arkhangel’skoi Oblasti - GAAO) 
Year  Fond  Opis’  Delo 
1985  2063  2  5194 
1986  2063  2  5373 
1987  2063  2  5556 
1988  2063  2  5695  
 
8. Annual reports, KDN of Solombal’ski okrug (Arkhangelsk city) 
(Gosudarstvennyi Arkhiv Arkhangel’skoi Oblasti - GAAO) 
Year  Fond  Opis’  Delo 
1985  2063  2  5194 
1986  2063  2  5373 
1987  2063  2  5556 
1988  2063  2  5695 
 
9. Annual reports, KDN of Primorskii raion (Arkhangelsk oblast) 
(Gosudarstvennyi Arkhiv Arkhangel’skoi Oblasti - GAAO) 
Year  Fond  Opis’  Delo 
1985  2063  2  5194 
1986  2063  2  5373 
1987  2063  2  5556 
 
10. Annual reports, KDN of Severodvinskii raion (Arkhangelsk oblast)  
(Gosudarstvennyi Arkhiv Arkhangel’skoi Oblasti - GAAO) 
Year  Fond  Opis’  Delo 
1985  2063  2  5194 
1986  2063  2  5373 
1987  2063  2  5556 
1988  2063  2  5695 
 
11. Annual reports, KDN of Isakogorskii okrug (Arkhangelsk city)  
(Gosudarstvennyi Arkhiv Arkhangel’skoi Oblasti - GAAO) 
Year  Fond  Opis’  Delo 
1985  2063  2  5194, list 107 
1986  2063  2  5373, list150 
1987  2063  2  5556, list 159 
1988  2063  2  5695, list 107 
1992  1137  1     16 
1993  1137  1     23 
1994  1137  1     33 
1995  1137  1     40 
 
12. Annual reports, KDN of Lomonosovskii okrug (Arkhangelsk city)  
(Gosudarstvennyi Arkhiv Arkhangel’skoi Oblasti - GAAO) 
Year  Fond  Opis’  Delo 
1985  2063  2  5194, list 96 
1986  2063  2  5373, list 150 
1987  2063  2  5556, list 110 
1988  2063  2  5695, list 16 
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1992  1145  1     12 
1993  1145  1      31 
1994  1145  1      31 
1995  1145  1      31 
 
13. Annual reports, KDN of Maimaksanskii okrug (Arkhangelsk city)  
(Gosudarstvennyi Arkhiv Arkhangel’skoi Oblasti - GAAO) 
Year  Fond  Opis’  Delo 
1992  5976  1       5 
1993  5976  1     16 
1994  5976  1     20 




14. Annual reports, KDN of Varavino-Faktoria okrug (Arkhangelsk city)  
(Gosudarstvennyi Arkhiv Arkhangel’skoi Oblasti - GAAO) 
Year  Fond  Opis’  Delo 
1992  1791  1       10 
1993  1791  1       19 
1994  1791  1       32 
1995  1791  1       45 
 
 
 
